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General Aviation (GA) is a catchall term for all aircraft operations in the US that are not 
categorized as commercial operations or military flights. GA aircraft account for almost 
97% of the US civil aviation fleet. Unfortunately, GA flights have a much higher fatal 
accident rate than commercial operations. Recent estimates by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) showed that the GA fatal accident rate has remained relatively 
unchanged between 2010 and 2015, with 1566 fatal accidents accounting for 2650 fatalities.  
Several research efforts have been directed towards betters understanding the causes of GA 
accidents. Many of these efforts use National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
accident reports and data. Unfortunately, while these studies easily identify the top types 
of accidents (e.g., inflight loss of control (LOC)), they usually cannot identify why these 
accidents are happening. Most NTSB narrative reports for GA accidents are very short 
(many are only one paragraph long), and do not contain much information on the causes 
(likely because the causes were not fully identified). NTSB investigators also code each 
accident using an event-based coding system, which should facilitate identification of 
patterns and trends in causation, given the high number of GA accidents each year. 
However, this system is susceptible to investigator interpretation and error, meaning that 
two investigators may code the same accident differently, or omit applicable codes. 
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To facilitate a potentially better understanding of GA accident causation, this research 
develops a state-based approach to check for logical gaps or omissions in NTSB accident 
records, and potentially fills-in the omissions.  
The state-based approach offers more flexibility as it moves away from the conventional 
event-based representation of accidents, which classifies events in accidents into several 
categories such as causes, contributing factors, findings, occurrences, and phase of flight. 
The method views aviation accidents as a set of hazardous states of a system (pilot and 
aircraft), and triggers that cause the system to move between hazardous states. I used the 
NTSB’s accident coding manual (that contains nearly 4000 different codes) to develop a 
“dictionary” of hazardous states, triggers, and information codes. Then, I created the 
“grammar”, or a set of rules, that: (1) orders the hazardous states in each accident; and, (2) 
links the hazardous states using the appropriate triggers. This approach: (1) provides a more 
correct count of the causes for accidents in the NTSB database; and, (2) checks for gaps or 
omissions in NTSB accident data, and fills in some of these gaps using logic-based rules. 
These rules also help identify and count causes for accidents that were not discernable from 
previous analyses of historical accident data. 
I apply the model to 6200 helicopter accidents that occurred in the US between 1982 and 
2015. First, I identify the states and triggers that are most likely to be associated with fatal 
and non-fatal accidents. The results suggest that non-fatal accidents, which account for 
approximately 84% of the accidents, provide valuable opportunities to learn about the 
causes for accidents. 
Next, I investigate the causes of inflight loss of control using both a conventional approach 
and using the state-based approach. The conventional analysis provides little insight into 
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the causal mechanism for LOC. For instance, the top cause of LOC is “aircraft 
control/directional control not maintained”, which does not provide any insight. In contrast, 
the state-based analysis showed that pilots’ tendency to clip objects frequently triggered 
LOC (16.7% of LOC accidents)—this finding was not directly discernable from 
conventional analyses. 
Finally, I investigate the causes for improper autorotations using both a conventional 
approach and the state-based approach. The conventional approach uses modifiers (e.g., 
“improper”, “misjudged”) associated with “24520: Autorotation” to identify improper 
autorotations in the pre-2008 system. In the psot-2008 system, the NTSB represents 
autorotation as a phase of flight, which has no modifier—making it impossible to determine 
if the autorotation was unsuccessful. In contrast, the state-based analysis identified 632 
improper autorotation accidents, compared to 174 with a conventional analysis. Results 
from the state-based analysis show that not maintaining rotor RPM and improper flare were 
among the top reasons for improper autorotations. The presence of the “not possible” 
trigger in 11.6% of improper autorotations, suggests that it was impossible to make an 
autorotative landing. Improper use of collective is the sixth most frequent trigger for 
improper autorotation. Correct use of collective pitch control is crucial to maintain rotor 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
"The idea of a vehicle that could lift itself vertically from the ground and hover motionless 
in the air was probably born at the same time that man first dreamed of flying." 
 –Igor Ivanovitch Sikorsky 
The Greek words helix (for spiral) and pteron (for wing) led to the genesis of the French 
term hélicoptère meaning “device for enabling airplanes to rise perpendicularly”. 
Helicopters have demonstrated their operational versatility by their ability to execute 
vertical takeoffs and landings (VTOL), and hovering capability. In addition to military 
operations, helicopters have found application in multiple civilian missions including 
Emergency Medical Services (EMS), search and rescue, transport to off-shore locations, 
external load operations, law enforcement, and aerial application (including firefighting) 
missions. Since helicopter missions can often be time-critical and involve flights in 
proximity to terrain/objects, they impose demanding requirements on both crew and 
machine.  
Analysis of General Aviation (GA) accident data by several researchers and safety teams 
generally arrive at a common conclusion—Inflight loss of control (LOC) is the top cause 
for GA accidents. Harris et al. (2000) analyzed over 8000 helicopter accidents that occurred 
during 1963–1997. They found that LOC was the cause for 625 out of 5371 (approximately 
12%) accidents involving civilian helicopters. In 2010, the US Joint Helicopter Safety and 
Analysis Team (US JHSAT) selected and analyzed 523 helicopter accidents for 2000, 2001, 
and 2006 (they do not specify the reasons for selecting the aforementioned years for their 
analysis). In their analysis, they found that inflight loss of control was the top cause—
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accounting for over 41% of the accident in their dataset (US JHSAT, 2011). In a related 
study, the US Joint Helicopter Implementation Measurement Data Analysis Team (US 
JHIMDAT) analyzed 415 helicopter accidents that occurred between 2009 and 2011 (US 
JHIMDAT, 2014). Their analysis showed that inflight loss of control was not only the top 
cause, but accounted for greater proportion of accidents when compared to the US JHSAT 
study (47.5% compared to 41%). A 2012 study by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to improve GA safety termed LOC as the most frequent “defining event” in GA 
accidents. In fact, recently, we (Rao and Marais, 2015) analyzed 5051 helicopter accidents 
that occurred in the US in 1982–20081, and identified LOC as the most frequent single-
node occurrence chain.  
While all of these studies indicated that LOC was the top reason for GA (fixed wing and 
helicopter) accidents, they did not provide any information on “why” the accident-aircraft 
(and pilot) experienced loss of control.  
Despite the best efforts of airframe manufacturers, safety teams, and regulatory authorities, 
helicopter (and more generally fixed wing General Aviation (GA)) accidents continue to 
occur, often resulting in severe injury and damage consequences. The relatively high 
frequency of GA accidents (compared to commercial operation accidents) suggests that we 
(the safety community) have a limited understanding of the causes for GA accidents—
raising the question: 
Why are we not learning as much as possible from GA accidents? 
                                                 
1 The NTSB established the accident database in 1962. The database underwent a major recording overhaul 
in 1982 and another change in 2008. This thesis uses data from accidents that were recorded after 1982. 
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There could be multiple potential answers to this question. One of the reasons could be that 
the nature of GA accident investigations and reporting potentially limits our understanding 
of accident causation. A combination of the high frequency of GA accidents and limited 
investigative resources results in GA accident reports not having the same depth of 
information when compared to commercial (Part 121) accidents. Another reason for our 
limited understanding of GA accident causation could be due to the tendency to analyze 
limited datasets (e.g., specific injury severity, helicopter model) and draw conclusions from 
them. In many cases, subject matter experts use the results from these analyses to propose 
specific intervention strategies and safety enhancements. While these measures address 
specific safety concerns (e.g., developing fire-resistant fuel tanks to prevent post-crash 
fires), they do not help us better understand accident causation in a large set of accidents. 
A third possible reason for the limited understanding of GA causation could be due to the 
setup of the NTSB accident coding system.  
In this research, I focus on developing a new approach to modeling aviation accidents. This 
thesis aims to steer the accident analysis community towards a path to potentially better 
understanding accident causation. Our pursuit of reducing the number of accidents raises 
the following question: 
The NTSB database contains a wealth of data, but is not always logically complete 
and omissions—can we develop an approach that enables logical checking and 
potentially removes the omissions? 
This thesis revolves around using historical accident data to better understand aviation 
accident causation in general. I use a state-based approach to modeling aviation accidents, 
and illustrate this new approach by using historical helicopter accident data. The remainder 
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of this chapter is laid out as follows: I begin by giving the reader some relevant background 
on GA and helicopter safety (Sections 1.1 and 1.2). Then, I lay out the research goals and 
provide an outline of the thesis in Sections 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. 
1.1 What is General Aviation (GA)? 
General Aviation (GA) is a catch-all term for all aircraft operations in the US that are not 
categorized as commercial operations or military flight (Shetty and Hansman, 2012). The 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines GA operations as “as all civil 
aviation operations other than scheduled air services and non-scheduled air transport 
operations for remuneration or hire” (ICAO, 2009). In 2014, GA aircraft comprised 
approximately 97% of the US civil aviation fleet (Fala and Marais, 2016). 
In its most recent General Aviation and Part 135 Survey, the FAA (2014) estimated that 
there were 204,408 aircraft in the GA fleet—78.9% were fixed-wing aircraft, while 4.9% 
were rotorcraft. The FAA classified 12.8% of the fleet as experimental aircraft and the 
remaining 3.4% in the other (gliders and lighter-than-air) aircraft category. The GA fleet 
is composed of aircraft ranging from homebuilt aircraft that generally use steam gauges 
(e.g., Piper Cub) to state-of-the-art aircraft (e.g., Gulfstream G650) with modern avionics 
and on-board Flight Data Recorders (FDRs). 
GA operations cover a broad variety of aviation activities that include emergency air 
medical services, student pilot instructional activities, and personal use flights. Generally, 
these operations can be categorized as either local or itinerant (Shetty and Hansman, 2012). 
The FAA defines local operations as “those operations performed by aircraft that remain 
in the local traffic pattern, execute simulated instrument approaches or low passes at the 
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airport, and the operations to or from the airport and a designated practice area within a 
20−mile radius of the tower” (FAA, 2016a). Operations that involve personal flight, 
instructional activities, or aerial observation missions could be classified as local 
operations, while corporate or business flights are classified as itinerant operations 
(Shetty and Hansman, 2012).  
Table 1: Breakdown of Active GA Aircraft Based on Primary Use (FAA, 2014)  
Type of Operation Proportion of Total GA Aircraft 
Personal use 66.4 
Business  7.7 
Instructional 6.4 
Corporate 5.8 
Remaining operations (<5% each)2 13.7 
Total 100.0 
In its General Aviation and Part 135 survey, the FAA categorizes GA operations into 15 
different operation types. I grouped the 11 operation types that individually accounted for 
less than 5% of the total active GA aircraft, and placed them under Remaining Operations, 
as shown in Table 1. These operations included air taxi (3.4%), aerial observation (2.9%), 
and aerial application (1.5%). The personal use category accounted for more than two-
thirds (66.4%) of all active GA aircraft in 2014. Personal use operations typically involve 
flights by aviation enthusiasts and hobby flyers. Many GA flights involve student pilots 
operating aircraft with (or without) the supervision of certified flight instructors (CFIs). In 
2014, the FAA estimated that 6.4% of GA aircraft were used for instructional flights.  
                                                 
2 Each of the remaining 11 categories accounted for less than 2% of the total active GA aircraft. Some of the 




1.2 Vertical Flight Safety: Background and Motivation 
In the latter part of the 19th Century, the modern-day term “helicopter” was born. Historical 
literature shows (Figure 1) that efforts to build a powered lift system were well underway 
before the conception of the fixed-wing airplane (Harris, 2012). 
 
Figure 1: Timeline showing early efforts by inventors to build helicopters [adapted from 
Harris (2012)]. 
Between 1900 and 1939, several inventors and vertical flight enthusiasts experimented 
with different designs with limited success. The 1930s saw the first steps towards the 
development of the modern helicopter. In May 1940, the US Army Air Corps successfully 
test flew Sikorsky’s VS-300 helicopter. In the years that followed, the Vought-Sikorsky 
company designed helicopters such as the XR-4, which had a gross weight of 2700 lb. and 
cruised at an altitude of 5000 ft.—capturing the attention of the US Navy. Then, with the 
development of the R-4, the Department of the Interior recognized the potential of using 
helicopters in forest and wildlife management. 
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While initial development and designs were tailored for military purposes, the work of a 
few vertical flight pioneers resulted in the introduction of helicopters in the commercial 
sector. Arthur Young and Lawrence “Larry” Bell’s persistence led to the design of Bell 
Ship-1. The Bell 47, which was a derivative of the Bell Ship-1 became the first civilian 
certified helicopter in the US. Other noteworthy individuals include Charles Kaman, and 
Stanley Hiller, Jr. 
As the years progressed helicopters were used in a variety of missions including coastguard 
search and rescue, aerial application (e.g., crop dusting), law enforcement, air-taxi 
operations, and personal use. With increased use of helicopters came safety issues. Initially, 
loss of engine power, mechanical failure of on-board systems/components, and the absence 
of crash-resistant safety features were among the top reasons for helicopter accidents and 
injuries. However, the so called fly-fix-fly approach to helicopter safety has helped reduce 
the accident rate. Advancements in helicopter design, improvements in engine technology 
through the introduction of the turbine engine (which is considered more reliable than the 
piston engine), and higher standards for certification are some of the reasons that have 
helped reduce the number of accidents related to mechanical failures.  
In recent years, regulators and safety analysts have shifted their attention to better 
understanding the role of the pilots/crew and organizational influences in helicopter 
accidents. In their annually-published “Most Wanted List”, the National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) called for improvements in helicopter safety in two successive years 
(2014 and 2015). Recently, the NTSB also expressed their concern over the increasing 
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number of loss of control (LOC) accidents in General Aviation (GA) operations3. They 
highlighted the key role of pilots, operators, and ground crews in improving safety by 
implementing sound risk management practices. 
A large body of literature is dedicated to analyzing historical accident data to improve 
helicopter/GA safety. Many studies have considered helicopter risk arising from various 
sources such as pilot behavior, mechanical systems, mission types, times of operations (e.g., 
Manwaring et al., 1998; DeVoogt, et al., 2009; Dempsey et al., 2007; Atkinson & Irving, 
1995). 
Generally, historical helicopter accident analyses use limited data sets and rely on expert 
knowledge to identify key safety concerns. These studies restrict their analyses to specific 
injury severity levels (e.g., fatal accidents), mission types (e.g., emergency medical service 
flights), modes of mechanical failure (e.g., fatigue failure), or specific airframe 
manufacturers (e.g., Augusta Westland or Robinson). Some studies analyze the role of the 
operator and machine independently. Both Rasmussen (1997) and Leveson (2004) argue 
that to better understand accident causation, we (safety analysts) should focus on the 
mechanisms or factors that influence human action, and not fixate on the role of the human 
in accidents. 
Many safety working groups have focused exclusively on the causes for fatal accidents in 
fixed-wing General Aviation (GA) aircraft and helicopters. In 1997, the Helicopter 
Accident Analysis Team (HAAT) was tasked by the Safe All-Weather Flight for Rotorcraft 
                                                 
3 The NTSB’s 2015 and 2016 “Most Wanted List” call for strategies to reduce the number of Loss of Control 
(LOC) accidents in GA operations. 
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(SAFOR) program with establishing the chain of events that led to fatal accidents and to 
propose interventions that might have eliminated one or more links, thus preventing the 
accident (HAAT, 1998). They chose 34 fatal rotorcraft accidents that occurred between 
1989 and 1996, and found that poor pilot judgment was responsible (in part) for 50% of 
the accidents in their sample. Violation of flight procedure by pilots (41.2%) and 
inadequate or misdirected management oversight resulting in risk-taking by pilots (38.2%) 
were the other top problems. To reduce the number of fatal accidents, the FAA (2016) 
initiated a Rotorcraft Safety Initiative (RSI) in 2013. The goal of this initiative was to 
identify the causes for a set of fatal helicopter accidents, and come up with intervention 
strategies that could prevent “similar” fatal accidents. While the efforts of these groups 
might have helped reduce the fatal helicopter accident rate per 100,000 flight hours4, there 
continue to be fatalities—reaching a 20-year high in 2013 (44 deaths). 
Historical accident analysis techniques, in general, have sought to determine the “root 
cause” for an accident (Taylor and Adams, 1986), or establish the chain of events that 
preceded an accident. Some research explores the role of these events or occurrences5 in 
aviation accidents. Most of this research considers fixed-wing aircraft, or does not 
explicitly highlight the role of occurrence chains (or sequences of occurrences) in 
helicopter accidents (Houston et al., 2012). In an effort to better understand the proximate 
causes for helicopter accidents, I explored the different chains of occurrences and ranked 
them based on different risk perspectives (e.g., injury severity, mission types). Chapter 3 
                                                 
4 Fatal accident rate reduced from 1.43 in 2001 to 0.67 in 2014—a 53.2% reduction. 
5 The NTSB defines as an occurrence as “A distinct major event of relative significance that leads to an 
accident or incident.” 
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of this thesis presents details of this approach and the lessons learned (see also Rao and 
Marais (2015)). 
Historical accident analysis is dependent on the data reported by accident investigators. 
The value of the lessons learned from historical accident analysis is limited by the level of 
detail in accident reports. Generally, investigators collect data on accidents through 
witness/survivor interviews and examining other evidence. Assuming that all accident 
investigations receive the same amount of resources (manpower and time), accident reports 
could be a potentially rich source of information. Unfortunately, in the US, the high 
frequency of GA accidents and the lack of flight data recorders (“black boxes”) makes it 
infeasible to obtain detailed information on the causes for each accident. In many cases, 
investigators do not travel to an accident site (colloquially referred to as a “desk top” audit), 
but make a determination of the probable cause based on the data available. Some of these 
accident reports are characterized by limited information that focuses on proximal events, 
and tend to leave out less obvious contributing factors that could have yielded valuable 
insight into the accident. 
1.3 Research Goals and Thesis Outline 
Despite many years of retrospective accident analysis, helicopter (and fixed wing GA) 
accidents continue to occur frequently, often resulting in fatalities and damage to property. 
One possible reason is that we (the accident analysis community) are limiting the lessons 
learned from historical data for a variety of reasons I outlined in Section 1.2. 
This thesis aims to address the following gap: 
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The NTSB database contains a wealth of data, but is not always logically complete and 
omissions—can we develop an approach that enables logical checking and potentially 
removes the omissions? 
To address this gap, this thesis presents a multi-year analysis of historical accident data to 
better understand aviation accident causation in general, specifically helicopter accidents. 
The fundamental question can be broken down into two research questions: 
1. The current accident coding system limits our understanding of accident 
causation—can a different approach help? 
2. Can we provide a more correct count and hence a more accurate ranking of the 
causes for accidents in the NTSB database? 
To answer the above questions, this thesis develops an approach to model aviation 
accidents using a state-based approach. I use aviation accident data from the NTSB 
database to build a state-based accident model. Then, I use this model to potentially better 
understand accident causation. 
Chapter 1 provides the reader with the requisite background in fixed wing GA and 
helicopter safety. Chapter 2 is divided into two parts. The first part reviews literature on 
helicopter safety, with particular emphasis on previous work in historical accident analysis. 
The second part of Chapter 2 provides background on commonly-used aviation accident 




The first half of Chapter 3 serves as a “beginners’ guide to the NTSB aviation accident 
database”. This chapter is motivated by the fact that I, in my years researching the database, 
have not found a user-friendly guide for any first-time database user. It lays out the NTSB’s 
accident coding systems and also highlights some key issues with the data. The second half 
of Chapter 3 identifies sequences of occurrence or occurrence chains that most frequently 
ended in accidents. It presents some of the key conclusions and highlights the shortcomings 
of the chain of events approach—motivating the need for a better representation of 
historical accident data. 
Chapter 4 presents a state-based aviation accident model. I begin the chapter by providing 
definitions for the basic elements of a state-based approach. Then, I build the state-based 
model by creating a dictionary of hazardous states and triggers. After creating the 
dictionary, I provide the grammar that links hazardous states and triggers. 
In Chapter 5, I use three examples to demonstrate the application and investigate the 
potential usefulness of the state-based model. I do one high-level analysis of the 6200 
accidents in the database to identify the most frequent states and triggers—i.e., the states 
and triggers that are most likely to be associated with, or lead to, accidents. Next, I 
investigate the causal patterns associated with two of the most hazardous states—loss of 
control and improper autorotation. 
Chapter 6 summarizes the contributions of this research and provides recommendations for 
future work. 
1.4 Terminology 
This section defines the various terms that will be referred to in this thesis. 
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Accident: An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft that takes place 
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such 
persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death, or serious injury, or in 
which the aircraft receives substantial damage. 
Incident: An occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of aircraft, 
which affects or could affect the safety of operations. 
Occurrence: A distinct major event of relative significance that leads to an accident or 
incident. 
Safety: Freedom from accident or losses. 
Hazard: A state or set of conditions of a system that, together with other conditions in the 
system's environment, will lead inevitably to an accident. 
Risk: The future impact of a hazard that is not controlled or eliminated. It can be viewed 
as future uncertainty created by the hazard. It can also be defined as the likelihood and 
consequences of an accident occurring in a system. 
Risk Assessment: The process of determining the likelihood and consequences associated 
with a risk. 
Risk Management: The process that ensures that the risk is maintained at an acceptable 
level during the lifetime of a system. 
Exceedance: A deviation in a flight parameter beyond an established bound/limit (upper 
or lower), which can result in an accident. 
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Safety Event: One or more exceedances that take place concurrently along with 
parameters during a specified phase of flight and directly relate to a safety of flight 
condition. 
Fatal Injury: Any injury that results in death within 30 days of the accident. 
Serious Injury: An injury that (1) requires hospitalization for more than 48 hours, 
commencing within seven days from the date the injury was received; (2) results in a 
fracture of any bone (except simple fracture of fingers, toes, or nose); (3) causes severe 
hemorrhages, nerve, muscle, or tendon damage; (4) involves injury to any internal organ; 
or (5) involves second- or third-degree burns, or any burns affecting more than 5% of the 
body surface. 











CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the literature on helicopter safety and highlights key accident 
modeling techniques. Through this chapter, I intend to provide the reader with essential 
background on various efforts to improve helicopter safety, and some highlights from 
different approaches to modeling accidents. 
The primary emphasis of the review is on studies that have used historical accident data. 
Sections 2.2–2.4 review various accident modeling techniques that have been used to 
understand the causes for aviation accidents. Section 2.5 captures the key elements of the 
models reviewed in and summarizes their merits and shortcomings. 
2.1 A Review of GA and Helicopter Safety Literature 
A large body of research has been dedicated to improving helicopter safety through 
historical analysis of helicopter accidents. Several studies have considered helicopter risk 
arising from various sources such as pilot behavior, mechanical systems, mission types, 
and times of operations (e.g., Manwaring et al., 1998; DeVoogt, et al., 2009; Dempsey et 
al., 2007; Atkinson and Irving, 1995). Some of their recommendations to improve 
helicopter safety include better crew resource management, enhanced pilot training, fuel 
management, and frequent maintenance to ensure healthy operating components. 
Some research has explored the role of occurrences in aviation accidents. Most of this 
research considers fixed-wing aircraft, or specific events or causes in accidents (Houston 
et al., 2012). The US Joint Helicopter Safety and Analysis Team (US JHSAT) selected and 
analyzed 523 helicopter accidents for 2000, 2001, and 2006 (they do not specify the reasons 
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for selecting the aforementioned years for their analysis). They found that loss of control 
(41% of the accidents), autorotations during practice and emergency (28% of the accidents), 
and system component failure (28% of the accidents), were the top three occurrences in 
helicopter accidents in these years (US JHSAT, 2011). 
Similar to the US JHSAT’s methodology, the US Joint Helicopter Implementation 
Measurement Data Analysis Team (US JHIMDAT) analyzed 415 helicopter accidents that 
occurred between 2009 and 2011 (US JHIMDAT, 2014). They carried out a “high-level” 
statistical analysis on the selected accidents to identify differences from the US JHSAT 
analysis (again, they do not mention the reasons for focusing on 2009–2011). Compared to 
the US JHSAT results, they noted a relative increase in the proportion of loss of control 
(LOC) (47.5% compared to 41.5% in US JHSAT study) and controlled flight into terrain 
(CFIT) accidents (6.7% compared to 3.1%), while accidents associated with system 
component failure decreased. 
Some researchers analyzed accident data to identify initiating events (or first events) in 
accident chains, while other focused on “breaking” the chain of events. Harris et al. (2012) 
reviewed over 8000 US helicopter accidents from 1963 to 1997. They categorized the 
accidents based on the 21 first-event categories used by the NTSB, and identified loss of 
engine power, inflight collision with object, and loss of control as the top-three first-events. 
In 1997, the Helicopter Accident Analysis Team (HAAT) was tasked by the Safe All-
Weather Flight for Rotorcraft (SAFOR) program with establishing the chains of events that 
led to fatal accidents and to propose interventions that might have eliminated one or more 
links, thus preventing the accident (HAAT, 1998). They chose 34 fatal rotorcraft accidents 
that occurred between 1989 and 1996 and that covered a diverse range of missions and 
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equipment. Further, their report states that the sample was not representative of all (nor 
fatal) rotorcraft accidents in 1989–1996. After selecting their sample, they proceeded to 
identify “problems” (e.g., preflight planning, safety culture, or pilot training) that 
contributed to the accidents. Not surprisingly, they found that poor pilot judgment was 
responsible (in part) for 50% of the accidents in their sample. Violation of flight procedure 
by pilots (41.2%) and inadequate or misdirected management oversight resulting in risk-
taking by pilots (38.2%) were the other top problems. 
Several studies have focused on the causes for fatal accidents in fixed-wing General 
Aviation (GA) aircraft and helicopters (e.g., Conroy et al., 1992; ATSB, 2004; Li et al., 
2008; Baker et al., 2011; Bazargan and Guzhva, 2007). A study by the Australian 
Transportation Safety Board (ATSB) looked at 215 fatal Australian GA accidents between 
1991 and 2000—24.2% of which involved helicopters (ATSB, 2004). These accidents 
were generally caused by engine failure, incorrect control inputs by pilots, and low-level 
flight in proximity to objects (e.g., power lines). Li et al. (2008) developed a Fatality Index 
in Aviation (FIA) score to predict fatality risk in aviation crashes. They analyzed 44,628 
accidents, of which 7889 (18%) involved pilot fatalities. In an effort to improve the EMS 
safety record, Baker et al. (2011) focused their attention on 182 fatal EMS accidents in 
1983–2005. Crashes during the dark accounted for 56% of the accidents, while 77% of 
fatal EMS crashes happened during instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). They 
recommended improved crashworthiness and reduced operations during hazardous 
conditions to reduce fatalities.  
O’Hare et al. (2006) analyzed 190 rotorcraft accidents that occurred in New Zealand in 
1988–1994 to identify risk factors in fatal and serious-injury accidents. They reported post-
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crash fire and nature of terrain as the biggest risk factors in fatal accidents, while pilots’ 
failure to obtain weather briefings prior to flights was an important factor in serious-injury 
accidents. They added that the nature of operations (e.g., short-haul flights) and the volatile 
New Zealand weather might have exacerbated the risk associated with not getting a 
preflight weather briefing. Safety organizations and regulators have also made efforts to 
reduce the fatal helicopter accident rate. The Helicopter Accident Analysis Team (HAAT) 
chose 34 fatal rotorcraft accidents that occurred between 1989 and 1996, and found that 
poor pilot judgment was responsible (in part) for 50% of the accidents in their sample. 
Violation of flight procedure by pilots (41.2%) and inadequate or misdirected management 
oversight resulting in risk-taking by pilots (38.2%) were the other top problems. In 2013 
there were 37 fatal helicopter accidents (out of 161 total accidents)—the highest number 
of fatal accidents in a calendar year since 1994. In response to the high number of fatal 
helicopter accidents, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) started a Rotorcraft 
Safety Initiative (RSI). This initiative focused efforts only on fatal helicopter accidents. 
Their goal was to identify intervention strategies that could prevent “similar” fatal 
accidents. 
Aviation maintenance tasks are complex undertakings in which individuals perform varied 
tasks in an environment with time constraints, minimal feedback, and sometimes difficult 
ambient conditions (ICAO, 1999). Several researchers have carried out historical analyses 
of fixed wing accidents in the GA and commercial sectors (e.g., Marais and Robichaud, 
2009; Goldman et al., 2002; Tsagkas et al., 2014; Franza and Fanjoy, 2012). Marais and 
Robichaud (2009) showed that in commercial aviation, maintenance-related accidents were 
more deadly than accidents in general, and that in a maintenance-related accident, the risk 
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was dependent on the nature of the maintenance activity. Goldman et al. (2002) showed 
that 7% of GA accidents between 1988 and 1997 could be attributed at least in part to a 
maintenance-related cause or factor. Their findings revealed that the most common 
accident cause factors involved installation errors, general maintenance, and maintenance 
inspection. Tsagkas et al. (2014) identified specific factors that guided maintenance 
technicians towards alternative courses of action during maintenance activities. Franza and 
Fanjoy (2012) conducted a statistical study on the probable causes for accidents involving 
Cirrus SR20 and Piper PA28-161 aircraft. They found that mechanical malfunction (not 
specified further) accounted for 20% of the probable causes for fatal accidents in the PA28-
161 fleet. 
The human role in aircraft maintenance has received attention from multiple researchers. 
Fogarty and Saunders (2000) used the SHEL (software, hardware, environment, and 
liveware) model to classify 250 military aviation incidents in Australia between 1996 and 
1998. They reported that inadequate supervision (40.4%) by supervisors and incorrect 
procedures followed (32.0%) by maintenance personnel were the most common 
maintenance errors. Rashid et al. (2010) analyzed 58 helicopter accidents that (1) were 
exclusively maintenance related and reflected human factors issues, (2) occurred in 1995–
2005, (3) involved maintenance crew with similar training, resources, and technical 
competence, (3) and represented currently used helicopters. Unsurprisingly, they found 
that when parts failed due to unsafe maintenance actions, the failed parts were more likely 




Some studies have looked into the role of maintenance specifically in helicopter accidents. 
Haaland et al. (2009) identified 59 tour-helicopter crashes in Hawaii between 1981 and 
2008, and found that 34 (~58%) of the accidents were due to poor maintenance. Baker et 
al. (2011) investigated 178 helicopter crashes related to the oil and gas operations in the 
Gulf of Mexico in 1983–2009. Their analysis revealed that 10.3% of the accidents 
associated with mechanical malfunctions were due to maintenance errors. They found that 
critical rotorcraft systems such as main rotors and transmission systems were most often 
exposed to maintenance errors. Majumdar et al. (2009) analyzed causal factors for 237 
helicopter accidents in the United Kingdom in 1986–2005, and 54 in New Zealand in 1996–
2005. They concluded that despite improvements in the reliability of rotorcraft engines, 
engine failure continued to be one of the main causes for maintenance-related, rotorcraft 
accidents. 
In summary, I reviewed multiple historical studies that directed their efforts at improving 
GA and helicopter safety. They highlighted loss of control (LOC), controlled flight into 
terrain (CFIT), flight into poor weather, and engine failure among the top reasons for 
helicopter accidents. Researchers in these studies focused their attention on specific 
sources of helicopter accident risk such as mechanical failures, mission types, and injury 
severity. Many of these studies tended to identify “a root cause” or “an initiating event” for 
accidents. Generally, these studies lacked multi-year reviews (with the exception of 
Harris et al. (2012) and Bazargan et al. (2012)); making it difficult to discern any trends in 
accident causation. As noted earlier, many studies focused on accidents that involved 
fatalities. Comparing the causes for fatal and non-fatal outcomes could potentially yield 
valuable insight into unsafe situations during flight. 
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2.2 Literature on GA Flight Data Recorder (FDR) Data Analysis 
To improve safety levels, regulators and safety analysts called for a shift from reactive to 
proactive safety management techniques. While the former technique responds/makes 
adjustments to operations/processes after an unacceptable outcome (e.g., accident), the 
latter makes adjustments to operations/processes before anything bad happens. Flight Data 
Monitoring (FDM) provides one such avenue for proactive flight safety. Flight Operations 
Quality Assurance (FOQA) or FDM is a process in which flight data is captured and 
analyzed to improve flight operation safety. The International Helicopter Safety Team 
(IHST) defines Helicopter Flight Data Monitoring (HFDM) as “a systematic method of 
accessing, analyzing and acting upon information obtained from flight data to identify and 
address operational risks before they can lead to incidents and accidents” (IHST, 2009). 
Proactive FDM techniques rely on the collection and analyses of flight data records to 
identify hazardous patterns during flights and/or key flight parameters to monitor. 
There have been some studies on the safety of commercial operations by analyzing Flight 
Data Recorder (FDR) data. Li and Hansman (2011, 2013) used a combination of data 
mining algorithms and expert review to identify anomalies during flight, such as low 
altitude and slow speed during approach, from a set of 365 B777 flights with various 
origins and destinations. Cohen et al. (1999) and Smith et al. (2000) developed and tested 
an aircraft performance risk assessment tool. They used aircraft Quick Access Recorders 
(QAR) and Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) data to calculate the risk of 
Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) accidents from a combination of safety events. The 




While many operators in the commercial aviation sector have embraced FDM analysis, 
applying these techniques in the GA sector poses technical, economic, and operational 
challenges. Challenges include the diverse GA fleet composition, ageing GA fleet, costs of 
upgrading/retrofitting existing GA aircraft, and complex nature of GA missions (e.g., GA 
operations do not necessarily follow well-defined phases of flight like in commercial 
operations). 
Recognizing the potential safety improvements from FDR data analysis, the FAA recently 
initiated projects [Safety Analysis for General Aviation (SAGA) and Rotorcraft-Aviation 
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (R-ASIAS)] to collect and build a database of 
voluntarily-contributed FDR data.  
Initial research using GA-FDR data has shown promise (e.g., Goblet et al., 2015; Harrison 
et al., 2015, Puranik et al., 2016a; Puranik et al., 2016b). Goblet et al. (2015) highlighted 
the challenges associated with fixed wing GA operations and proposed a set of algorithms 
to identify flight phases as a first step in identifying non-nominal events (or safety events) 
during flight. In an effort to characterize unsafe behavior during the approach phase of 
flight, Fala and Marais (2016) analyzed FDR records from 23 instructional flights. They 
suggested refinements to the existing safety event definitions and called for the creation of 
pilot-friendly safety metrics. Related research by Puranik et al. (2016b) used energy 
management techniques to define a “nominal” or safe approach profile for GA aircraft.  
There has been limited research in analyzing (non-military) helicopter flight data records. 
Gavrilovski et al. (2016) used a model-based approach for safety event definitions. They 
used a lateral dynamic model along with flight data to identify potential precursors to a 
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dynamic rollover. They also developed a helicopter performance model to assess safety 
during autorotations. In this approach, they used the performance model in conjunction 
with flight data to estimate flight parameters that were not captured by the on-board FDR. 
2.3 An Overview of Accident Modeling 
Literature on accident causation and modeling is extensive, but often fragmented. This 
chapter begins by providing an overview of accident modeling. Then, I review key 
modeling theories6 that have shaped our understanding of aviation accident causation, and 
conclude this chapter by comparing and contrasting the different modeling techniques. 
Accident models help us better understand the causal mechanisms in accidents during post-
hoc analysis. They aid in depicting the relationship between causes and consequences 
(outcomes of an accident), and are frequently used as tools in understanding and assessing 
the risks associated with a system. 
Figure 2 summarizes the history and evolution of accident modeling. Initial efforts to 
understand accident causation viewed accidents as the culmination of a linear sequence of 
events. These simple linear approaches suggested that accidents could be prevented by 
eliminating any one of the causes. With time, researchers realized that accidents were more 
a combination of unsafe actions and latent (or already prevalent) hazards—resulting in 
epidemiological models. In the more recent past, researchers recognized the need for non-
                                                 
6 While this section reviews some of the models used to describe aviation accidents, it does not serve as an 
exhaustive review of the different accident causation models. The interested reader is pointed to works by 




linear accident models. These models attempt to capture the interactions between the 
different components and actors in a system (operating in a particular environment). 
 
Figure 2: Summary of accident model methods [adapted from (OHS, 2012)]. 
The Domino model proposed by Heinrich et al. (1931) in the 1940s was among the first 
accident models. This model represents accidents as a sequence of discrete events that 
occur in a particular order. Heinrich’s model falls under the category of other sequential 
event-based models such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), and 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). While these models help represent simple 
accidents, they cannot explain accidents in complex systems. 
Efforts to explain accidents in complex systems paved the way for a new class of accident 
models called epidemiological models. This class of models, as the name suggests, 
borrowed ideas from the field of medicine and disease prevention. Epidemiological models 
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attempt to explain accident causation as a combination of active and latent factors that 
come together at a particular instant of time. One of the noteworthy models of this class is 
Reason’s “Swiss Cheese Model”, which highlights the relationship between proximate 
causes and latent factors. Reason’s model is widely used by the aviation industry to explain 
accident causation. Later in this Chapter, I present the merits and shortcomings of this 
model. 
Traditional accident modeling approaches tended to focus on component or hardware 
failure, and employed the analytic reduction principle7 (Leveson, 2016). These approaches 
often failed to consider the role of human or social factors in accidents. Complex 
sociotechnical systems exhibit non-linear relationships and dynamics between components 
(technical, human, and organizational). These relationships are not captured by sequential 
or epidemiological models. A new class of models based on systems theory or systemic 
models was developed to model the behavior of complex sociotechnical systems. 
Sociotechnical models are an improvement over the sequential models because they 
describe accidents using complex networks of events rather than simple cause-effect chains. 
Some of the noteworthy systemic models include Rasmussen’s hierarchical sociotechnical 
network and Leveson’s Systems Theoretic Accident Model and Process (STAMP). 
                                                 
7 The analytic reduction principle involves: (1) breaking down the system into individual parts; (2) analyzing 




Section 1.3 describes the various traditional accident modeling approaches that viewed 
accidents as a linear combination of events. Section 1.4 presents accident models that are 
based on systems theory8. 
2.4 Linear and Epidemiological Accident Models 
2.4.1 Domino Model 
This model explains accidents as a chain of discrete events that occurred in a particular 
order. Heinrich’s Domino Theory was among the earliest event-based models. It compared 
an accident sequence to five dominoes shown in Figure 3. This model suggests that the 
social environment leads to fault of the person, which in turn is the proximate cause for 
unsafe act or condition. This unsafe act/condition leads to an accident, which results in 
injuries (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 3: Heinrich’s Domino Model of accident causation [adapted from Leveson 
(2001)]. 
This model suggests that there exists a single cause that triggered the sequence of events 
leading to the accident, and that eliminating this root cause could prevent future accidents; 
however, most accidents generally involve multiple causes. Focusing our efforts on 
eliminating a single cause might lead to missed opportunities (missing other relevant 
                                                 
8 In contrast to analytic reduction, systems theory views the system as a whole, and not as individual parts. 
One of the basic tenets of systems theory is that “the whole is greater than the sum of the individual parts. 
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causes), thereby not helping prevent future accidents. Leveson (2001) and Perrow (1984) 
cite the example of the DC-10 crash at Chicago O’Hare in 1979 to highlight the peril of 
focusing on a single cause. In this accident, the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) blamed a “maintenance-induced crack” as the reason behind the accident. 
However, the NTSB failed to identify “faulty design” as one of the reasons for the accident, 
leading to future accidents with the same design flaw. 
2.4.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
A fault tree is a logical diagram that is used to represent the relationship between a system 
failure and the causes for the failure (Qureshi, 2008). It is a deductive analysis that looks 
“backward” at the causes for an undesired event. Some of the key objectives of an FTA 
include: (1) identifying the causes of a failure; (2) expose weaknesses in the operation and 
design of the system; (3) prioritize the reason for failures; and, (4) calculating failure 
probabilities (Vesely et al., 2002). 
This technique employs Boolean logic (e.g., AND, OR gates) to analyze and model 
accidents. This technique begins by identifying an undesired event for a system, and then 
resolving the undesired event into its causes. The event is resolved until the “basic” causes 
are deduced from the logical event tree (fault tree). 
2.4.3 Chain of (Time-Ordered) Events 
The chain of events model, in which accidents are represented as a series of time-ordered 
events, is one of the most commonly used accident models. These events almost always 
include human error or mechanical failure. Unlike the domino model that considers only a 
single chain of events, the event-based model can also include multiple event sequences in 
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the form of parallel or converging chains. For example, the Multiple Events Sequencing 
(MES) model includes a time sequence of events and conditions associated with each actor 
in an accident (Benner, 1975). 
The relationship between the events in a chain of events model is generally linear, 
suggesting that a preceding event must be present in order for the subsequent event to 
happen. It is difficult (if not impossible) to capture the non-linear of accident causation in 
complex systems. This model also suffers from backward chain propagation, where the 
assignment of an initiating event can be arbitrary as it is dependent on the stopping point 
when going backward in the event chain. 
2.4.4 Swiss Cheese Model 
Reason explained accident causation in complex sociotechnical systems using an 
organizational model. The organizational view recognizes that accidents are generally not 
caused by a single error; rather they are caused by a combination of errors that occur at 
different levels of the organization. Reason (1997) describes organizational accidents as: 
Situations in which latent conditions that arise from aspects such as management decisions 
that combine adversely with local triggering events (e.g., weather) and with active failures 
(errors and/or procedural violation) committed by individuals or teams at the sharp end of 




Figure 4: Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model [adapted from Reason (1998)]. 
This model represents the safeguards (or defences) as layers of cheese that are 
superimposed over each other as shown in Figure 4. The holes in the defences arise due to 
either latent9 (e.g., decision made by designers) or active failures (e.g., slips, fumbles, 
violations). Accidents occur when the holes in the different layers of cheese line up—
releasing the accident trajectory. 
Unlike the chain of events model, which focuses on error events in a chain leading up to 
the accident, the Swiss cheese model focuses on the system’s role in accident occurrences 
and prevention. The preventive measures from the Swiss cheese model include changes to 
the operating conditions, organizational decisions, system configurations, and improving 
the defences against accidents. 
                                                 
9 Latent conditions are sometimes referred to as “resident pathogens”. These pathogens arise from 
decisions made by management, designers, or builders. These latent pathogens may remain dormant 




Despite wide application of Reason’s model, there are also many criticisms of the model 
(Dekker, 2002; Qureshi, 2008; Luxhoj and Kauffeld, 2003; Shappel and Wiegmann, 2000). 
Multiple researchers (Shappel and Wiegmann, 2000; Dekker, 2002) suggested that the 
model does not describe in sufficient detail the nature of the holes in the Swiss cheese. 
Luxhoj and Kauffeld (2003) stated that the inability of the model to account for the 
interrelationship between the different causal factors reduced the practical significance of 
the model—a view echoed by Shorrock et al. (2003). Saleh et al. (2013) suggested that the 
frequent use of the Swiss cheese metaphor might have resulted in a flawed understanding 
of accident causation. They added that Reason’s model might have contributed to a false 
impression that an accident sequence is instantaneous (when the holes line-up) and does 
not progress in jerks, which is often the case. Young et al. (2004), while not advocating 
discarding the model, called for increased awareness among investigators about the 
applicability of the model and to not adhere to it “dogmatically”. This model does not help 
better understand an accident—for example, why did the holes form, or why did the holes 
line up (even if in jerks). All it really does is explain why things can be wrong (the holes) 
and yet nothing bad happens (the holes have not lined up yet). 
2.4.5 Human Factors and Classification System (HFACS) 
Building on the model proposed by Reason, Shappel and Wiegmann (2000) developed the 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification system. They used this system to not only 
categorize unsafe acts by the human operators at sharp end of the accident, but to describe 




Figure 5: Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) [adapted from 
(Shappel and Wiegmann, 2001)]. 
Unsafe acts are the lowest level of the framework. Unsafe acts can be broken down into 
errors or violations. Errors represent the activities that fail to achieve the intended outcome, 
and violations refer to the disregard for rules and regulations (Shappel and Wiegmann, 
2001). The further classify errors as decision-based, skill-based, and perceptual errors. 
Violations are classified as routine (or habitual) and exceptional (or one-off). To illustrate 
the difference between the two types of violation, Shappel and Wiegmann provide the 
example of motorist violating speed limits. They state that driving at 64 mph in a 55 mph 
speed zone, while considered a violation, is acceptable to the authorities. However, driving 
at 105 mph in a 55 mph zone is a gross violation (of an isolated nature) of the speed limit, 
and is unacceptable to the authorities. 
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Preconditions for unsafe acts constitute the second level of the HFACS framework. As the 
name suggests, this level identifies substandard operating conditions and poor practices 
followed by the operators.  
The third level, unsafe supervision, highlights supervisory shortcomings and their 
influence on safety. Unsafe supervision is further classified as: (1) inadequate supervision; 
(2) planned inappropriate operations (e.g., overworking employees); (3) failure to correct 
problem; and, (4) supervisory violations. Supervisory violations occur when the 
management is aware of an existing problem, but it chooses to disregard the rules and 
continue operations. 
The top most level of the HFACS framework is used to identify organizational influences. 
This level can be broken down into resource management, organizational climate, and 
organizational process. The framework shows that the decision and policies of the upper 
management percolate down to the lower levels. Incorrect handling of resources (monetary, 
equipment, and human), improper use of authority (or failure to claim responsibility), and 
insufficient safety management can result increased organizational risk. 
2.5 Systemic Accident Models 
Accident models based on systems theory are termed systemic models. One of the key 
differences between systemic and epidemiological/sequential accident models is that the 
former attempts to describe an accident as a complex network of human-machine 
interaction while the latter represents accidents as a simple cause-effect sequence. Some 
noteworthy systemic accident models are Rasmussen’s (1997) hierarchical socio-technical 
framework (and Accimap) and Leveson’s (2004) systems theoretic accident modeling and 
process (STAMP). Some accident models such as Hollnagel’s (1998 and 2004) Cognitive 
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Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) and Functional Resonance Accident 
Modeling (FRAM) focus on human performance and cognitive abilities while operating 
complex systems. 
2.5.1 Rasmussen’s Socio-Technical Framework and AcciMap Method 
Rasmussen developed a systems-based framework that modeled different levels of a 
system (e.g., government, regulators, organization, management, staff, and work). He 
considered system safety as a property that emerges from the various interactions between 
the different levels of the system. 
 
Figure 6: Rasmussen’s risk management framework [adapted from Rasmussen (1997)]. 
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Figure 6 shows the hierarchical model of this socio-technical model used in risk 
management. Level-1 represents the government, which controls safety through legislation. 
Level-2 represents the regulators who implement the legislations prescribed by the 
government. Level-3 describes the activities of a company, while level-4 represents the 
company management and the decisions that influence the working of their employees/staff. 
Levels 5 and 6 represent the actions taken by company staff when working with 
machines/technology, and the application of engineering disciplines in designing the 
machines, respectively. The arrows represent the flow of information between the different 
levels. According to this framework, a system can operate safely when legislations, 
regulations, and decisions made at the higher levels of the system are reflected through the 
actions of employees. Similarly, information about the system at the staff level should flow 
up the hierarchy to inform decisions taken at the higher levels. 
Figure 6 also shows that various environmental stressors can affect different levels of the 
system at any instant of time. For the system to remain safe, the different levels would need 




Figure 7: Rasmussen and Svedung’s AcciMap model for analyzing accidents [adapted 
from Underwood and Waterson (2014)]. 
Rasmussen and Svedung (2002) developed AcciMap as a control theory-based systems 
thinking approach to modeling accidents (Underwood and Waterson, 2014). Accimap 
provides a graphical representation of the failures in a system, and the actions/decisions 
that precipitated the failures. It combines the cause-consequence chart and risk 
management framework (Rasmussen, 1997). Investigations that use Accimap (Figure 7) 
generally focus on six organizational levels: (1) government policy and budgeting; (2) 
regulatory bodies and associations; (3) local area government, company management 
planning and budgeting; (4) technical and operational management; (5) physical processes 
and activities; and (6) equipment and surroundings. 
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2.5.2 System-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Process (STAMP) 
 
Figure 8: Hierarchical safety control structure in the STAMP model [adapted from 
Leveson (2004)]. 
Leveson (2004) proposed the Systems-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Process (STAMP) 
to analyze accidents using a systems theory approach (Figure 8). This approach views 
system safety as a control problem where an accident is caused due to failed enforcement 
of safety-related constraints at various levels of a socio-technical system. This model can 
also help demonstrate how complexity within a system influences events leading up to an 
accident (Underwood and Waterson, 2014)10. 
STAMP helps provide a description of a system’s control structure, and helps identify 
failures in the different levels of the system that contributed to the accident. As shown in 
Figure 7, the STAMP model has a system development and system operations control 
                                                 
10 The interested reader is directed to Underwood and Waterson (2014) for a more comprehensive application 
of the STAMP model. They compared and contrasted multiple accident models while analyzing the Grayrigg 
rail accident that occurred in the UK in 2007. 
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structure. Leveson (2004) gives the example of an aircraft manufacturer to explain the 
working of the model. While the aircraft manufacturer has the development of the system 
under its control, system operation is the domain of the aircraft operator (e.g., airline). 
Leveson added that system safety could be achieved by interaction between the two control 
structures (as depicted in the lower half of Figure 8)—by designing safety into the system, 
and by correct operation. This model facilitates iterative improvement of safety through a 
dialogue between manufacturers and operators. The manufacturers communicate some of 
the assumptions about the operating environment, and the operators provide feedback 
about the system’s performance in the actual environment.  
2.5.3 Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) 
Hollnagel (1998) proposed CREAM as a practical approach to analyze the cognitive 
performance of a human operator, predict the probability of an error by the operator, and 
assess the consequences on the system. It can also be used for retrospective analysis of 
accidents. This technique comprises a human error classification scheme and a model. 
CREAM employs the Contextual Control Model (COCOM), which focusses on the actions 
that are chosen by an operator (Figure 9). The four control modes that are specified by the 
control model are: (1) scrambled; (2) opportunistic; (3) tactical; and, (4) strategic. A 
comprehensive description of these control modes can be found in Hollnagel (1998, pp. 
155–157). COCOM assumes that an operator has variable degrees of control over his 
actions, and that the level of operator performance is directly proportional to the degree of 




Figure 9: The Contextual Control Model (COCOM) [adapted from Hollnagel (1998)]. 
This approach allows for the classification of human action into groups that help describe 
the phenotypes (error mode) and genotypes (causes)11 of these actions. There are eight 
observable phenotypes in CREAM (i.e., timing, duration, sequence, object, force, direction, 
distance, and speed), which can be further divided into four sub-groups that further describe 
the nature of the erroneous action. It classifies the phenotypes of causal mechanisms into 
either individual, technological, or organizational. In addition to the error modes and their 
                                                 
11 Hollnagel (2016) describes phenotypes as the observable forms of erroneous actions, while genotypes refer 
to the mechanism for erroneous actions. Saleh et al. (2010), in their review of accident literature, state that 
phenotypes represent threshold-based classification of accidents (e.g., based on severity), while the accident 
genotype represents the fundamental mechanism of an accident. Both sets of authors agree that while 
phenotypes are observable, genotypes can only be inferred. 
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underlying causes, CREAM uses a set of common performance conditions (CPC) that help 
the investigator/analyst describe the context in which the erroneous action was carried out. 
2.5.4 Functional Resonance Accident Modeling (FRAM) 
Building on the work in CREAM, Hollnagel (2004) proposed the Functional Resonance 
Accident Modeling (FRAM) technique in 2004. This technique attempts to describe 
variability in human performance using the idea of functional resonance. Hollnagel 
suggests that successes and failures do not result from actions that are fundamentally 
different. He adds that while the outcomes might be different, the underlying process does 
not necessarily change. He argues that success and failure are emergent phenomena that 
result from human performance variability while performing these actions. A combination 
of the variabilities in different functions could reinforce (or resonate) the variability in a 
specific function. 
A FRAM-based analysis consists of four steps: (1) identifying key system functions and 
characterize the functions using six basic parameters12; (2) use a checklist to identify 
potential variability; (3) identify dependencies between the different functions and define 
functional resonance; and, (4) suggest potential barriers and performance monitoring 
strategies. 
This technique helps provides a better understanding of the working of a complex socio-
technical system. It does not specify the characteristic of each component in the system, 
thereby avoiding the tendency of “identifying a solution for each cause” (Hollnagel, 2016). 
                                                 
12 The six basic parameters are obtained from the Structured Analysis and Design Technique (SADT). They 
are: (1) inputs; (2) outputs; (3) resources; (4) controls/constraints; (5) preconditions; and, (6) time. Hollnagel 
(2013) provides detailed explanation of each of the parameters. 
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One of the major shortcomings of this approach is that it is time-intensive. The qualitative 
nature of the FRAM analysis raises questions about the applicability of this approach in 
quantifying failure; for example, the probability of a component failing.  
2.6 State-based Accident Modeling 
State-based models find their origins in finite state machines. State-transition diagrams 
have been extensively used in the software domain to develop and understand software 
interfaces, and interactive systems. Harel (1987) introduced the statechart formalism to aid 
with the design of complex discrete-event systems. Statecharts extended the capabilities of 
finite state machines by avoiding the “exponential blow-up” problem—a scenario where 
the number of possible states for a system grows exponentially. 
 
Figure 10: Generic state-based representation of a system. 
Figure 10 shows a generic state-based representation of a system. States are segments of 
time wherein a system exhibits a particular behavior. Control theory literature (Chen, 1995) 
defines “the state of a system at time 𝑡0 is the information at 𝑡0 that, together with the 
input 𝑢(𝑡), for 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0, determines uniquely the output 𝑦(𝑡) for all 𝑡 ≥ 𝑡0.” The nodes in 
Figure 10 represent the different system states. The arrow at the top of each node represents 
a possible “default or start state” for a system. Triggers occur at precise instants of time 
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and cause a system to transition between states. The links with arrows represent state 
transitions. A system can transition between states or self-transition, where it goes back to 
the same state. In Chapter 4, I provide a detailed explanation of a state-based model applied 
to historical accident data. 
Some researchers have used state-based approaches to model system safety (e.g., Ariss et 
al, 2010; Reif et al., 2010; Landry et al., 2009; and Jian, 2011). In an effort to integrate 
fault trees into statecharts, Reif et al. (2000) used the example of a radio-controlled railway 
crossing. They suggested that fault trees and statechart models of a system should be 
constructed separately; however, the construction of both models should be interdependent. 
Building on this work, Ariss et al. (2010) successfully integrated fault trees and statecharts. 
They provided a set of state-transitions rules to model the logic gates that appear in fault 
tree analysis (FTA). They demonstrated their approach by modeling the failure of gas 
burner unit.  
Favaro’ and Saleh (2016) used a control-theoretic approach to model system safety. Their 
research used a state-space formalism to model the dynamics of a system. They defined set 
of equations that modeled the different states of a system (over a period of time), and used 
this information (about the states) to identify and monitor the “hazard levels” of the system, 
and to develop a “time-to-accident” metric.  
Some studies have applied a state-based approach to model air traffic safety (e.g., Landry 
et al., 2009; Jian, 2011). Landry et al. (2009) modeled human-integrated systems to using 
modified statecharts. They defined safety of the system as the ability of an agent (human 
or automated) in the system to control the state of the system such that it does not reach an 
“undesirable” or “unsafe” state. To make the distinction between states from which a 
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system cannot recover (e.g., midair collision) and their precursor states (e.g., loss of 
separation), they termed the unrecoverable states as unsafe and the precursor states as 
undesirable. They leveraged the orthogonal 13  property of statecharts to represent the 
current and future states of a system. They specified a set of conditions, which when 
satisfied, permitted the transition from one state to another. In addition to developing a 
predictive model, the researchers demonstrated the capability of their approach to be used 
with conventional reliability-based calculations. 
2.7 Summary 
In this chapter, I reviewed several key accident models; many of these models have been 
used to analyze aviation accidents. This section summarizes the different accident models 
presented in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. Table 2 serves as a quick reference guide on the 
characteristics, merits, and shortcomings of different accident model. 
Table 2: Summary of Accident Models 
Accident Model Description Shortcomings 
Domino model 
(Heinrich, 1931) 
Describes accidents as a 
sequence of five factors 
including social environment, 
personnel fault, unsafe 
conditions or actions, and injury.  
 Suggests that accidents result from 
a single cause 
 Attributes accidents to human error 
or failure 
                                                 
13 Harel (1987) defines the orthogonal property of statecharts as being in a state where the system must be in 
all of its AND components. In other words, if a system state A can be divided into two components C and D, 
then the system can enter state A only if enters each of the components C and D. The interested reader is 
directed to Harel (1987, pp. 242–250) for a more comprehensive explanation. 
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Accident Model Description Shortcomings 
Chain of events  
Describes accidents as a 
sequence of time-ordered events. 
It considers human and 
mechanical failure. Accidents 
can be represented by multiple 
chains. 
 Linear model which suggests that 
the preceding event needs to be 
present for the subsequent event to 
happen 
 Assumes that “breaking the chain” 
by eliminating one of the events 
(links) can prevent an accident 
 The assignment of an initiating 
event can be arbitrary as it is 
dependent on the stopping point 
when going backward in the event 
chain 
Fault Tree Analysis 
A deductive method to identify 
the most basic causes for an 
accident. It represents an 
accident by a tree diagram that 
uses Boolean logic. 
 Assumes linear relationship 
between causes and accident 
 Fault trees can get large and 
complicated for a large system 
 Difficult to apply to systems/sub-
systems that can operate with partial 
failure  
Swiss Cheese model 
(Reason, 1998) 
An epidemiological model that 
represents that barriers between 
a hazard and accident by slices 
of Swiss cheese. The holes in the 
cheese slices represent the latent 
conditions (or resident 
pathogens). An accident occurs 
when the holes in the cheese 
align. 
 No clear description of the holes in 
the cheese, or when and why they 
appear 
 Incapable of identifying relationship 
between the different causes 
 Can lead to misinterpretation that 




System-based framework where 
risk management is viewed as 
control problem where injuries 
and damage result from a loss of 
control of the physical process. 
It is difficult to establish a fixed 
procedure in a dynamic 
environment. Accidents take 
place when there is a loss of 
control at the safety boundary 
 This model is qualitative in nature. 
It does not provide mathematical 
basis for predictive analysis 
 Relies on detailed information in 
accident reports 




Accident Model Description Shortcomings 
STAMP  
(Leveson, 2004) 
A system-theoretic approach that 
uses elements of Rasmussen’s 
model. Views system safety as a 
control problem where an 
accident is caused due to failed 
enforcement of safety-related 
constraints at various levels of a 
socio-technical system. 
 Dependent on detailed information 
from accident reports 
 Qualitative model that makes it 
difficult to apply techniques to large 




Hollnagel developed CREAM to 
model human performance, and 
potentially predict the 
probability of an error being 
committed. This model focuses 
more on the impact of human 
performance on a system, and 
does not consider technical 
aspects. This model can be 
applied to qualitative and 
quantitative analyses. 
 Can be complicated and time 
consuming to implement 
 Does not suggest remedial measures 
to improve human performance  
 Requires domain-specific 




FRAM is a qualitative accident 
model that attempts to describe 
variability in human 
performance using the idea of 
functional resonance. It helps 
develop a better understanding 
of the working of a complex 
socio-technical system 
 Qualitative approach that can be 
highly time consuming 
 This model does not allow for 
conventional probabilistic failure 
analysis—focuses on likelihood of 











CHAPTER 3. NTSB ACCIDENT DATABASE AND 
OCCURRENCE CHAINS 
This chapter discusses the NTSB’s accident database and the use of occurrence chains to 
understand accident causation. Most helicopter accident research focuses on single root 
causes or most frequent causes for accidents. In this chapter, I attempt to better leverage 
the information in the accident database by identifying the “stories” (or trajectories) 
associated with each accident. Sequences of occurrences (or occurrence chains) represent 
these accident trajectories. Specifically, I seek an answer to the following question: 
Can we learn more about GA accident causation by counting and comparing these 
occurrence chains? 
The first part of this chapter serves as a quick guide to the NTSB’s accident recording 
system for the past three decades. I also present some of the key issues that analysts should 
bear in mind during their analyses (and the conclusions that are drawn). The second part of 
this chapter explores the concept of occurrence chains in helicopter accidents14. I present 
key results and important lessons learned. 
3.1 Layout of Accident Database 
The NTSB established a publicly-available accident database in 1962 15 . Accident 
investigators enter accident investigation data in a coded format using an automated data 
entry system (NTSB, 2002). Major revisions were made to the database in 1982, adding 
                                                 
14 This chapter builds and expands on the work presented in Rao and Marais (2015). 
15 Accidents that occurred before 1982 are beyond the purview of this thesis. The interested reader is directed 
to Robichaud (2012) for a description of the NTSB database in 1962–1982. 
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additional features that aided in better describing accidents. The NTSB records accident 
information on their database, which includes fields related to aircraft type, geographic 
location of accidents, phases of flight, severity of injuries and damage, crew details, and 
type of maintenance. In addition to coded information, the database also contains accident 
narratives, which could potentially provide additional insight into accidents. 
The NTSB uses occurrences to summarize the events leading up to the accident. They 
define an occurrence as a distinct major event of relative significance that leads to an 
accident or incident (NTSB, 1998). Figure 11 summarizes the NTSB accident recording 
system. Accident reports place each occurrence in a sequence (occurrence chain) leading 
up to the accident. In general, the final occurrence in a chain can be interpreted as the 
accident—that is, each preceding occurrence still leaves a possibility (though it may be 
remote), of escaping without injury or damage. 
 
 
Figure 11: Summary of the NTSB accident recording system. 
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To record the findings (why the accident happened) for each accident, the NTSB uses 
subject codes and modifiers. The subject codes are designated as causes, factors, or events 
in accidents. For accidents with multiple causes and factors, the NTSB has no provision to 
show the magnitude of each cause or factor with respect to the others, reflecting the 
difficulty in assigning proportional blame. 
The NTSB produces factual and probable cause reports (usually available online in pdf 
format) for each accident, and also provides a coded summary in a searchable database 
format. The probable cause report provides a brief synopsis of the accident and the probable 
cause statement. The factual report generally provides more detail such as pilot experience 
and aircraft airframe hours accompanied (usually) by a prose account of the accident. 
3.1.1 Old System (1982–2008) 
Until 2008, NTSB investigators could choose from 54 occurrence codes, 1597 subject 
codes, and 470 modifier codes to provide summaries of accidents (Figure 11). The NTSB 
used five-digit subject codes accompanied by four-digit modifiers to represent the key 
findings in accidents. The NTSB classified these subject codes into four sections to 
describe the nature of the findings (Table 3). NTSB-Sections IA and IB are used to list the 
primary events/findings that led to the accident. NTSB-Sections II and III are used to 
further define or explain the primary events or findings. 
Table 3: NTSB Accident Classification 1982–2008 (NTSB, 1998) 
Category Examples 
IA—Primary non-person related findings  
Aircraft Structure Control surfaces, rudder, fuselage, landing gear 
Aircraft System Autopilot, hydraulic systems 
Power plant 
Bleed air system, compressor assembly, fuel 
system 
Miscellaneous aircraft/equipment Lights, coolant, fuel, lavatory 




Miscellaneous publication Aircraft manuals, charts and other manuals 
IB—Primary person-related findings  
Aircraft/equipment performance 
Autopilot, communication equipment, navigation 
instruments 
Operations/ATC/Maintenance 
Missed approach, aircraft control, compensation 
for wind 
II—Direct underlying events 
Inadequate design, inadequate training, 
physiological conditions 
III—Indirect underlying events 
Inadequate surveillance of operation, insufficient 
standards 
 
To illustrate the NTSB accident coding system, consider a maintenance-related accident 
from March 2007, when a Bell 206L-1 on an air-taxi mission lost engine power during 
cruise. The investigation findings blamed the accident on incorrect installation of the 
engine fuel line fitting by maintenance personnel (NTSB ID: DFW06FA083). Table 4 
provides a breakdown of the corresponding subject codes and modifiers used to explain 
this accident in the database. 
Table 4: Illustration of NTSB Accident Coding in 1982–2008 
Numeric Code NTSB Classification Description 
24111 Subject Code Maintenance, Installation 
3109  Modifier Improper 
4108 Personnel Modifier Other maintenance personnel 
 
NTSB investigators place occurrences in a sequence leading up to the accident. They use 
three digit codes ranging from “100: Abrupt Maneuver” to “430: Miscellaneous/Other”.  
3.1.2 Current System (2008–Present) 
In 2008, the NTSB began recording accidents using a new coding system. In place of the 
subject codes, the NTSB introduced ten digit findings codes, which ranges from 
“01000000XX: Aircraft handling/service” to “05000000 XX: Not determined”. The last 
two digits “XX” represent the modifier codes.  
49 
 
For example, consider an accident involving a Robinson R-44 II in June 2012. During a 
cherry-drying operation near Wenatchee, WA, the pilot maneuvered close to power lines 
(NTSB ID: WPR12LA259). The main rotor impacted the power lines, and the helicopter 
crashed into the trees. The pilot was seriously injured and the helicopter sustained 
substantial damage. The pilot’s failure to maintain clearance from the power lines was one 
of the causes for the accident; given by the findings code 0106201220. Table 5 shows the 
breakdown of the findings code. To facilitate clarity, we will refer to findings codes as 
subject codes in the remainder of this document. 
Table 5: Illustration of NTSB Breakdown of Findings Code in 2008–Present 
Findings Code NTSB Classification Description 
0106201220 Category  Aircraft 
0106201220 Subcategory  Operation/performance/capability 
0106201220 Section  Performance/control parameters 
0106201220 Subsection  Altitude 
0106201220 Modifier Not attained/maintained 
 
In the post-2008 system, the NTSB replaced the three-digit occurrence codes with six-digit 
codes. The first three digits correspond to the phase of flight, and the last three digits 
represent an “event”. Consider for example the code 500240, where the first three digits 
(500240) indicate approach phase of flight, while the last three digits (500240) represent 
loss of control inflight. To facilitate ease of understanding and continuity with the old 




3.2 Issues with Accident Data 
Multiple data issues should be borne in mind while analyzing NTSB accident data, and 
arriving at conclusions about accident causation. I highlight here some of the key issues 
associated with the data. These issues include incomplete or inconsistent data entries in the 
database, lack of information about the current coding system, subjectivity in probable 
cause determination, and inconsistency in published accident narratives. I highlight 
relevant data issues while presenting analysis results. 
3.2.1 Lack of Consistency in Data Entries 
Inconsistent entry of data fields is one of the major issues in the accident database. The 
absence of information in many cases impedes accident trend analysis. Consider for 
example aircraft “airframe hours”. Airframe hours help estimate the amount of time an 
aircraft has been in service16. Consistent reporting of airframe hours could potentially help 
correlate airframe-related failures and flying time17. Unfortunately, the NTSB does not 
report airframe hours in each accident. Potential reasons including inaccessible 
maintenance records and/or pilot logs. 
3.2.2 Changes in Accident Recording System 
The NTSB changed its accident recording system twice: first in 1982, followed by the 
transition to the current system in 2008. While the transition to the current coding system 
provides additional capabilities to the analyst (e.g., creation of a CFIT occurrence), it also 
                                                 
16 Some of the common methods of estimating airframe hours include: (1) using pilot log books to calculate 
the amount of flying time accrued by the aircraft; (2) referring to maintenance logs, which base their 
information on tachometer readings and pilot logs; and in some cases, (3) using an “air hobbes” that activates 
only when the aircraft is off the ground. 
17 Note that since the NTSB does not record the year of manufacture of an aircraft, it is generally difficult to 
determine the age of the aircraft at the time of the accident. 
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presents some challenges. One of the issues involves the deletion of fields from the 
previous version of the database. For example, in the old system the NTSB represented 
US-registered aircraft by the USUS code. This code is no longer used in the current 
system—making it challenging to identify aircraft that are registered in the US. 
Another challenge with the current system involves the information lost during the 
transition away from five-digit subject codes to 10-digit findings codes. The absence of a 
“map” (correspondence between codes in the old and new system) creates a “gap” or 
discontinuity while reporting results. During my review of multiple historical accident 
studies, I noticed that many studies restricted their analysis to either pre-2008 accidents or 
considered only accidents post-2008. This problem (absence of a map) is further 
exacerbated by the absence of a coding manual for the new system18. 
3.2.3 Subjectivity in Recording Accident Details 
It is worthwhile to take a moment here to consider the levels of information available to 
investigators and analysts, as shown in Figure 12. First, the accident itself has all the 
requisite detail, by the very fact that it occurred. Second, a smaller subset of information is 
available to investigators, because we cannot possibly know every single detail of the 
accident. Third, it is possible that the investigators do not obtain all the theoretically 
available information about the accident. For example, a witness may know something 
about the accident, but that witness might not be found and questioned. At the same time, 
the witness is putting their own interpretation on what they experienced, further 
                                                 
18 Unlike the pre-2008 system, the NTSB does not provide a detailed manual of how accidents are recorded 
in the current system. Information for the post-2008 system can be found in the dictionary table in 




obfuscating the true nature of the accident. Fourth, the investigators may not record every 
piece of information in their narrative, while simultaneously putting their interpretation on 
the findings. And finally, the investigators might not code all the information into the 
database. 
 
Figure 12: Levels of information available to accident investigators and safety analysts. 
3.2.4 Inconsistency in Accident Narratives 
Generally, each accident is accompanied by a detailed factual report and a synopsis or brief 
report. The brief reports contain information on the occurrences, subject codes and 
modifiers, and the causes and contributing factors to accidents. They also include a 
probable cause statement that summarizes the NTSB’s accident findings in a couple of 
lines. In contrast, the factual reports include a history of flight narrative that gives the reader 
some background on the events leading up to the accident. The factual reports also include 
information on personnel (e.g., age, experience, medical certificate, and ratings held by 
pilots); aircraft (e.g., owners, serial numbers, powerplant models, and airframe hours); 
meteorological information (e.g., wind, ceiling); airport or landing site; and wreckage and 
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impact information. In addition to the narratives, they include details on the nature of 
operations (e.g., personal use, aerial application), levels of damage (e.g., destroyed, 
substantial), and names of investigation personnel. These accident reports could potentially 
yield valuable insight into accidents; however, not all accidents have factual reports, and 
for those that do, the level of details varies significantly19. 
Table 6: Summary Statistics of Factual and Brief Accident Reports 
Type of Report 
Pre-2008  
(Accident Count = 5198)20 
Post-2008 
(Accident Count = 982) 
Count Mean SD Count Mean SD 
Factual 2769 730 904 982 806 1071 
Brief 5198 128 90 964 200 157 
 
Table 6 summarizes the availability of factual reports in the database. The count indicates 
the number of accidents that had factual reports with a “non-zero” word count. Only about 
half (53.3%) of pre-2008 accidents had factual reports with information in them. The large 
standard deviation (904.3) suggests varying levels of detail in the reports. It is encouraging 
to note that every accident in 1982–2008 had a brief report; providing potential learning 
opportunities. In contrast to 1982–2008, all 982 helicopter accidents post-2008 had factual 
reports. These reports also had large variation in their level of detail. Comparing the 
average factual report lengths for pre and post-2008 accident (t-test at significance level 
5%) reveals a statistically significant difference. However, further investigation of the 
                                                 
19 The interested reader is directed to Leveson (2001, pp. 13–18) for a comprehensive discussion regarding 
the use of accident reports and potential limitations. 
20 Note that there were 43 midair collision that involved 63 helicopters. Therefore, the total number of 
(helicopters in) accidents is 5218 for 1982–2008.  
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effect size21 reveals that difference between the mean report lengths is marginal. In other 
words, the average lengths of the reports did not change over the two time periods. 
3.3 Features of Accident Dataset 
The accident dataset analyzed in this thesis consist of all civil helicopter accidents that 
occurred in the US in 1982–2015. The dataset contains 6200 helicopter accidents—5218 
accidents were recorded (by the NTSB) under the old system (1982–2008), while the 
remaining 982 were recorded under the current system (2008–present). Fatal accidents 
accounted for 16.2% (1005 out of 6200) accidents. 
Figure 13: Helicopter accident trends between 1982 and 2015. The grey markers 
represent the years that still have ongoing accident investigations. 
Figure 13 shows a decreasing trend for the number of helicopter accidents each year. The 
drop in the number of accidents after 2013 is primarily due to the number of ongoing 
accident investigations. As expected, the number of accidents under investigation is higher 
for more recent years (Table 7).  
                                                 
21 Comparing the means using a t-test at a 5% significance level suggests a statistically significant difference. 
The Cohen’s d value is ~0.08—indicating that the difference between the means is trivial. 
55 
 
Table 7: Accident Year and Number under Investigation 
Year 
Accidents still under investigation 
(% of total accidents that year) 
2012 1 (0.6%) 
2013 3 (2.0%) 
2014 36 (25.3%) 
2015 69 (53.1%) 
3.4 Occurrence Chains: Do They Tell the Full Story? 
This section presents a method to identify high-risk occurrence chains (or sequence of 
occurrences) using historical accident data. This method uses a frequentist approach to 
calculate the presence of various occurrence chains in helicopter accidents that occurred in 
the US between 1982 and 2008. The chains are ranked for different injury severity levels 
and mission types.  
3.4.1 Approach to Identifying High Risk Occurrence Chains 
Risk is essentially a combination of the probability and consequences of a given set of 
events. We usually refer to risk by one or a combination of these dimensions. For example, 
we refer to the chance of winning a lottery (probability), the potential areas impacted by a 
hurricane (consequences), or the expected number of motor vehicle accident fatalities in a 
year (probability times consequence). 
In the case of accidents, the consequences are always negative; that is, there is no “upside” 
risk, as there may be in, for example, financial transactions. For accidents, we usually 
interpret consequences in terms of loss of life, injury, and loss of property. We may, for 
example, refer to the number of fatalities associated with rotorcraft firefighting efforts in a 
given year. When considering populations, or accidents during a particular time period or 
in a particular area, we also interpret consequences using simple or normalized counts. For 
example, we may track trends in the number of accidents per year in a particular region, 
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and we might normalize this number by flight hours. It is important to consider these 
different dimensions of risk when developing accident reduction measures. For example, 
consideration of fatalities resulted in commercial aircraft designers creating aircraft with 
measures to increase survivability in a crash (e.g., fireproof and fire resistant cabin 
materials). Conversely, reducing the raw number of accidents is also important—the public 
would likely stop using commercial aviation if there were frequent small accidents, even 
if they did not result in injuries. Accidents that seem less significant from an injury or loss 
perspective may also provide insights into potentially more serious accidents. This 
perspective is particularly relevant to general aviation, where fatal accidents often involve 
so much damage that little physical evidence can be found (these aircraft rarely have “black 
boxes”). 
Here, I show how occurrence chains corresponding to different perspectives on risk can be 
identified. In particular, I identify the occurrence chains that most often result in accidents, 
and the occurrence chains that most often result in accidents of a particular severity (e.g., 
which chains are most likely to result in fatal accidents). 
The analysis approach consists of three steps, as described next. 
 
Figure 14: Directed network between occurrence chain and accidents. 
First, I identify the occurrence chains corresponding to the accidents. My example from 
Table 4 illustrates the process, as shown in Figure 14. As mentioned in Section 3.1, the 
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NTSB accident reports place each occurrence in a sequence leading up to the accident. In 
this thesis, I designate the final node as the accident. In this case, I therefore have a two-
node occurrence chain (Loss of engine power—non- mechanical, Forced landing) followed 
by a hard landing accident. 
 
Figure 15: The non-permissible accident code is introduced into the occurrence chain and 
a “new” accident node is introduced. 
In some accidents, the NTSB reports “non-intuitive” final occurrences (e.g., loss of control, 
loss of engine power). For example, when accident reports suggest that LOC was the final 
occurrence, I know that the accident ultimately must have involved the helicopter crashing 
into the ground, water, or other object following the loss of control. Thus the NTSB coding 
must be missing the final occurrence node. I term these occurrence codes that must have 
an ensuing node, though it is not documented, as “non-permissible accident codes”. Tables 
284 and 285 in Appendix F show the full list of occurrences that I consider non-permissible 
and permissible accident codes. After identifying the accidents with non-permissible 
terminating codes, I place the non-permissible occurrence in the chain and introduce a 
“New” accident node, as shown in Figure 15. So, for example, if an accident had “250: 
Loss of control” as the terminating occurrence, then the chain is re-coded as: 
“250: Loss of control” + “New Accident Node” 
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In some accidents, only a single occurrence is recorded by the NTSB. One such accident 
occurred in April 1994 during an air-medical mission near Bluefield VA 
(NTSB ID: BFO94FA071). The pilot of a Bell 214 did not execute the correct instrument 
approach in IMC conditions (rain, fog, and low ceiling). The subsequent collision with 
terrain (230) resulted in four fatalities. The investigators added that better instructions from 
the ATC personnel could have prevented the accident. Here, since “230: Inflight collision 
with terrain/water” is a permissible terminating occurrence as well as the only occurrence 
recorded in the database, I record this occurrence chain as “230S: Inflight collision with 
terrain/water”. The suffix S indicates that chain had a single occurrence and was the 
terminating occurrence (or accident node). 
After identifying the occurrence chains, I calculate the presence 
(cf. Sorenson and Marais, 2015) of 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗  as number of times each chain j 
appears in different types of accidents (e.g., fatal, non-fatal), normalized by the total 
number of (fatal, non-fatal) accidents:  
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑂𝑐𝑐 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗|𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
=





𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑂𝑐𝑐 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑗|𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝐹𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
=






For example, the single node “250: Loss of Control inflight” chain appears in 121 out of 
the 845 fatal accidents, thus its presence in fatal helicopter accidents is 14.3%. Note that 
midair collision accidents involve more than one aircraft that can have the same or different 
sequences of occurrences leading up to the collision (and after). 
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3.4.2 Occurrence Chain Statistics 
This section provides key occurrence chain statistics. First, I identify the top occurrence 
chains in accidents overall. Then, I determine the top chains in fatal accidents, and compare 
their presence in accidents that were non-fatal. Finally, I compare the presence of the top 
chains overall across different mission types. 
3.4.2.1 Old System (1982–2008) 
Figure 16: Distribution of occurrence chains in 1982–2008. “250: Loss of control” was 
the most frequent chain; associated with 13.5% of helicopter accidents. 
Figure 16 shows the frequency distribution of occurrence chains for helicopter accidents 
in 1982–2008. These accidents were associated with 422 different occurrence chains, 
where the top 10 chains accounted for over half the accidents (54.6% of accidents). 54.6% 
of the accidents had only one occurrence, 36.4% of the accidents had two occurrences, and 
7.2% of the accidents had three or more occurrences. Accidents had an average chain length 
of 1.55 (with SD = 0.67).  
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Table 8: Presence of the Top-Five Occurrence Chains in All Accidents 
First Occurrence Second Occurrence Presence in Accidents 
Loss of control-inflight (250) - 13.5% 
Loss of engine power (350) Forced landing (180) 5.7% 
Loss of engine power-non-
mechanical (353)  
Forced landing (180) 5.4% 
Inflight collision with terrain/water 
(230S) 
- 5.2% 
Inflight collision with object (220) - 5.1% 
 
Table 8 compares the presence of the top five occurrence chains in all US helicopter 
accidents in 1982–2008. The presence of each occurrence chain is calculated using Eq. 1. 
“250: Loss of control inflight” (LOC) was the top occurrence chain, accounting for 13.5% 
of all helicopter accidents. The high frequency of the LOC chain may reflect a lack of detail 
in many investigations, since we would expect that LOC would be induced by some prior 
event (which may not be known). 
Note the occurrence chain “230S: Inflight collision with terrain/water”, where the ‘S’ 
signifies that this chain was the sole recorded occurrence in the accident. 5.2% of accidents 
result from this chain, but unfortunately, the NTSB reports do not indicate what happened 
before the collision. Again, as with LOC, I assume that in each accident there must have 
been some instigating factor that was not captured by the investigation. 
3.4.2.2 Injury-Specific Occurrence Chain Ranking 
Next, I identify the top occurrence chains in fatal accidents and compare their presence in 
non-fatal outcomes. An accident is fatal if any injury sustained results in death within 30 
days of the accident (NTSB, 1998). I group accidents that had serious, minor, or no injuries 
as “non-fatal” accidents.  
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Table 9: Comparison of the Presence of Top Occurrence Chains in Fatal and Non-Fatal 
Accidents 
Occurrence Chain Presence in Accidents 
First Occurrence Second Occurrence Fatal Non-fatal 
Loss of control inflight (250) - 14.3% 13.4% 
Inflight collision with object (220) - 10.0% 4.2% 
Inflight collision with terrain/water 
(230S) 
- 9.0% 4.4% 
Airframe/system/component failure 
(130) 
Loss of control inflight (250) 6.4% 1.8% 
Inflight encounter with weather 
(240) 
- 6.4% 1.2% 
 
Table 9 compares the presence of the top five fatal occurrence chains in fatal and non-fatal 
accidents. Three of the top five chains overall (Table 6) are among the top five for fatal 
accidents; i.e., LOC, collision with terrain/water, and inflight collision with object. “240: 
Inflight encounter with weather” enters the top five chains for fatal accidents, highlighting 
the tendency of flights into poor weather to result in fatal outcomes. 
The loss of control chain appeared most frequently in both fatal and non-fatal accidents. 
Unfortunately, the high presence of the single node LOC chain suggests that investigators 
had limited information about the occurrences that preceded LOC. In some cases, the 
investigators were able to establish the precursor to loss of control. One such example is 
the chain “130-250: Airframe/system/component failure followed by LOC”, which 
appeared in 6.4% of fatal accidents. System failures, particularly flight control cables and 
control surfaces, made it difficult (if not impossible) for the pilot to control the aircraft. 
Often, helicopter mission require operation in proximity to objects/terrain. Unsurprisingly, 
“220: Inflight collision with object” and “230S: Inflight collision with terrain/water” were 
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among the top occurrence chains for fatal accidents. Similar to the LOC chain, the single 
node collision with object/terrain chains do not provide any insight into the events that 
preceded them. 
3.4.2.3 Operation-Specific Occurrence Chain Statistics 
The NTSB defines 34 types of operation, of which 20 are reported in the context of 
helicopter accidents. When the type of activity being carried out at the time of the accident 
is unclear, the NTSB assigns the UNK code22. Table 10 shows the five types of operation 
that most frequently resulted in accidents between 1982 and 2008. 
Table 10: Top-Five Operation Categories Involved in Accidents 
Type of Operation Description Accidents 
PERS Personal use 1048 (20.2%) 
INST Instructional flight 868 (16.7%) 
AAPL Aerial application 631 (12.1%) 
UNK Unknown 627 (12.0%) 
OWRK Other work use 386 (7.4%) 
 
Personal use missions accounted for the largest proportion of accidents in 1982–2008. 
Accidents involving instructional flights were the second most frequent, accounting for 
16.7% of all accidents. These accidents generally involved solo-flights by students, in some 
cases accompanied by a Certified Flight Instructor (CFI). Flight training also involved 
simulated emergency scenarios to better prepare pilots in the event of an emergency during 
a non-training flight. However, the pilot’s (or CFI’s) inability to recover from a simulated 
emergency often resulted in accidents. DeVoogt (2007) points out the paradoxical nature 
                                                 
22 In certain accidents, the NTSB coded the mission type as “unknown” or “other work” while also indicating 
that the accident was either an “air medical” or “site seeing” mission. Using this information, I identified 157 
site seeing accidents and 199 air medical accidents.  
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of helicopter training—that is, the frequency of accidents during simulated emergencies is 
higher than the frequency of these emergencies occurring during non-instructional flights. 
He also suggests that student pilots are exposed to high levels of risk during training by 
practicing for emergencies that have rarely resulted in accidents during non-instructional 
missions. 
Aerial application missions generally involve agricultural operations such as application of 
pesticides or plant fertilizers. 12.1% of the accidents occurred during this mission. 
Collision with objects (e.g., wire strikes) and loss of engine power due fuel 
starvation/contamination were among the top causes for aerial application accidents. The 
NTSB classified 12% of the accidents under the “unknown” mission category23. The “other 
work” mission category, which accounted for 7.9% of the accidents, involved various 
flights including cattle herding, blow-drying of plants, and transportation of workers to 
worksites. 
Table 11: Comparison of the Presence of Occurrence Chains for different Mission Types 




PERS INST AAPL UNK OWRK 
Loss of control-inflight 
(250) 
- 15.9% 16.1% 10.3% 11.5% 11.4% 




7.0% 3.5% 6.5% 5.7% 4.7% 
Loss of engine power-
non-mechanical (353)  
Forced landing 
(180) 
5.6% 2.0% 10.5% 4.6% 8.0% 
Inflight collision with 
terrain/water (230S) 
- 5.4% 6.3% - 5..9% 2.1% 
Inflight collision with 
object (220) 
- 4.5% 1.8% 11.4% 2.7% 7.0% 
                                                 
23 In the NTSB database, 1.7% of the accidents had “blank” fields for mission type. For purposes of clarity, 
I do not combine these “blank” mission type accidents with those that the NTSB designated as unknown. 
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The LOC chain has the highest presence in accidents that involved personal flights and 
instructional activities (Table 11). As stated earlier in this section, the frequent citing of the 
single node chain provides little insight into understanding the causes for loss of control. 
Likely reasons for the frequent use of the single node chain are: (1) Lack of information 
available to the investigator from the accident site and witness interviews (ref. Figure 12); 
and (2) Lack of depth in accident investigation. 
The “200S: Hard landing” chain does not appear in the top five most frequent chains. 
However, it has the second highest presence in instructional flying accidents; appearing in 
15.7% of instructional accidents. The presence of the LOC chain is almost the 
same (16.1%), but it tends to result in more fatalities and serious injuries. Many hard 
landing accidents involving student pilots happened during the landing or hover-to-landing 
phases. Student pilots are usually relatively inexperienced in judging distances and 
monitoring RPM. 
Inflight collision with an object (220) is the top occurrence chain for accidents during aerial 
application missions. Wire strikes, agricultural operations, and main and tail rotor strikes 
were the dominant characteristics of collision with object accidents. Also, the probability 
of “353-180: Loss of engine power-non-mechanical followed by a forced landing” is the 
highest for these operations, suggesting negligence during preflight checks for common 
non-mechanical triggers such as fuel and oil levels. 
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3.4.2.4 Comparison of Pre and Post-2008 Occurrence Chains 
Figure 17: Distribution of occurrence chains in 2008–2015. “240: Loss of control” was 
the most frequent chain; associated with 7.6% of helicopter accidents. 
The frequency distribution of occurrence chains in 2008–2015 (Figure 17) is similar to that 
of 1982–2008 (see Figure 16). Accidents in 2008–2015 were associated with 378 different 
occurrence chains. 51.7% of the accidents had only one occurrence, 31.7% of the accidents 
had two occurrences, and 16.6% of the accidents had three or more occurrences. In contrast 
to the old system (where the top 10 chains accounted for over half the accidents), the top 
10 chains in the current system accounted for only 31.9% of the accidents. The reduced 
proportion of accidents could be attributed to multiple reasons including: (1) Investigators 
leveraged the greater variety of occurrence codes in the current system (98 compared to 54 
in the old system) to better represent accidents; (2) Greater variety of accidents; or (3) just 
that the sample size is smaller (fewer accidents) and hence the proportion estimate has not 
converged to the true proportion24. 
                                                 
24Owing to the lower accident count, there might be fewer accidents associated with a particular occurrence 
chain j. As more accidents occur (and are recorded by the NTSB in current system), the frequency of this 
chain j might increase—thus increasing the proportion of accidents associated with the chain. 
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Number of accidents 5218 982 
Number of Occurrences 54 98 
Number of occurrence chains 422 378 
Top occurrence chain 
(% presence) 
250: Loss of control inflight 
(13.5%) 
240: Loss of control inflight 
(7.6%) 
Average chain length (and SD) 1.55 (0.67) 1.73 (0.95) 
Number of single node chains 51 89 
Accidents per occurrence chain 12.3 2.6 
 
Table 12 compares key information for occurrence chains that were recorded under the old 
and current systems. Investigators frequently attributed accidents to Inflight loss of 
control—the top occurrence chain in accidents recorded under the old and current systems. 
Unfortunately, the continued use of the single node LOC chain does not help us (safety 
analysts) better understand LOC accident causation. In fact, the proportion of single node 
chains increased in the current system (23.5% compared to 12.1% in the old system). A 
comparison of the chain lengths reveals a statistically significant (confidence level of 5%) 
higher average for chains in the current system. The Cohnen’s d value is 0.24, indicating 
that the size of the difference between the means is moderate. 
The current system also introduced over 40 new occurrences to better represent accidents. 
One such example is the controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) and non-CFIT occurrences. 
The old system did not explicitly mention CFIT in the coding system, making it difficult 
for the analyst to identify such accidents. In the subsequent chapter, I will present an 
approach to identifying CFIT accidents using the old system. 
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The last row of Table 10 presents the accidents per occurrence chain metric. This metric 
captures the average “usage” of an occurrence chain to capture accidents. In 2008–2015, 
each occurrence chain captures only 2.6 accidents—almost five times less than in 1982–
2008. The lower number of accidents per occurrence chain in the current system suggests 
that a greater variety of chains is used by investigators. Tracking this metric, as more 
accidents are recorded, could potentially provide a better insight into: (1) the variety of 
occurrence chains used by investigators to capture accidents; and (2) the different accident 
trajectories.  
3.4.3 Lesson Learned from Occurrence Chain Analysis 
I began this chapter by asking the following question: 
Can we learn more about GA accident causation by counting and comparing these 
occurrence chains? 
The answer is yes, we can learn a little more than just a root cause analysis. In Section 3.4, 
I demonstrated the occurrence chain approach to identifying accident “stories”. My 
analysis showed that accident stories tended to be short; that is, over 82% of the accidents 
in 1982–2015 had a maximum of two nodes. I ranked occurrence chains based on their 
presence in accidents. The high presence of the single node loss of control (LOC) chain, 
while highlighting the well-known tendency for pilots to lose control, also suggests a lack 
of information available to investigators to reconstruct the accident story.  
The occurrence chain approach also helps with comparing accident stories across different 
injury severity levels. Take for instance the single node hard landing chain (200S)—it has 
the highest presence in instructional flight accidents and generally resulted in minor or no 
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injuries to the occupants. Occurrence chains also help highlight mission-specific safety 
issues. For example, in 2008–2015, “220: Low altitude operations” chain (not present in 
the pre-2008 system) had the highest presence in aerial application accidents. This chain 
highlights the tendency for pilots during aerial application missions to fly in proximity to 
the ground. 
While this approach helps us think beyond a single root cause by identifying the most risky 
event sequences, it does not provide a complete picture of an accident. I discuss some of 
the key issues with the occurrence chain technique in the remainder of this section. 
Like with any chain of events model, this approach also suffers from backward chain 
propagation, where the assignment of an initiating event can be arbitrary as it is dependent 
on the stopping point when going backward in the event chain. To illustrate this point, 
recall the earlier example involving a fatal crash that occurred in poor weather condition 
(NTSB ID: BFO94FA071). Inflight collision with terrain/water (230) was the only 
occurrence used in this accident. However, one could ask why this accident was not coded 
as “240–230: Inflight encounter with weather followed by an inflight collision with 
terrain/water”. The occurrence chain technique is dependent on an investigator’s 
interpretation of the sequence of events that led to an accident. 
While the low average chain length might suggest lack of information available in the 
accident, the occurrence chain technique does not leverage all the information available in 
the subject codes and modifiers. Often, subject codes provide vital information to 
understanding the reasons behind an occurrence. For example, many LOC accidents are 
associated with the subject-modifier combination “poor inflight planning/decision making”. 
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Here, I can say that the pilot’s poor decision was one of the causes for LOC. In addition to 
not using subject codes, the large variety of occurrence chains (422 in the old system and 
378 in the current system) makes it difficult to propose any intervention strategies. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, several researchers have analyzed NTSB accident data to 
identify the causes for GA accidents. Some research looked exclusively at occurrences (or 
occurrence chains) to explain accident causation. Other GA accident literature focuses on 
the subject codes that are designated as “causes” or “factors” by the NTSB. In an effort to 
potentially better understand GA accident causation, in the next chapter, I propose a state-





CHAPTER 4. A STATE-BASED AVIATION ACCIDENT MODEL 
One of the key objectives of accident investigations is to learn how to prevent future 
accidents. In Chapter 3, I presented the NTSB’s accident recording system and analyzed 
the top occurrence chains in helicopter accidents. The NTSB accident coding system lends 
itself to a chain of events model of accidents. Such models have several limitations 
(Leveson, 2001), in particular, not all aspects of an accident can be viewed as “events” 
(e.g., poor training is a continuing condition, or state, rather than an event). In this chapter, 
I propose a state-based accident modeling approach to potentially better understand GA 
accident causation.  
Section 4.1 reviews the fundamental elements of a state-based approach. In Section 4.2, I 
provide the definitions for a system, nominal state, and hazardous state using illustrative 
helicopter accident examples. Section 4.3 describes the dictionary of hazardous states and 
trigger events from the NTSB accident database. Section 4.4 details how I use the accident 
data to build the “grammar” that links hazardous states to trigger events.  
4.1 Basic Elements of State-based Approach 
Before discussing the details of how I use NTSB data to build the accident model, it is 
important to understand the basic elements of the model. Figure 18 shows a state-based 




Figure 18: State-based representation of a simple notional system. The nodes represent 
the different states of the system, the links with arrows represent the transitions. Triggers 
cause the system to transition from one state to another (or remain in the same state). 
The basic elements of the state-based model are: (1) states; and (2) triggers. 
State: Segments of time wherein a system exhibits a particular behavior. The nodes in 
Figure 1 represent the two possible states of the notional system. The link with the black 
node points to the “default” or “start” state of the system. A system must be in one and 
only one state at any given point of time. 
Triggers: Occur at precise instants of time and cause a system to transition between states 
or remain in the same state. Triggers may be deterministic or stochastic. In some cases, the 
amount of time spent in a state can cause the system to move to a new state (e.g., the time 
spent flying through instrument meteorological or IMC conditions can trigger a spatial 
disorientation state). If the system remains in a state beyond a specified time bound, it 
triggers a time-out, which transitions the system to a new state. 
4.2 Definitions of System and States in the Accident Model 
For the state-based aircraft accident model, the helicopter and the pilot(s) operating the 
helicopter constitute the system. I graphically represent the two constituents of the system 
as two halves of a circle—the top half representing the state of the pilot(s) operating the 




Figure 19: Building the system from its constituent parts. The top half of the circle 
represents the state of the pilots operating the aircraft, while the bottom half represents 
the states of aircraft. 
The state25 of a system at any instant of time is given by: 




where, 𝒙(𝒕) represents the state of the system at any given instant of time 𝒕. 
A nominal state for the system is defined as a state of system operation that is accepted as 
safe by society. The system is said to be in a nominal state if both constituents of the system 
(pilot and aircraft) are in a nominal state, as shown by the green circle in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Illustration of the nominal state for the system. 
Operating the system in a nominal state does not imply that the system is absolutely (100%) 
safe26. It just means that the system is in a less unsafe state compared to a hazardous state.  
A hazardous state for the system can be defined as “A state of system operation that is 
less safe compared to the nominal state (i.e., off-nominal operation)”. The state 
immediately preceding an accident or incident must be a hazardous state—the system 
                                                 
25 The state-based approach used in this thesis does not attempt to model the dynamics of the entire system. 
Here, I leverage historical accident data to model the different states of a system (pilot and aircraft) during 
operation, and to identify triggers that cause the system to transition between states. 
26 While in reality there is no system that can be 100% safe, for completeness, I state that, a system that is 
100% safe cannot transition to a hazardous state; i.e., it always transitions back to the 100% safe state. 
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cannot transition directly from a nominal to an accident/incident state. The system is said 
to be in a hazardous state if it is in one of the following scenarios: 
a) Pilot is in a hazardous state. 
b) Aircraft is in a hazardous state. 
c) Both pilot and aircraft are in a hazardous state. 
Figure 21 illustrates the three scenarios (a, b, and c) in which the system is in a hazardous 
state. 
 
Figure 21: Illustration of the three possible scenarios in which a system is said to be in a 
hazardous state. Scenario (a) happens when the pilot is in a hazardous state (e.g., physical 
impairment due to prescription medication), scenario (b) occurrs when the aircraft is in a 
hazardous state (e.g,, poorly maintained aircraft or loss of control state), and scenario (c) 
happens when both (a) and (b) occur. 
The mathematical representation of a system’s hazardous state (based on the source of the 
hazard) are given by: 













  (5) 
where, xhaz(t) indicates that the system is in a hazardous state, Pilothaz indicates that the 
pilot is the source of the hazard, and Aircrafthaz indicates that the aircraft is the source of 
the hazard.  
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The system can start a mission in either the nominal flight state or a hazardous state, 
transition through a set of hazardous states during flight, and end in one of three possible 
end states: (1) accident; (2) incident; or (3) safe landing. 
To facilitate a better understanding of the different states and triggers, I consider examples 
of accidents under the following categories: 
1. A flight that began with the system in a hazardous state due to poor aircraft 
maintenance. 
2. A flight that began with the system in a hazardous state due to pilot impairment. 
3. A flight that began with the system in a nominal state. 
Preflight Mechanical Issue due to Improper Maintenance (NTSB ID: DEN84FA207) 
In a July 1984 accident near Englewood, CO, a Bell 206B experienced an on-board system 
failure and subsequent loss of control before colliding with terrain. The resulting accident 
killed both the pilot and the passenger. The NTSB cited incorrect maintenance installation 
as one of the causes for this accident. 
Figure 22: State-based representation of the accident sequence, which began with the 
system in a preflight mechanical issue state. Improper maintenance was one of the causes 
for this accident.  
Figure 22 shows a state-based representation of the same accident. The preflight 
mechanical issue state was triggered by improper maintenance installation, insufficient 
information/checklist provided by the manufacturer, and the pilot’s failure to detect the 
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mechanical issue during a preflight check27. In this accident, all trigger information was 
available in the accident codes (see Section 4.3.2 for a discussion of cases where the trigger 
information is not available). 
The system began operation with an existing mechanical issue. Subsequently, the cyclic 
control disconnected, triggering a transition to a system failure state. The failure of a 
critical helicopter control component (i.e., cyclic) rendered the aircraft uncontrollable (as 
shown by the “control not possible” trigger), triggering a transition to an inflight loss of 
control (LOC) state. The helicopter crashed into the surrounding terrain, fatally injuring all 
occupants.  
Flight that began with an impaired pilot (NTSB ID: CHI03FA181) 
In June 2003, a Robinson R44 II experienced an inflight loss of control and crashed near 
Coleta, IL. The accident investigation revealed that the pilot was impaired because he had 
taken anti-depressant drugs before the flight. During the flight, he did not maintain rotor 
RPM, resulting in a loss of control. He did not recover from the uncontrolled descent and 
crashed into the terrain. 
Figure 23: State-based representation of the accident sequence, which began with the 
system in a hazardous state owing to pilot impairment. I add the impaired pilot state to 
the improper RPM and loss of control states to indicate the role played by pilot 
                                                 
27 Note that the preflight mechanical issue state has three triggers. I term these this succession of triggers as 
a “rapid sequence of triggers”, which I discuss later in this Chapter. 
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impairment in the accident. The triggers in red were inferred as they were not recorded in 
the database. 
Figure 23 shows a state-based representation of this accident. I inferred the trigger events 
labeled in red from the accident data as they were not coded in the database. In this accident, 
the system began in a hazardous state owing to drug consumption by the pilot, and failure 
to follow procedure, as shown in the first node in Figure 23. In flight, the pilot’s incorrect 
throttle or collective input triggered a transition to the improper RPM state. Since the pilot 
failed to correct his throttle/collective input, the system transitioned to a loss of control 
state. The impaired pilot’s failure to recover from the uncontrolled descent transitioned the 
system to a collision with terrain accident (end state). 
Flight that began in a Nominal State (NTSB ID: DEN00GA050) 
In February 2000, the pilot of a Bell OH-58A+ was executing a practice autorotation to do 
a functional check of the free-wheeling unit28. While trying to exit the autorotation, the 
pilot failed to follow the procedure for a power recovery (where the pilot should gently roll 
the throttle back on, let the engine and rotor RPM needles coincide, and raise the collective). 
The failed power recovery resulted in an inflight loss of control and subsequent collision 
with terrain. The accident killed both occupants. 
                                                 
28 Helicopters are fitted with a freewheeling unit to prevent the main rotor from driving the engine in the 




Figure 24: State-based representation of the accident sequence, which began in a nominal 
state during a practice autorotation, but transitioned to an inflight loss of control accident.  
Figure 24 shows the state-based representation of this accident. The system began in a 
nominal state while practicing autorotations; however, the pilot’s failure to execute a power 
recovery triggered a loss of control. The pilot failed to apply corrective action to recover 
from the loss of control state, resulting in a transition to a collision with terrain end state. 
4.3 Using Accident Data to Create a Dictionary of Hazardous States, Triggers, and 
Information Codes 
The state-based accident model requires a set, or vocabulary, of states and triggers that may 
appear in accidents. The different states and triggers can be defined using multiple potential 
sources (e.g., helicopter flight physics models, expert surveys). Since the focus of this 
thesis is to try to better understand the causes for helicopter accidents recorded in the 
NTSB’s database, I defined states and triggers by using the codes from the NTSB’s 
accident coding manual.  
In this section, I present a set of hazardous states and triggers. These definitions are based 
on the NTSB accident data coding manual, as well as, where applicable, accident statistics. 
The NTSB coding manuals for the pre- and post-2008 systems together contain nearly 3384 
different subject codes, modifiers, occurrences, and phase of flight codes. In compiling 
these definitions, I create a logical expression that defines how each NTSB code or set of 
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codes is translated into states, triggers, or information codes. This set of logical expressions 
covers both the old (pre-2008) and current (post-2008) accident coding systems, thereby 
facilitating a continuity in the accident analysis. I use these logical expressions to construct 
a computer program (in MATLAB®) that automatically identifies the states, triggers, and 
information codes corresponding to accidents in the NTSB database. 
4.3.1 Hazardous States 
Using the NTSB accident codes, I defined 86 hazardous states in total. 51 hazardous states 
are one-to-one equivalents of occurrence or subject codes; i.e., these states correspond to 
only one code, and vice versa. For example, the subject code “24802: Ground resonance” 
translates directly to the ground resonance hazardous state, as shown in Table 13. The table 
reads as follows. The first row gives the state name. The second row explains what the state 
is. Next, the table shows the expression for the pre-2008 codes. In this case, the expression 
is a simple one-to-one correspondence. The remainder of the table gives the expression for 
the post-2008 system. The notes field provides information on how I identified the codes 
and expressions corresponding to each state. 
Table 13: Ground Resonance State Definition 
Ground Resonance 
Hazardous state where the primary frequency of the main rotor is amplified by the stiffness (and 
frequency) of the landing gear, resulting in violent vibration of the helicopter. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24802: Ground resonance  
I identified this state by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “ground 
resonance”. 
 
In one case in the pre-2008 
database, the NTSB did not 
specify a modifier while 
recording ground resonance. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
232: Ground resonance 
I identified this state by 




for the phrase “ground 
resonance”. 
 
The NTSB coding manual has multiple codes that convey the same meaning. Further, the 
NTSB uses many of these codes interchangeably while recording accidents in the database. 
I defined 28 hazardous states by grouping subject codes, occurrences, modifiers, and phase 
of flight codes that conveyed the same meaning. 
For example, the NTSB uses several codes to indicate inflight loss of control. Table 14 
summarizes the corresponding state definition and logic expression. Each row presents a 
code or set of codes that translate into the state—i.e., rows are connected into a single 
logical expression with OR statements. For example, in this case, the pre-2008 NTSB codes 
250, 110, 24566, 24539, 24524, 24525, OR 553, all translate into the “inflight loss of 
control” state (in some cases with appropriate modifiers, as indicated in the table). The 
remainder of the table gives the expression for the post-2008 system. 
Table 14: Inflight Loss of Control State Definition 
Inflight Loss of Control 
A hazardous state that involves an unintended departure of an aircraft from controlled flight regime 
(FAA, 2016b). 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
250: Loss of control inflight 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“control”.  
I exclude codes that suggest 
pilot action or component 
failures. 
110: Uncontrolled altitude deviation 
24566: Aircraft control AND (“not maintained” OR “not possible” OR 
“reduced” OR “uncontrolled”) 
24539: Directional control AND (“not maintained” OR “not possible” 
OR “reduced” OR “uncontrolled”) 
24524: Descent AND (“uncontrolled”) 
24525: Descent rate AND (“uncontrolled”) 
553: Uncontrolled descent 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
240: Inflight loss of control  
01062020XX: Directional control AND (“not attained/maintained” OR 
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “incorrect operation/use” OR 
“capability exceeded”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“control”.  
01062022XX: Pitch control AND (“not attained/maintained” OR 




Inflight Loss of Control 
01062024XX: Yaw control AND (“not attained/maintained” OR 
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “incorrect operation/use” OR 
“capability exceeded”) 
I exclude codes that suggest 
pilot action or component 
failures. 
02063040XX: Aircraft control 
650: Uncontrolled descent 
 
Using a similar process, I defined the remaining states, as shown in Tables 53 through 83 
(Appendix A). 
Finally, I defined 4 additional hazardous states that are not available from the NTSB codes: 
(1) Controlled flight into terrain (CFIT); (2) improper autorotation; (3) preflight 
mechanical issues; and (4) Preflight pilot hazardous state. 
Controlled flight into terrain/object (CFIT) is a hazardous state where an airworthy aircraft, 
which is under pilot control, is inadvertently flown into terrain, water or an object. The 
NTSB’s post-2008 coding system has a code that matches this state, i.e., “120: Controlled 
flight into terrain/object”. The pre-2008 system does not have a similar code. Thus, I 
defined the CFIT state for the pre-2008 system as shown in Table 15. 
Table 15: Controlled Flight into Terrain/Object (CFIT) State Definition 
Controlled Flight into Terrain/Object (CFIT) 
Hazardous state where which an airworthy aircraft (under pilot control) is inadvertently flow into terrain, 
water, or an object. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
230: Inflight collision with terrain/water AND NOT (Inflight loss of 
control state OR loss of engine power state OR system failure state) 
The definition for CFIT 
indicates that the aircraft 
should be airworthy and under 
the control of the pilot at the 
time of impact. Thus, I defined 
this state as any collision with 
terrain/object that did not 
involve any issues with the 
engine or systems (which 
satisfies the definition of 
airworthy), and did not involve 
loss of control 
220: Inflight collision with object AND NOT (Inflight loss of control 
state OR loss of engine power state OR system failure state) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
120: Controlled flight into terrain/object 
The post-2008 coding system 
has a code that is a one-to-one 
map for the CFIT state. 
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Autorotation is a state of helicopter flight where the main rotor blades are driven only by 
aerodynamic forces and not by the engine. Helicopter pilots are trained to perform 
autorotative landings in the event of losing engine power. To execute a successful 
autorotation, pilots are instructed to maintain best gliding airspeed and requisite rotor RPM 
(through collective inputs), perform a flare (by aft cyclic motion) to reduce airspeed and 
maintain the correct descent angle and rate, and finally perform a safe landing. 
While there might be situations where correctly-performed autorotations ended in 
accidents due to unfavorable terrain; here, I want to identify those autorotations that were 
not correctly executed, i.e., improper autorotations. Table 16 presents the different logical 
expressions that define an improper autorotation. 
Table 16: Improper Autorotation State Definition 
Improper Autorotation 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain key flight parameters like rotor RPM, descent, 
airspeed, altitude, or flare during autorotation. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24520: Autorotation AND (24518: Altitude AND (“inadequate” OR 
“misjudged” OR “low” OR “improper” OR “not maintained” OR 
“delayed” OR “below” OR “unavailable” ))  
The key elements to a 
successful autorotation are: 
 Maintaining rotor RPM 
 Maintaining airspeed 
 Performing a correct 
descent, with proper descent 
rate 
 Performing a correct flare 
(or level-off) 
 
I combined the 24520: 
Autorotation code with the 
codes corresponding to each of 
the above elements (along with 
the logical expressions for each 
of the elements). 
 
I included the 24520 code with 
the modifiers that suggested 
improper autorotation. 
 
24520: Autorotation AND (24519: Proper altitude AND (“not 
maintained” OR “not attained” OR “exceeded” OR “below” OR 
“misjudged”)) 
24520: Autorotation AND (24524: Descent AND (“excessive” OR 
“not maintained” OR “exceeded”, “improper” OR “inadvertent” OR 
“intentional” OR “uncontrolled”, “misjudged” OR “premature” OR 
“not maintained/obtained” OR “not possible” OR “not corrected” OR 
“intentional” OR “premature”) 
24520: Autorotation AND (24525: Proper descent rate AND 
(“excessive” OR “not maintained” OR “exceeded” OR “improper” 
OR “inadvertent” OR “intentional” OR “misjudged” OR 
“uncontrolled” OR “not maintained/obtained” OR “not possible” OR 
“not corrected”)) 
24520: Autorotation AND (24535: Flare AND (“misjudged” OR “not 
possible” OR “not attained”, “delayed” OR “inadequate” OR “low” 
OR “high” OR “premature” OR “reduced” OR “abrupt” OR 
“improper” OR “not possible” OR “excessive” OR “not performed” 
OR “abrupt” OR “inaccurate” OR “not successful” )) 
24520: Autorotation AND (24534: Level-off AND (“improper” OR 
“not possible” OR “misjudged” OR “not attained” OR “delayed” OR 




Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain key flight parameters like rotor RPM, descent, 
airspeed, altitude, or flare during autorotation. 
24520: Autorotation AND (24803: Height/velocity curve AND 
(“exceeded” OR “not complied with” OR “below” OR “not followed” 
OR “not attained” OR “disregarded” OR “low” OR “intentional” OR 
“not obtained/maintained”)) 
I included the forced landing 
occurrence and the emergency 
descent phase of flight code 
24520: Autorotation AND (22308: Adequate rotor RPM AND (“not 
maintained” OR “not possible” OR “not attained” OR “not available” 
OR “misjudged” OR “not followed” OR “delayed”)) 
24520: Autorotation AND (24558: Rotor RPM AND (“not 
maintained” OR “misjudged” OR “low” OR “high” OR “inadequate” 
OR “reduced” OR “excessive” OR “exceed” OR “improper” OR 
“diminished” OR “ not possible” OR “diminished” OR “not verified” 
OR “not identified” OR “not corrected” OR “not 
obtained/maintained” OR “not attained”) 
24520: Autorotation AND (24506: Airspeed AND (“not maintained” 
OR “excessive” OR “inadequate” OR “low” OR “misjudged” OR 
“not attained” OR “reduced” OR “not obtained/maintained” OR 
“misjudged” OR “below” OR “exceeded” OR “initiated” OR “high” 
OR “excessive”)) 
24520: Autorotation AND (24509: Airspeed-minimum control speed 
with the critical engine inoperative AND (“not maintained”)) 
24520: Autorotation AND (24516: Airspeed-maximum operating 
limit speed AND (“exceeded”)) 
24520: Autorotation AND (“misjudged” OR “poor” OR “improper” 
OR “delayed” OR “not maintained” OR “improper use of” OR 
“inadequate” OR “uncontrolled” OR “restricted” OR “not obtained” 
OR “not successful” OR “not identified” OR “premature”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
601: Autorotation AND (01062037XX: Descent rate OR 
01062040XX: Descent/approach/glide path OR 01062041XX: 
Landing flare OR 01062010XX: Airspeed OR 01062012XX: 
Performance/control parameters-altitude OR 01062052XX: 
Performance/control parameters-Prop/rotor parameters 
In the post-2008 system, the 
NTSB records autorotation as a 
phase of flight with the code 
601. This code does not have 
any modifiers associated with 
it. Similar to the pre-2008 
system, I build logical 
expressions that include the 
autorotation code and subject 
codes corresponding to the key 
elements of an autorotation. 
601: Autorotation AND (01062037XX: Descent rate AND (“not 
attained/maintained” OR “incorrect use/operation” OR “capability 
exceeded” OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “not specified” OR 
“related operating info”)) 
601: Autorotation AND (01062040XX: Descent/approach/glide AND 
(“not attained/maintained” OR “incorrect use/operation” OR 
“capability exceeded” OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “not 
specified”)) 
601: Autorotation AND (01062041XX: Landing flare AND (“not 
attained/maintained” OR “incorrect use/operation” OR “not 
specified”)) 
601: Autorotation AND (01062010XX: Airspeed AND (“not 
attained/maintained” OR “capability exceeded”)) 
601: Autorotation AND (01062012XX: Performance/control 
parameters-altitude altitude AND (“not attained/maintained” OR 
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “incorrect use/operation OR 
“related operating info”)) 
601: Autorotation AND (01062052XX: Performance/control 
parameters-Prop/rotor parameters AND (“not attained/maintained” 
OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “capability exceeded”)) 
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The definitions for preflight mechanical issues and preflight pilot hazardous state are 
shown in Tables 70 and 71, respectively (see Appendix A). 
4.3.2 Triggers 
Using the NTSB accident codes, I defined 182 triggers. Similar to one-to-one states, 95 
triggers are direct equivalents of a subject or occurrence code. For example, the subject 
code “24705: Control interference” translates to the trigger event “Control interference” 
(Table 17). The 95 triggers that are direct equivalents are shown in Tables 210 through 308 
(Appendix B). 
Table 17: Control interference Trigger Definition 
Control interference 
This trigger, as the name suggests, impedes the pilot from controlling the aircraft. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24705: Control interference AND (“inadvertent” OR “encountered” 
OR “improper” OR “conflicting” OR “not removed” OR “excessive” 
OR “performed” OR “initiated”) 
Note that the NTSB used the 
“performed” modifier to 
indicate control interference by 
a passenger, and “initiated” 
when a pilot tried to take over 
the controls when another pilot 
was flying the helicopter  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Similar to the process I followed for defining “many-to-one” hazardous states, I defined 26 
many-to-one triggers by combining NTSB codes that conveyed the same meaning. Table 
18 defines the failure to remove aircraft/rotor tie-down trigger. Tables 135 through 159 
(Appendix B) present these triggers. 
Table 18: Failure to Remove Aircraft/Rotor Tie-down Trigger Definition 
Failure to Remove Aircraft/Rotor Tie-down 
This trigger represents failure of ground personnel or pilot(s) to remove a tie-down before flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
23316: Ground tie-down rope/strap AND (“not removed”) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “tie-down”. I did 
not include the code that 
17118: Miscellaneous equipment/furnishings—Aircraft tie-down(s) 
AND (“not removed” OR “separation” OR “entangled”) 
24008: Tie down AND (“not removed”) 
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Failure to Remove Aircraft/Rotor Tie-down 
24810: Rotor blade tie-down(s) AND (“not removed”) 
corresponded to securing cargo 
under this trigger. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01011020XX: Aircraft handling/service—Parking/securing-Tie-
down/mooring 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “tie-down”. I did 
not include the code that 
corresponded to securing cargo 
under this trigger. 
01011000XX: Aircraft handling/service—Parking/securing (general) 
AND (“incorrect use/operation”) 
 
Table 19 shows the definition for the improper preflight planning trigger. I searched the 
coding manual for the word “preflight”, and derivatives of the word “plan” and “prepare”. 
Table 19 shows the codes and logical statements for this trigger. The codes in the pre-2008 
system (24001, 24002, and 24405) convey the same meaning—that the pilot did not carry 
out a proper preflight plan. 
Table 19: Improper Preflight Planning Trigger Definition 
Improper Preflight Planning 
This trigger represents incorrect or insufficient planning by the pilot(s) before flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24001: Preflight planning/preparation AND (“inadequate” OR 
“improper” OR “poor” OR “not performed” OR “inaccurate” OR 
“intentional”) 
First, I searched for the word 
“preflight” and derivatives of 
the word “plan” and “prepare” 
in the NTSB coding manual. I 
did not include codes for 
inflight planning.  
24002: Aircraft preflight AND (“improper” OR “inadequate” OR 
“poor” OR “not performed” OR “inaccurate” OR “disregarded”) 
24405: Preflight briefing service OR (“not obtained” OR “not used” 
OR “improper use of” OR “incorrect”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
030: Preflight/dispatch event First, I searched for the word 
“preflight” and derivatives of 
the word “plan” and “prepare” 
in the NTSB coding manual.  
 
While these codes do not 
necessarily convey the same 
meaning, they can be placed 
under a hierarchy for preflight 
planning (see Figure 8). 
02061000XX: Planning/preparation (general) 
02061010XX: Planning/preparation—Performance calculations 
02061015XX: Planning/preparation—Weight/balance calculations 
02061020XX: Planning/preparation—Weather planning 
02061025XX: Planning/preparation—Flight planning/navigation 
02061030XX: Planning/preparation—Fuel planning 
All the post-2008 codes classified under the improper preflight planning trigger system do 
not necessarily convey the same meaning; however, they can be placed in an improper 
preflight planning hierarchy (Figure 25). Using this hierarchy facilitates counting not just 
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the number of instances improper preflight planning triggered hazardous states, but also 
the number of times each of the constituents of the hierarchy appeared in accidents. 
 
Figure 25: A trigger hierarchy for improper preflight planning. Using this hierarchy 
facilitates counting not just the number of instances improper preflight planning (top-
level trigger) triggered hazardous states, but also the number of times each of the 
constituents (second-level triggers) of the hierarchy appeared in accidents. 
Similar to preflight planning, consider the example of the “rotorcraft flight control failure” 
trigger, shown in Table 20. Here, each of the rows are individual triggers that can also be 
grouped under the “rotorcraft flight control failure” hierarchy, as suggested by the 
hierarchies in the NTSB coding manual. I tabulate similar such hierarchies in Tables 160 
through 209 (Appendix B), and use the blue shade for convenient identification.  
Table 20: Using the existing NTSB hierarchy of subject codes to define the rotorcraft 
flight control failure trigger. These codes indicate structural failure/malfunction of 
rotorcraft flight control components 
Rotorcraft Flight Control Failure 
This trigger represents failure of a flight control component. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
10900: Rotorcraft flight control (general) AND 
(“disconnected” OR “separation” OR “cut/severed” 
OR “jammed” OR “fatigue” OR “inadequate” OR 
“undetermined” OR “disabled” OR “vibration” OR 
“failure-total” OR “failure”) 
These codes are those given the NTSB 
hierarchy. Each row is an individual (second-
level) trigger. 10901: Rotorcraft flight control-cyclic control AND 
(“disconnected” OR “separation” OR “cut/severed” 
OR “jammed” OR “fatigue” OR “inadequate” OR 
“undetermined” OR “inoperative” OR “lock” OR “not 
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Rotorcraft Flight Control Failure 
This trigger represents failure of a flight control component. 
safetied” OR “seized” OR “fractured” OR 
“oscillation”) 
10902: Rotorcraft flight control-cyclic control rod 
AND (“fractured” OR “separated” OR “corroded” OR 
“disconnected” OR “movement restricted” OR 
“overload” OR “failure-partial” OR “failure-total” OR 
“not safetied” OR “not installed” OR “fatigue”) 
10903: Rotorcraft flight control-cyclic bellcrank AND 
(“failure-total” OR “disconnected” OR “inadequate” 
OR “fatigue”) 
10904: Rotorcraft flight control-collective control 
AND (“unlocked” OR “worn” OR “inoperative” OR 
“failure-total” OR incorrect” OR “undetermined” OR 
“locked” OR “failure” OR “failure-partial” OR 
“blocked-partial” OR “disabled” OR “movement 
restricted” OR “not secured”) 
10905: Rotorcraft flight control-collective control rod 
AND (“fatigue” OR “failure-total” OR “disengaged” 
OR “overload” OR “disconnected”) 
10906: Rotorcraft flight control-collective bellcrank 
AND (“jammed” OR “improper”) 
10908: Rotorcraft flight control-tail rotor pedal AND 
(“vibration” OR “jammed” OR “blocked-total” OR 
“cut/severed”) 
10909: Rotorcraft flight control-tail rotor control AND 
(“loss-total” OR “undetermined” OR “failure” OR 
“disconnected” OR “fatigue” OR “incorrect” OR 
“failure-total” OR “loss-partial” OR “movement 
restricted” OR “worn” OR “disabled” OR “lack of“ 
OR “inoperative”) 
10910: Rotorcraft flight control-tail rotor bellcrank 
AND (“fatigue”) 
10911: Rotorcraft flight control-tail rotor cable AND 
(“failure-total” OR “chafed” OR “fractured” OR 
“failure” OR “loose part” OR “separation” OR 
“undetermined” OR “corroded” OR “movement 
restricted” OR “disengaged” OR “worn” OR 
“overload”) 
10912: Rotorcraft flight control-mixing unit AND 
(“fatigue” OR “disconnected” OR “failure-total” OR 
“separation”) 
10914: Rotorcraft flight control-rotating scissors AND 
(“disconnected”) 
10915: Rotorcraft flight control-swashplate assembly 
AND (“disconnected” OR “disengaged” OR “over-
temperature” OR “seized” OR “failure-total” OR 
“failure-partial” OR “jammed” OR “fatigue”) 
10916: Rotorcraft flight control-pitch change rod/link 
AND (“overload” OR “loose part” OR “failure-total” 
OR “fracture” OR “fatigue”) 
10917: Rotorcraft flight control-pitch change horn 




Rotorcraft Flight Control Failure 
This trigger represents failure of a flight control component. 
10918: Rotorcraft flight control-synchronized elevator 
control AND (“separation”) 
10920: Rotorcraft flight control-control rod bearing 
AND (“worn” OR “failure-total” OR “separation”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01046700XX: Rotorcraft flight control (general) AND 
(“failure” OR “malfunction”) 
I identified these codes by searching for the 
“rotorcraft flight control” hierarchy in the 
NTSB coding manual. 
Each row is an individual (second-level) 
trigger. 
01046710XX: Rotorcraft flight control—Main rotor 
control AND (“failure” OR “damaged/degraded”) 
01046720XX: Rotorcraft flight control—Tail rotor 
control AND (“failure”) 
01046730XX: Rotorcraft flight control—Rotorcraft 
servo system AND (“failure” OR 
“fatigue/wear/corrosion”) 
 
4.3.2.1 Trigger Definitions Based on Position in Accident Sequence 
I defined four triggers as a combination of codes and their position in the state transition 
sequence. I discuss the approach to identifying these triggers in more detail in Section 4.4.2 
(after presenting the rules for sequencing states). Tables 21 through 24 present the 
definitions of these triggers. 
Table 21: Clipping of Object/Terrain Trigger Definition 
Clipping of Object/Terrain  
This trigger represents clipping of an object or terrain during flight. I defined this trigger after 
sequencing states. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
220: Inflight collision with object AND NOT (an end state) AND 
NOT (“170: Fire/explosion” OR “171: Fire” as end state) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrases “collision with 
object” and “collision with 
terrain”. I used the state 
sequence to ensure that these 
codes were not end states. 
 
In some cases, a post-impact 
fire can result from a collision. 
In such scenarios, I treat the 
collision as the end state (and 
the fire/explosion results from 
the end state).  
230: Inflight collision with terrain/water AND NOT (an end state) 
AND NOT (“170: Fire/explosion” OR “171: Fire” as end state) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
470: Collision with terrain/object AND NOT (an end state) AND 
NOT (“170: Fire/smoke post-impact” OR “180: Explosion post-
impact” as end state) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrases “collision with 
88 
 
Clipping of Object/Terrain  
120: Controlled flight into terrain AND NOT (an end state) AND 
NOT (“170: Fire/smoke post-impact” OR “180: Explosion post-
impact” as end state) 
object” and “collision with 
terrain”. I used the state 
sequence to ensure that these 
codes were not end states. I also 
include cases where the NTSB 
reports CFIT; however, CFIT 
was not the end state. 
 
 In some cases, a post-impact 
fire can result from a collision. 
In such scenarios, I treat the 
collision as the end state (and 
the fire/explosion results from 
the end state). 
 
Table 22: Clipping of Wing/Rotor Trigger Definition 
Clipping of Wing/Rotor  
This trigger represents clipping of wing/rotor during flight. I defined this trigger after sequencing states. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
160: Dragged wing/rotor/float/other AND NOT (an end state) AND 
NOT (“170: Fire/explosion” OR “171: Fire” as end state) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “dragged wing”. 
I used the state sequence to 
ensure that these codes were 
not end states. 
 
In some cases, a post-impact 
fire can result from a collision. 
In such scenarios, I treat the 
collision as the end state (and 
the fire/explosion results from 
the end state).  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
093: Dragged wing/rotor/float/other AND NOT (an end state) AND 
NOT (“170: Fire/smoke post-impact” OR “180: Explosion post-
impact” as end state) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “dragged wing”. 
I used the state sequence to 
ensure that these codes were 
not end states. 
 
 In some cases, a post-impact 
fire can result from a collision. 
In such scenarios, I treat the 
collision as the end state (and 
the fire/explosion results from 




Table 23: Clipping in Midair Trigger Definition 
Clipping in Midair  
This trigger represents clipping of another aircraft during flight. I defined this trigger after sequencing 
states. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
270: Midair collision AND NOT (an end state) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “midair”. I used 
the state sequence to ensure 
that the midair collision was 
not the end state. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
250: Midair collision AND NOT (an end state) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “midair”. I used 
the state sequence to ensure 
that the midair collision was 
not the end state. 
 
Table 24: Inflight fire/explosion Trigger Definition 
Inflight Fire/Explosion  
This trigger represents fire/explosion that occurred during flight (before impact). I defined this trigger 
after sequencing states. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
170: Fire/explosion AND NOT (an end state) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “fire” and 
“explosion”. I also used the 
state sequence to ensure these 
codes were not end states 
171: Fire AND NOT (an end state) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
150: Fire/smoke (non-impact) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “fire” and 
“explosion”. In the post-2008 
system, the NTSB clearly 
distinguishes between post-
impact and non-impact 
fires/explosion 
 
Finally, I defined the “time spent in poor weather” trigger as the time spent in poor weather 
trigger that causes the system to move from a poor weather hazardous state to the 
disoriented/lack of awareness state (Table 25). A (non-instrument rated) pilot relies on 
visual cues to correctly orient the aircraft relative to the environment (ATSB, 2011). The 
obscuration of these visual cues during flight in poor weather (IMC conditions) and light 
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conditions can result spatial disorientation. The NTSB coding manual does not contain a 
trigger for the disoriented/lacking awareness state.  
Table 25: Time Spent in Poor Weather Trigger Definition 
Time Spent in Poor Weather 
This trigger causes the system to move from a poor weather state to a disoriented/lack of awareness 
state. 
User-defined Code Notes 
I defined the time spent in poor weather trigger that causes the system 
to move from a poor weather hazardous state to the disoriented/lack 
of awareness state. 
This trigger is inferred when the 
NTSB accident report does not 
indicate how the system 
transitioned from the poor 
weather state to the 
disoriented/lack of awareness 
state. 
 
4.3.3 Information Codes 
In some cases, the NTSB codes are neither triggers nor hazardous states—they provide 
additional information about hazardous states. I term these codes as information codes. For 
example, “19200: Terrain” and “20200: Object” codes provide additional information 
about the terrain or object, but do not describe a hazardous state of the system, nor a trigger 
that could cause a transition. An aircraft’s phase of flight can also be considered as an 
information code (with the exception of “553: uncontrolled descent”, which describes 
inflight loss of control and “601: Autorotation”, which indicates that the pilot performed 
an autorotation). 
4.3.3.1 Information about Object 
In the pre-2008 system, the NTSB used “20200: Object” frequently in accidents that 
involved “220: Collision with object” hazardous state (or clipping trigger event). The 
modifiers associated with the subject code provide additional information about the type 
of object the aircraft encountered (e.g., transmission wire, pole, or trees). 
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Table 26: Information about the Objects that Aircraft Collided with During Accidents 
(post-2008) 
Information about Object 
This code contains detailed information about the specific objects that aircraft collided with during 
flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
Tree(s) 
These codes are modifiers 
associated with the subject code 
20200: Object in the pre-2008 
coding system. 
 
 The NTSB used the object code 
(along with modifiers) to 
provide additional information 
regarding the object that the 




















Aircraft moving on ground 











Electrical tower (marked) 





Approach light/navigation aid 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
Pole These codes are modifiers 
associated with the subject code 
030220XXXX: 
Object/animal/substance in the 
post-2008 coding system. 
 
The NTSB uses the object code 
(along with modifiers) to 
 Runway/taxi/approach light 
Sign/marker 







Information about Object 
This code contains detailed information about the specific objects that aircraft collided with during 
flight. 
Wind sock provide additional information 
regarding the object that the 
aircraft clipped/collided with 














For accidents recorded in the post-2008 system, the NTSB provided information about the 
nature of the object under the “03022000XX–03022055XX: Object/animal/substance” 
hierarchy. The codes in this hierarchy were associated with modifiers such as “contributed 
to outcome” and “effect on equipment”, which provide some insight into the role of the 
object in the accident.  
Tables 410 through 412 (Appendix E) provides the description for different types of terrain, 
airport conditions/facilities, and flight phases. 
4.4 Creating the Grammar for the State-based Accident Model 
In the previous section, I presented the vocabulary to define states and triggers, and 
compiled the dictionary (of states and triggers) for the state-based accident model. Now, I 
proceed to create the “grammar” that contains the rules for: (1) sequencing the different 
states in accidents; and, (2) linking triggers to states. 
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4.4.1 Sequencing (Ordering) of Hazardous States 
In this section, I present the rules for arranging the different hazardous states in accidents. 
Figure 26 shows a simple representation of the working of the computer program that 
sequences the states. 
 
Figure 26: Demonstrating the working of the algorithm on a notional accident sequence. 
The top half of the figure (a) shows the unordered set of states in the accident, and (b) 
shows the states arranged in order after applying the sequencing rules. 
The top half of Figure 26 shows the unordered states from the accident report. The 
algorithm begins by identifying the preflight hazardous states and end/terminating state, 
and placing them at the beginning and end of the accident sequence, respectively. Then, 
the algorithm applies the sequencing rules (that I present in this chapter) to order the 
remaining states, providing the final ordered set of hazardous states in the accident. 
Before presenting the rules for sequencing (ordering) the different hazardous states, I sort 
the hazardous states (from the dictionary) into: (1) preflight hazardous states; (2) end or 
terminating states; and, (3) remaining states. 
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Preflight Hazardous State: as the name suggests, is a hazardous state that appears before 
flight; i.e., hazardous system states before being airborne. As stated earlier, the system can 
be in a hazardous state if either of the system’s constituents (i.e., pilot or aircraft) is in a 
hazardous state. Preflight pilot hazardous states include physically impaired pilot, poor 
psychological/mental state, and the pilot’s lack of experience or qualification. Preflight 
hazardous state for the aircraft is due to mechanical issues that generally result from 
improper maintenance and poor design. Table 27 shows all of the possible preflight 
hazardous states. If more than one of these codes appeared, then the algorithm puts them 
in the order specified in the table. 
Table 27: Possible Preflight Hazardous States in Accidents 
Preflight Hazardous States 
Hazardous states that appear in the beginning of an accident sequence. 
Can appear at the beginning of an accident sequence Notes 
Preflight mechanical issue  If more than one of these codes 
appeared, then the algorithm 
puts them in the order specified 
in the table. 
 
I classified improper 
supervision as a preflight 
hazardous state as it represents 
the instructor’s hazardous 
attitude. 
 
The low fuel, oil, and grease 
states are preflight states only if 
they are triggered by improper 
preflight planning by the pilot, 
improper maintenance by 
ground personnel (not 
filling/applying the correct 
amount of fluid). 
 
The NTSB used the codes 
corresponding to anxiety or 
pressure to indicate hazardous 
pilot mental state prior to flight. 
Physically impaired/incapacitated state 
Poor Psychological state 
Improper supervision state 
Insufficient qualification/training state 
Overconfidence/Lack of confidence  
Fatigued/overworked state 
Anxiety/under pressure state 
Preflight pilot issue (non-
impairment/psychological/confidence/fatigue) 
Unattended aircraft state 
Low fuel state 
Low oil state 
Low grease state 




End State: or terminating state, is a state that appears at the end of an incident or accident 
sequence. Hard landing, rollover, and collision with terrain/water are some examples for 
end states. Table 28 provides the 13 possible end states for accident sequences. 
Table 28: Possible End/Terminating States in Accidents 
End/Terminating States 
Hazardous states that appear in the end of an accident sequence. 
Can appear at the end of an accident sequence Notes 
Midair collision I identified 13 end possible end 
states.  
 
The NTSB combined the 
collision with object and terrain 
codes in the post-2008 system 
 
In the pre-2008 system, the 
NTSB sometimes used the 
180: Forced landing occurrence 
to indicate: (1) an end state; and 
in some cases (2) an emergency 
descent. 
Forced/emergency landing 
Collision during takeoff/landing 
Inflight collision with terrain/water/object 
Hard landing 
Dragged wing/rotor/float 
On-ground collision with terrain/object 
Rollover 
Nose down/nose over 
Controlled flight into terrain/object 
Ditching 
Abnormal runway contact 
Fire/explosion 
 
Intermediary States: are those hazardous states that are neither preflight nor end states. 
Examples for remaining states include inflight loss of control, loss of engine power, and 
low rotor RPM states.  
Now, I present the rules for sequencing the intermediary hazardous states. Consider the 
vortex ring state (also referred to as VRS or the settling with power state), which occurs 
when a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnut-
shaped vortex. The circulation of air at the rotating blade tips is pushed downwards by 
aerodynamic forces resulting in a vortex, which reduces the lift and increases the drag on 
the blades. A rapidly descending helicopter experiences increased upward flow of air at the 
blade root and eventual blade root stall. 
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Table 29 shows the hazardous states that can appear immediately after a vortex ring state. 
Each row contains a hazardous state that can potentially appear immediately after VRS. If 
more than one of the states is recorded in an accident that involved VRS, the states are 
arranged in the same order specified in Table 29. 
Table 29: Sequencing Rules for Vortex Ring State 
Vortex Ring State  
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnut-
shaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper altitude/clearance A high rate of descent, low 
airspeed, and applying more 
than 20% of available engine 
power to the rotor RPM can 
lead to vortex ring state. 
After entering the vortex ring 
state, generally, the helicopter 
experiences a loss of altitude. 
In some cases, the tail rotor 
enters a vortex ring state, 
resulting in a loss of tail rotor 
effectiveness (LTE). 
Failure to recover from LTE can 
result in an inflight loss of 
control. 
Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness (LTE) 
Loss of control 
Improper go-around 
 
Maintaining airspeed is critical to helicopter safety during forward flight. Failing to 
maintain airspeed can result in hazardous states such as improper translational lift, loss of 
tail rotor effectiveness, and aircraft/blade stall. Table 30 presents the different hazardous 
states that can appear immediately after the improper airspeed hazardous state. 
Table 30: Sequencing Rules for Improper Airspeed State 
Improper Airspeed State  
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct airspeed during flight. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper descent Maintaining airspeed is critical 
to helicopter safety during 
forward flight. 
 
Pilot can control the airspeed 
using the throttle (when the 
Improper altitude/clearance 
Improper RPM 
Improper translational lift 
Vortex ring state 
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) 
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Improper Airspeed State  
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct airspeed during flight. 
Inflight loss of control engine is operational) or by 





Ground resonance is a hazardous state where the primary frequency of the main rotor is 
amplified by the stiffness (and frequency) of the landing gear, resulting in violent vibration 
of the helicopter. This phenomenon occurs when an improper landing causes helicopter 
airframe to jolt or bounce. Table 31 shows the different hazardous states that can appear 
immediately after the ground resonance state. 
Table 31: Sequencing Rules for Ground Resonance State 
Ground Resonance State  
Hazardous state where the primary frequency of the main rotor is amplified by the stiffness (and 
frequency) of the landing gear, resulting in violent vibration of the helicopter. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Inflight loss of control Ground resonance occurs when 
the helicopter touches down 
incorrectly.  
 
This phenomenon occurs in 
fully articulated rotor systems 
where each blade is attached to 
the rotor hub through a hinge, 
and can move independently of 
the other blades. 
 
Owing to the violent vibration 
during ground resonance, parts 
of the helicopter can break-off, 
transitioning to a system failure 
state. 
On-ground loss of control 
System failure 
 
In certain cases, the positions of some states in the sequence are interchangeable. Improper 
rotor RPM and improper airspeed are examples of hazardous states whose positions can be 
interchanged in the accident sequence. Consider for example an accident involving a Hiller 
UH-12B that occurred in 1986, near Fall River, KS (NTSB ID: MKC86FA082). The 
accident report mentioned that the pilot failed to maintain airspeed and RPM during the 
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descent. Here, the system (aircraft and pilot) first entered an improper airspeed state 
followed by an improper RPM state. Consider another accident where the order of the 
improper RPM and airspeed hazardous states is flipped. The fatal accident occurred near 
Niles, OH, when a kit-built Rotorway Scorpion collided with terrain, killing the pilot 
(NTSB ID: CHI82FA260). Here, the pilot failed to correct a low RPM state before 
transitioning to an improper airspeed hazardous state. I handle such interchangeable 
situations by placing them in the order in which they are mentioned in the accident reports. 
Table 32 shows the different hazardous states that can appear immediately after an 
improper RPM state. 
Table 32: Sequencing Rules for Improper RPM State 
Improper RPM State  
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct rotor RPM during flight. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper climb Set of hazardous states that can 
appear immediately after the 
improper RPM state.  
 
The helicopter flying handbook 
emphasizes the importance of 
maintain rotor RPM by 
comparing it to “life” (FAA, 
2016c). The appearance of 
several key hazardous states 
after the improper RPM state 




Improper translational lift 
Improper descent 
Vortex ring state 
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) 
Inflight loss of control 
Improper flare 
 
Similarly, I present the rules for the remaining hazardous states in Tables 309 through 358 
(see Appendix C). 
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4.4.2 Linking States and Triggers 
After sequencing the hazardous states, I specify the rules that link the different triggers and 
hazardous states. Figure 27 shows a simple representation of the working of the computer 
program that links the triggers into (and out of) each hazardous state. 
 
Figure 27: Demonstrating the working of the algorithm on a notional accident sequence. 
The top half of the figure (a) shows sequenced and unlinked hazardous states, and (b) 
shows the triggers linked to each hazardous state. 
The computer program takes in the sequenced set of hazardous states for each accident and 
uses the rules I specified to link hazardous states and triggers. 
There is a clear relationship between some triggers and hazardous states (e.g., loss of 
engine power, system failure state). Table 33 shows the different triggers for the loss of 
engine power state. If more than one of these triggers appears in an accident report, I group 
the triggers and refer to the group as a “rapid sequence of triggers”. 
Table 33: Triggers into the Loss of Engine Power State 
Loss of Engine Power State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft has lost engine power. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Engine assembly failure There is a clear relationship 
between these triggers (e.g., 
combustion assembly failure) 
Compressor assembly failure 
Combustion assembly failure 
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Loss of Engine Power State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft has lost engine power. 
Turbine assembly failure and the loss of engine power 
hazardous state. 
 
If more than one of these 
triggers appears in an accident, I 
group the triggers and refer to 
the group as a “rapid sequence 
of triggers”. 
Exhaust system failure 
Propeller accessory drive failure 
Ignition system failure 
Bleed air system failure 
Fuel system failure 
Improper use of the fuel system 
Lubrication system failure 
Engine installation failure 
Reduction gear assembly failure 
Cooling system failure 
Turboshaft engine component failure 
Throttle/power control failure 
Fuel injection system contamination/failure 
Induction air system contamination/failure 
Inlet assembly failure  
Improper fuel grade 
Fuel contamination/exhaustion 
Carburetor heat control failure 
Improper reading from/failure of engine instruments 
Engine compartment failure 
Engine compressor stall/surge 
Engine pre-ignition/detonation 
Uncontained engine failure 
Engine accessories failure 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
Improper use of carburetor heat 
Improper use of deicing system 
Improper engine shutdown 
Deicing system failure 
Improper use of deicing system 
Unknown reasons 
 
Similar to the loss of engine power state, there exists a clear relationship between the 
system failure state and the triggers associated with it. Table 34 shows the triggers for the 
system failure state. 
Table 34 Triggers into the System Failure State 
System Failure State 
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Fuselage/wing failure I identified these codes by 
searching the dictionary of 
triggers that indicated failure of 
a system or component. 
 
Flight control surfaces/attachments failure 
Door/window failure/contamination 
Flight control system failure 
Stabilizer system failure 
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System Failure State 
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned. 
Rotor drive system failure Some triggers are common to 
the loss of engine power and 
system failure states. For 
example, improper use of the 
deicing system can potentially 
trigger pitot static tube 
malfunction (system failure), or 
a loss of engine power. 
 
Snagging or entanglement of 
external load equipment can 
trigger a system failure or an 
inflight loss of control. In some 
accidents, the NTSB does not 
report a system failure, but 
indicates an inflight loss of 
control (with the 
snagging/entanglement code).  
 
If more than one of these 
triggers appears in an accident, I 
group the triggers and refer to 
the group as a “rapid sequence 
of triggers”. 
Rotor system failure 
Rotorcraft flight control system failure 
Airframe component failure 
Electrical system failure  
Hydraulic system failure 
Improper use of electrical system 
Improper use of hydraulic system 
Navigation instrument failure 
Rotorcraft flight control failure 
Deicing system failure 
Improper use of deicing system 
Pneumatic system failure 
Improper use of aerial application/external load equipment 
Aerial application/external load equipment failure/entanglement 
Entanglement of helmet 
Improper use/failure of shoulder harness 
Improper use/failure of seat belt 
Entanglement of cargo restraints 
Failure of rafts 
Failure of furnishing equipment 
Improper reading from/failure of engine instruments 
Lubricating system failure/contamination 
Propeller accessory drive failure 
Exhaust system failure 
Landing gear failure 
Unknown reasons 
 
Certain codes in the NTSB coding manual translate to triggers that have broad definitions, 
and can therefore trigger multiple hazardous states in a single accident. Improper inflight 
planning/decision-making is an example of a trigger that can be linked to multiple 
hazardous states in the same accident. Consider for example a sightseeing accident that 
occurred near Humuula, HI, in February 1994. The pilot encountered hazardous weather 
conditions, failed to maintain airspeed, and subsequently lost control of the aircraft and 
collided with terrain (NTSB ID: LAX94LA134). Improper inflight planning/decision-
making is the only the trigger available from the accident report and can potentially trigger 
three hazardous states: intentional/inadvertent flight through poor weather, improper 
airspeed, and inflight loss of control. In this scenario, I assign improper inflight 
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planning/decision-making as a trigger to all three hazardous states. Table 359 through 409 
(in Appendix D) shows similar triggers that could be applied to multiple states in an 
accident. 
Many rotorcraft accidents involved collision with terrain/objects. In some cases, these 
collisions were end states, while in other situations, colliding with (or clipping, hitting) 
objects/terrain caused the accident. To be able to differentiate between collisions that are 
end states and triggers in accidents, I defined four “clipping” triggers—clipping of 
object/terrain, clipping in midair, clipping of wing/rotor, and inflight fire/explosion (see 
Tables 21–24 for trigger definitions). Some accident reports indicate that the aircraft 
collided with an object/terrain before losing control. For example, in May 1994, the pilot 
of a Schweizer 269C lost control of the aircraft and collided with terrain near Hiram, GA 
(NTSB ID: ATL94LA100). The VFR-rated pilot inadvertently flew into IMC conditions, 
collided with trees, lost control of the aircraft, and impacted the terrain. When I apply the 
trigger definition to this accident sequence, the collision with trees translates to “clipping 
of object/terrain” trigger.  
If the computer program cannot identify a trigger for each hazardous state in a particular 
accident, that accident is flagged for manual review.  
Table 35 provides all the triggers that can cause the system to move to an inflight loss of 
control state. 
Table 35: Triggers into the Inflight Loss of Control State 
Inflight Loss of Control 
A hazardous state that involves an unintended departure of an aircraft from controlled flight regime 
(FAA, 2016). 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of cyclic I searched for codes that were 
associated with controlling the 
aircraft.  
 
Improper use of collective 
Improper compensation for winds 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
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Inflight Loss of Control 
A hazardous state that involves an unintended departure of an aircraft from controlled flight regime 
(FAA, 2016). 
Improper maneuvering I excluded codes relating to 
system failure (with the 
exception of the entanglement 
triggers) and loss of engine 
power. 
 
If no triggers were available 
from the accident report, I 
inferred triggers based on: 
 Whether a system 
failure state preceded 





 Whether an improper 
autorotation/low RPM 
(engine not 
operational) /VRS state 
preceded LOC. If yes, I 




 If the engine was 
operational, I inferred 
the “incorrect use of 
throttle/collective 
input”. Also, I used 
this trigger to indicate 
failed power recovery 
after a simulated 
autorotation. 
 If the helicopter 
experienced LTE, then 
I inferred “incorrect 
use of anti-torque pedal 
and cyclic” 
 If the pilot was in a 
disoriented state before 
LOC, I inferred the 
“no/failed recovery 
action after disoriented 
state” trigger. I used 
this trigger (and not 
improper remedial 
action) to be able to 
differentiate between 
codes that appeared in 
accident reports and 
those that I inferred. 
Improper aircraft handling 
Improper use of rotorcraft flight controls 
Improper use of tail rotor/anti-torque control 
Not possible 
Improper load jettison 
Aerial application/external load equipment entanglement 
Control interference 
Relinquishing control 
Failure to remove aircraft/rotor tie-down 
Improper use of control friction 
Improper trim setting 
Disturbance by passenger 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Not possible  
Improper use of procedures/directives 
Clipping of object/terrain  
Clipping in midair 
Incorrect use of throttle and/or collective input 
Incorrect use of collective and/or cyclic 
Incorrect use of anti-torque pedal and cyclic 
Impossible/reduced control authority after system failure 
No/failed recovery after disoriented state 
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Inflight Loss of Control 
A hazardous state that involves an unintended departure of an aircraft from controlled flight regime 
(FAA, 2016). 
 
If more than one of these 
triggers appears in an accident, I 
group the triggers and refer to 
the group as a “rapid sequence 
of triggers”. 
 















CHAPTER 5. ANALYZING HELICOPTER ACCIDENTS USING 
STATE-BASED ACCIDENT MODEL 
In this chapter, I use three example questions to demonstrate the application and investigate 
the potential usefulness of the state-based model. I do one high-level analysis of the 6200 
accidents in the database to identify the most frequent states and triggers—i.e., the states 
and triggers that are most likely to be associated with, or lead to, accidents. Next, I 
investigate the causal patterns associated with two of the most hazardous states—loss of 
control and improper autorotation. 
5.1 Presence of Hazardous States and Triggers in Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents 
Most efforts to reduce GA accidents focus on reducing fatal accidents. The argument made 
for focusing on reducing fatal accidents is that, since these accidents have the most severe 
consequences, we should first eliminate them. While this goal is worthy, it usually results 
in a narrow focus on investigating only fatal accidents, suggesting an underlying 
assumption that non-fatal accidents cannot provide insight into fatal accidents. 
Unfortunately, fatal GA accidents are often difficult to investigate. In many cases, it is hard 
to discern the reasons for an accident if the aircraft is extensively damaged or destroyed in 
a post-crash fire. Many fatal accidents have no survivors, making it impossible for 
investigators to gather information from interviews with pilots or occupants. Many 
rotorcraft do not have on-board flight data recorders (FDR) or “black boxes”, making it 
challenging for investigators to reconstruct the reasons for fatal accidents. In contrast, non-
fatal accidents, which account for the majority of accidents, offer the potential for deeper 
understanding because the aircraft is often not destroyed, and investigators can supplement 
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their accident findings with pilot testimonies. Unfortunately, many investigations do not 
take advantage of this potential—in part because these accidents are not fatal and therefore 
do not warrant significant investigation resources. 
In this section, I argue that data from non-fatal accidents can help us to better understand 
the causes of fatal accidents. To make my argument, I apply the state-based accident 
modeling approach to 6200 helicopter accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015. I 
identify the most frequent states (preflight, remaining, and end states) and triggers in 
accidents overall, and compare their presence in fatal and non-fatal outcomes29. I show that 
fatal and non-fatal accidents share many causes, thus deeper investigations of non-fatal 
accidents may help identify ways to reduce all types of accidents. 
I begin by developing a measure of frequency that takes into account that states and triggers 
may repeat in a particular accident. Repeated occurrence of a state in an accident does not 
necessarily reflect greater importance. For example, the prevailing/existing weather 
hazardous state may be mentioned multiple times in an accident to describe various weather 
characteristics (e.g., tailwind, high density-altitude). Another example of repeated mention 
of a state in an accident involves improper rotor RPM—where the first instance refers to 
the rotor RPM being too high while the second instance is to indicate the RPM was too 
low. Therefore, we calculate the presence [cf. Sorenson and Marais, 2015] for each 𝐻𝑎𝑧𝑗 
as the number of times that hazardous state was reported at least once in an accident, 
normalized by the total number of accidents: 
                                                 



















For example, the LOC hazardous state appears at least once in 2516 out of the 6200 
accidents, thus its presence in rotorcraft accidents is 40.6%. The total presence of all the 
hazardous states generally does not sum to 100% because a given accident can involve 
multiple hazardous states. For example, an accident might involve both loss of control and 
inadequate rotor RPM hazardous states. 
Between 1982 and 2015, there were 6200 helicopter accidents—16.2% were fatal and the 
remaining 83.8% were non-fatal30. 
Table 36: Comparison of the Ranking and Presence of End States in Fatal, Non-fatal, and 
Accidents Overall.  
Description of End States 
Presence in Accidents 
Overall Fatal Non-fatal 
Inflight collision with terrain/water/object 45.2% 79.0% 38.6% 
Hard landing 19.2% 2.5% 22.4% 
Roll over 16.9% 3.2% 20.5% 
On-ground collision with terrain/water/object 2.7% 1.1% 3.0% 
Forced/emergency landing 1.9% 0.2% 2.2% 
 
                                                 
30 Similar to the classification in Chapter 3, I group all accidents that did not involve any fatalities as non-
fatal accidents. The non-fatal category includes accidents that involved serious, minor, or no injuries. 
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Table 36 shows the top five end states in helicopters accidents overall in 1982–2015. The 
top five states are ranked based on their presence in accidents overall. The first column 
provides a description of the state, the second column shows the presence of the end state 
in accidents overall, and the third and fourth columns show the presence of end states in 
fatal and non-fatal accidents, respectively. The top five end states appeared in 84% of 
accidents. The other eight end states (see Table 27 in Chapter 4) accounted for the 
remaining accidents31. 
Not surprisingly, 45.2% of the accidents had inflight collision with terrain/water/object as 
the end state (flights must end on the ground/water). The deadly nature of this end state is 
highlighted by its high presence (79%) in fatal accidents. 
The hard landing end state has the second highest presence (19.2%) in accidents overall, 
as shown in the second row of Table 36. Accidents that ended in hard landings were 
generally survivable, as indicated by the high presence of this end state in non-fatal 
accidents. Many accidents that involved improper autorotation ended in hard landings. 
Rollovers occur when the helicopter exceeds a critical roll/bank angle while one of the 
skids (landing gear wheels) is in contact with the ground. Rollovers appeared third most 
frequently in accidents overall. Similar to hard landings, accidents that ended in rollovers 
usually did not result in death. 
Table 37: Comparison of the Presence of Preflight states in Fatal, Non-Fatal, and 
Accidents Overall. 
Description of Preflight States 
Presence in Accidents 
Overall Fatal Non-fatal 
Prevailing/existing weather and light state 17.7% 19.4% 17.4% 
                                                 
31 6% of the accident did not have a permissible end state. See discussion regarding non-permissible end 
states in Chapter 3. 
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Description of Preflight States 
Presence in Accidents 
Overall Fatal Non-fatal 
Preflight mechanical issues 13.9% 17.1% 13.2% 
Qualification/lack of experience  6.4% 11.1% 5.5% 
Improper supervision 4.0% 1.6% 4.4% 
Overconfidence/lack of confidence 1.1% 3.0% 0.8% 
 
Table 37 shows the top five preflight hazardous states in helicopter accidents between 1982 
and 2015. Not all poor weather accidents need necessarily involve intentional/inadvertent 
flight through poor weather. While flight in the prevailing weather (or light) state (e.g., 
high density altitude, tailwind, or glare) can be considered less hazardous (than, say, VFR 
flight into IMC), the prevailing weather and light conditions could still play a role in the 
accident. This state has the highest presence (17.7%) in accidents overall. 
Preflight mechanical issues appeared in 13.9% of accidents overall. Flights that began with 
preflight mechanical issues had a higher presence in fatal accidents (17.1%) compared to 
non-fatal cases (13.2%), highlighting the importance of proper maintenance and preflight 
checks. 
6.4% of accidents began with pilots who lacked relevant experience with regard to the 
aircraft or operating environment. The presence of lack of experience is almost twice as 
high in fatal accidents as in non-fatal accidents, suggesting that inexperienced pilots are 
more likely to get into situations that result in fatalities.  
Table 38: Comparison of the Presence of Intermediary states in Fatal, Non-Fatal, and 
Accidents Overall. 
Description of Intermediary States 
Presence in Accidents 
Overall Fatal Non-fatal 
Inflight loss of control 40.6% 60.3% 36.7% 
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Description of Intermediary States 
Presence in Accidents 
Overall Fatal Non-fatal 
Loss of engine power 26.0% 14.7% 28.2% 
Improper altitude/clearance 15.8% 23.8% 14.0% 
System failure 13.1% 17.7% 12.2% 
Improper autorotation 9.8% 7.6% 10.3% 
 
Table 38 shows the top five intermediary states (i.e., states that are neither end states, nor 
preflight hazardous states). Inflight loss of control (LOC) was the top-ranked hazardous 
state, appearing in 40.6% of helicopter accidents in 1982–2015. Accidents involving loss 
of control often had severe consequences, as indicated by a high presence of 60.3% in fatal 
accidents, versus 36.7% in non-fatal accidents. The presence of LOC in over a third of the 
non-fatal accidents (36.7%) provides potential opportunities to learn more about the causes 
for LOC by interviewing pilots/passengers who survived the LOC accidents. 
Loss of engine power is the second-ranked hazardous state in helicopter accidents, with a 
presence of 26.0% in accidents overall. Pilots are trained to perform autorotative landings 
if they experience a loss of engine power during flight. Many pilots are able to recover 
successfully, as indicated by the higher presence of 28.2% in non-fatal accidents.  
The improper altitude/clearance hazardous state appeared third most frequently in 
helicopter accidents overall. Failure to maintain proper altitude/clearance from 
terrain/objects often results in inflight collisions with terrain/object (end state) or clipping 
terrain/object, which can potentially trigger an LOC state. Maintaining altitude is one of 
the key elements to a successful autorotative landing. Misjudged or inadequate altitude 
during autorotations can potentially result in accidents.  
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System failure appeared in 13.1% of accidents overall. Failure of critical aircraft control 
systems (e.g., cyclic control) can often render the helicopter uncontrollable. The high 
presence in fatal accidents (17.7%) compared to non-fatal outcomes (12.2%) suggests that 
flights with inflight system failures were more likely to end in fatalities. 
Similar to the previous calculations (see Eq. 6), the presence of a 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑘 is given by the 
number of times that trigger event was cited at least once in an accident (fatal, and non-
fatal), normalized by the total number of (fatal, and non-fatal) accidents: 
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑘| 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡)
=













For example, the inflight planning/decision trigger appears at least once in 100 out of the 
1005 fatal accidents, thus its presence in fatal accidents is 14.3%. Similarly, it appears at 
least once in 422 out of 5195 non-fatal accidents, thus its presence in non-fatal accidents 
is 7.8%. 
Note that the NTSB assigned the “25000: Reason for occurrence undetermined” subject 
code when the reason for an occurrence was unknown—in 11.4% of fatal accidents and 
9.4% of non-fatal accidents. Although this code is one of the most frequently cited, I do 
not include it in the ranking of top triggers because it does not provide any information on 
the actual cause in an accident. 
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Table 39: Comparison of the presence of triggers in Fatal, Non-Fatal, and Accidents 
Overall.  
Description of Preflight States 
Presence in Accidents 
Overall Fatal Non-fatal 
Improper maintenance  10.8% 11.0% 10.2% 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 8.9% 14.3% 7.8% 
Improper use of procedures/directives 7.5% 10.0% 7.0% 
Improper preflight planning 7.0% 7.7% 6.8% 
Rotor drive system failure 6.5% 6.6% 6.5% 
 
Table 39 shows the top five triggers associated with helicopter accidents in 1982–2015. 
The improper maintenance trigger has the highest presence overall. Improper maintenance 
actions include errors (slips, lapses, or mistakes) or violations (disregarding 
directives/procedures). Improper maintenance can trigger a preflight mechanical issue 
(which is the second-ranked preflight hazardous state). Improper maintenance often affects 
key helicopter systems such as the rotor system and rotor drive system (Rao et al., 2016).  
Improper inflight planning/decision-making is ranked second based on presence in 
accidents overall. It has the highest presence in fatal accidents (14.3%). The coding manual 
and accident reports provide little information on the exact nature of poor decisions made 
by pilots. A possible reason for the high presence of improper inflight planning/decision-
making could be that investigators did not have enough information to make a more 
accurate determination of what went wrong in accidents (and chose improper inflight 
planning/decision-making instead). 
Improper use of procedures or directives was more likely to appear in fatal than non-fatal 
accidents. This trigger represents situations where the pilots/maintenance personnel had 
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access to sufficient information/procedures, and chose to disregard or failed to use them 
correctly. 
As part of their training, pilots are instructed to complete a thorough preflight plan prior to 
departure. The preflight plan includes an airworthiness check, weather briefing, and 
consulting navigation charts to plot a flight path and make note of terrain or obstacles. 
Failure to carry out or complete a preflight plan can put the flight in a hazardous state 
before departure. For example, on a snowy evening in January 1991, an MBB BK-117B1 
crashed into terrain while returning from a medevac mission near Sonestown, PA (NTSB 
ID: NYC91FA067). The resulting crash killed the pilot and three other occupants. The 
NTSB used radar data and flight data recovered from the helicopter to reconstruct the flight 
path and altitude. Their investigation revealed that impact with a mountain ridge occurred 
at 2440 ft. MSL, while the ridge was 2520 ft. MSL with 40 ft. high trees. The NTSB 
concluded that the pilot’s preflight planning did not consider the ridge. In this accident, it 
is likely that the pilot took no evasive action because he had limited knowledge of the 
impending collision with terrain. 
The rotor drive system, as the name indicates, is responsible for driving the main rotor and 
tail rotor in a helicopter. Failure of any component in this system triggers a system failure 
hazardous state. Recovering directional control of the helicopter, and performing a safe 
autorotative landing becomes difficult after a rotor drive system failure. The almost equal 
presence in fatal and non-fatal suggests that this trigger is equally likely to appear in both 
fatal and non-fatal outcomes. 
I began this section by arguing that we can use non-fatal helicopter accident data to 
potentially better understand the causes for fatal accidents (and accidents overall). To see 
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if there is potential to learn from non-fatal accidents, I used the state-based approach to 
identify the top hazardous states and triggers in accidents overall. Then, I compared the 
presence of these states and triggers in fatal and non-fatal accidents. The results from the 
analysis suggest that we can learn from non-fatal accidents to improve rotorcraft safety. 
Poor aeronautical decision-making (ADM) is a feature of both fatal and non-fatal GA 
accidents. Poor inflight planning/decision-making was the top trigger in fatal accidents. 
While this trigger suggests that an incorrect action or improper setting chosen by the pilot 
led to the hazardous state, it provides little information about the actual action taken during 
flight. Since this trigger is important in fatal accidents, and occurs frequently in non-fatal 
accidents, we have an opportunity to learn much more about it, and potentially prevent 
both fatal and non-fatal accidents. One way we could learn from these accidents is by 
interviewing pilots or survivors about the incorrect actions that resulted from bad decisions, 
and also the circumstances that might have resulted in poor decisions. The interviews might 
also lend insight into pilots’ risk perception, confidence in their abilities, and assessment 
of situations. Another avenue that could potentially improve our understanding of bad 
decisions includes analyzing flight data recorder (FDR) data in fata (and non-fatal) 
accidents. While the number of GA aircraft with FDRs is limited, recent efforts to improve 
GA safety using flight data records could help understand pilot decision-making. 
Improper maintenance was the second-ranked trigger in fatal helicopter accidents, and had 
a similar presence in non-fatal accidents. This trigger puts that system in a preflight 
mechanical issue state (which happens to be the second most frequent preflight hazardous 
state). In many cases, system failures that often follow preflight mechanical issues can 
render aircraft difficult (if not impossible) to control. Paying closer attention to the kinds 
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of mistakes or violations by maintenance personnel, and the affected systems, can help 
potentially prevent future preflight mechanical issues. 
Improper preflight planning puts the flight at risk (of an accident) before departure. The 
act of not doing/completing a preflight plan not only puts the rotorcraft in a preflight 
hazardous state, but also indicates pilots’ hazardous attitudes prior to flight. Not consulting 
weather briefings, not noting terrain/objects in flight path, and disregard for preflight 
procedures were present in both fatal and non-fatal accidents. Similar presence in non-fatal 
accidents could help learn lessons that include: (1) reasons for not completing a preflight 
plan; (2) key preflight parameters that were missed (e.g., aircraft weight and balance, fuel 
level); and (3) actions (or inactions) due to lack of information (that pilots might have 
acquired by following preflight procedure). 
5.2 Analysis of Inflight Loss of Control Accidents 
Analyses of GA accident data by several researchers and safety teams generally arrive at a 
common conclusion—Inflight loss of control (LOC) is the top cause for GA accidents. 
Harris et al. (2000) analyzed over 8000 helicopter accidents that occurred during 1963–
1997. They found that LOC was the cause for 625 out of 5371 (approximately 12%) 
accidents involving civilian helicopters. In 2010, the US Joint Helicopter Safety and 
Analysis Team (US JHSAT) selected and analyzed 523 helicopter accidents for 2000, 2001, 
and 2006 (they do not specify the reasons for selecting the aforementioned years for their 
analysis). In their analysis, they found that inflight loss of control was the top cause—
accounting for over 41% of the accidents in their dataset (US JHSAT, 2011). In a related 
study, the US Joint Helicopter Implementation Measurement Data Analysis Team (US 
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JHIMDAT) analyzed 415 helicopter accidents that occurred between 2009 and 2011 (US 
JHIMDAT, 2014). Their analysis showed that inflight loss of control was not only the top 
cause, but accounted for a greater proportion of accidents when compared to the US JHSAT 
study (47.5% compared to 41%). A 2012 study by the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to improve GA safety termed LOC as the most frequent “defining event” in GA 
accidents. In fact, recently, we (Rao and Marais, 2015) analyzed 5051 helicopter accidents 
that occurred in 1982–2008, and identified LOC as the most frequent single-node 
occurrence chain. 
While all of these studies indicated that LOC was the top reason for GA (fixed wing and 
helicopter) accidents, they did not provide any information on “why” the accident-aircraft 
(and pilot) experienced loss of control. One of the potential reasons for the limited 
understanding of LOC causation could be due to the setup of the NTSB accident coding 
system. In this section, I use the state-based approach to: (1) check if we are correctly 
counting accidents that involved LOC; and (2) potentially identify the gaps in our 
understanding of the causes (or the “why”) for helicopter accidents that involved LOC. 
Then, I compare the results from this analysis with those of a conventional analysis using 
only the NTSB codes. 
5.2.1 Conventional Analysis of LOC Accidents from NTSB Database 
In this section, I carry out a conventional analysis of the NTSB accident database. I identify 
LOC accidents using the NTSB occurrence codes, and determine the top causes and 
contributing factors for LOC using the subject codes. Since the accident dataset spans a 
32-year period that uses multiple NTSB accident coding systems (pre- and post-2008 
coding systems), I present the results from each of these coding systems separately. 
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5.2.1.1 LOC Accidents in 1982–2008 
I begin by identifying the accidents that involved LOC. In the pre-2008 system, the NTSB 
specifies the occurrence “250: Loss of control inflight” for LOC accidents. I identified 
1403 (26.8%) accidents that involved LOC, with 22.5% of them being fatal. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the NTSB uses subject codes and modifiers to describe the 
various events in an accident. In each accident, they classify some of the subject codes as 
causes or contributing factors, and the remaining codes as findings (that are neither causes 
nor factors). Table 40 shows the top five subject codes in a causal role. 
Table 40: Top Causes for LOC Accidents (pre-2008) 
Subject Codes that were causes for LOC  
Presence in 
Accidents 
24566: Aircraft control 16.6% 
24558: Rotor RPM 9.3% 
24539: Directional control 8.6% 
24010: Inflight planning/decision-making 7.0% 
25000: Reason for occurrence undetermined 6.3% 
 
Unsurprisingly, the 24566: Aircraft control subject code was cited most often, appearing 
at least once in 16.6% of fatal LOC accidents. In 86% of cases, this subject code was 
modified with “not maintained”; in other words, (one of) the recorded causes for inflight 
loss of control was “not maintaining aircraft control”! 
The 24539: Directional control subject code appeared at least once in a causal role in 8.6% 
of LOC accidents. Accidents that blamed Directional control point to the pilot’s inability 
to maintain lateral directional authority over the rotorcraft. Pilots in these accidents often 
encountered situations such as loss of tail rotor effectiveness during hover, yaw and roll 
exceedances while compensating for strong crosswinds, or loss of directional control due 
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to tail rotor system failure. The directional control code, similar to aircraft control, was 
frequently modified by “not maintained”. This code (like 24566: Aircraft control) provides 
little information about the cause for LOC. 
Maintaining rotor RPM is critical to safe rotorcraft flight. The FAA helicopter flying 
handbook emphasize this point by stating that “RPM is life”. In LOC accidents that 
occurred in 1982–2008, 24558: Rotor RPM appeared as the second most frequent cause 
(9.3% of LOC accidents). Failure to maintain rotor RPM can result in the onset of blade 
stall and subsequent LOC. If all the blades stall, the outcome is usually fatal (FAA, 2016c). 
The pilot can correct rotor RPM by altering the throttle setting, or appropriate collective 
and cyclic control inputs. 
24010: Inflight planning/decision-making was a cause in 7.0% of LOC accidents. 
Generally, the coding system and accident reports provide little information on the exact 
nature of poor decisions made by pilots. In many LOC accidents, the NTSB does not record 
the specific actions following a poor decision by the pilot. 
Table 41: Top Contributing Factors for LOC Accidents (pre-2008) 
Subject Codes that were contributing factors for LOC 
Presence in 
Accidents 
20000: Weather condition 33.1% 
19200: Terrain condition 13.5% 
20200: Object 7.8% 
20100: Light condition 4.6% 
34333: Lack of total experience in type of aircraft 2.4% 
 
Table 41 shows the top five contributing factors for LOC accidents. Four out of the top 
five contributing factors (weather condition, terrain condition, object, and light condition) 
provide additional information about the environment in which the accident occurred. 
119 
 
Over a third of the LOC accident reports (33.1%) cited 2000: Weather conditions as a 
contributing factor to the accident. Accompanying modifiers for this code include “rain”, 
“fog”, “tailwind”, and “gust”. The modifiers provide additional information about the 
nature of weather in LOC accidents.  
The NTSB used 19200: Terrain condition to provide additional information about the 
topography of the area. The nature of terrain played a key role in the outcome (e.g., fatal 
vs. non-fatal) of many LOC accidents. For example, an LOC accident over grassy 
vegetation might be more survivable than an accident that occurs near mountainous terrain. 
Similar to the subject code that describes the weather condition, 20100: light condition 
indicates the nature of ambient lighting that prevailed at the time of the LOC accident. 
Modifiers for this code included “dark night”, “sun glare”, “night”, and “dusk”. 
5.2.1.2 LOC Accidents in 2008–2015 
I used the occurrence code 240: Loss of control inflight to identify LOC accidents recorded 
under the post-2008 accident coding system. I identified 226 LOC accidents, with 20% of 
them being fatal. 
Table 42: Top Causes for LOC Accidents (post-2008) 
Subject Codes that were causes for LOC 
Presence in 
Accidents 
02063040XX: Use of equipment/info—Aircraft control 49.1% 
01062000XX: Performance/control parameters (general) 18.6% 
01062052XX: Performance/control parameters—Prop/rotor parameters 13.7% 
01062020XX: Performance/control parameters—Directional control 11.5% 




Table 42 shows the top five causes for LOC accidents in 2008–2015. Similar to the causes 
in the pre-2008 accidents, the NTSB frequently attributed not maintaining control 
(02063040XX: Use of equipment/info-Aircraft control) and failing to maintain directional 
control (01062020XX: Performance/control parameters-Directional control) among the 
top causes for LOC. In addition to these two codes, they used a generic code, 01062000XX: 
Performance/control parameters (general), to suggest that the pilot lost control of the 
aircraft. These codes can be simply thought of as tautologies for LOC, and not necessarily 
as causes. 
Failing to maintain rotor RPM is ranked third among the top causes for LOC accidents, 
appearing at least once in 13.7% of accidents. In some cases, pilots fail to maintain rotor 
RPM during autorotative landings. The FAA helicopter flying handbook states the 
following while suggesting measures to be taken by the pilot in the event of an engine 
failure: “By lowering the collective pitch, which must be done immediately in case of an 
engine failure, lift and drag are reduced, and the helicopter begins an immediate descent, 
thus producing an upward flow of air through the rotor system. This upward flow of air 
through the rotor provides sufficient thrust to maintain rotor rpm throughout the descent”. 
Failure to maintain rotor RPM can result in a failed autorotation, loss of control, and 
subsequent hard landing. 
02041015XX: Action-Incorrect action performance appears at least once in 7.5% of LOC 
accidents. This code, as the name suggests, indicates incorrect action by the pilot, which 
potentially resulted in LOC. 
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Table 43: Top Contributing Factors for LOC Accidents (post-2008) 
Subject Codes that were contributing factors for LOC 
Presence in 
Accidents 
02041025XX: Action-Delayed action 3.1% 
02041515XX: Info processing/decision—Understanding/comprehension 1.3% 
02041520XX: Info processing/decision—Decision making/judgment 1.3% 
03021017XX: Terrain-Sloped/uneven 1.3% 
01022701XX: Flight control system-control column section 0.9% 
 
Table 43 shows the top contributing factors for LOC accidents. In contrast to the pre-2008 
system, the top five contributing factors accounted for only 10.2% of the LOC accidents. 
Some of the reasons for the lower presence of the top five contributing factors could be 
due to: (1) a larger (and potentially better) set of codes for the NTSB investigators to choose 
from; or (2) just that there have been fewer accidents recorded under the post-2008 system. 
In the post-2008 system, the NTSB frequently use the newly introduced 02041025XX: 
Action-Delayed action code to indicate that delayed action (e.g., control inputs) was a 
contributing factor in LOC accidents.  
The codes corresponding to decision-making/judgment and comprehension/understanding 
appeared in the top-three contributing factors (In 1982–2008, the NTSB listed inflight 
planning/decision-making as one of the top causes). 
The code 01022701XX: Flight control system-control column section corresponds to the 
mechanical failure of the flight control column (also referred to as the yoke). The failure 
of the control column generally renders the aircraft uncontrollable. 
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5.2.2 State-based Analysis of LOC Accidents 
In this section, I present the results from the state-based analysis of LOC accidents. Similar 
to the conventional analysis, I begin by identifying LOC accidents from the set of 6200 
helicopter accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015. After applying the definition 
for the LOC state (see Table 14 in Chapter 4), I identified 2520 accidents that involved the 
LOC state—an increase of 891 accidents compared to 1629 identified using the 
conventional database analysis. The larger set of accidents using the state-based approach 
can be attributed to the definition for this state, which involves a combination of subject 
codes, occurrences, and phase of flight code (compared to the single occurrence that is used 
in a conventional analysis of the database). As mentioned in Chapter 4, the NTSB uses 
some of these codes interchangeably when referring to LOC in accidents—the definition 
for the LOC state in the state-based approach takes into account the different codes used 
by the NTSB to represent LOC. 
Triggers were available from the accident database for 42.2% of the 2520 accidents. Table 
44 shows the top five triggers for the LOC state. Using an expression similar to Eq. 2, I 
calculated the presence for each trigger as a proportion of the number of times a trigger 
appears at least once in an LOC accident, to the total number of LOC accidents (2520 
accidents). 
Table 44: Top Triggers from the Database for the LOC State.  
Triggers from Database 
Presence in 
Accidents 
Inflight planning/decision-making 10.3% 
Not possible  8.9% 
Improper remedial action 6.9% 
Improper maneuvering  3.5% 
Improper compensation for wind 3.2% 
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Comparing the top triggers in Table 44 with the top causes and factors for LOC (in Tables 
40 through 44) reveals that only inflight planning/decision-making is common across both 
the state-based and conventional analyses. As mentioned earlier, the planning/decision-
making trigger can be linked to multiple hazardous states in an accident. 
In some accidents, the pilot was unable to control the aircraft owing to the failure of on-
board systems, or was in a flight regime that made it impossible to control the aircraft. The 
“not possible” trigger captures these situations and appears in 8.9% of LOC accidents. 
Improper remedial action is ranked fourth, appearing at least once in 6.9% of LOC 
accidents. This trigger does not provide any insight into the type of remedial action (e.g., 
lowered collective) that was not executed correctly. 
Pilots are trained to maintain directional control using the anti-torque pedals that affect the 
thrust produced by the tail rotor. Improper compensation for wind can trigger a loss of 
directional control. The high presence of this trigger (which provides specific information 
regarding pilot action) highlights the tendency for helicopter pilots to misjudge wind 
intensity while applying anti-torque pedals.  
Next, I discuss the remaining 57.8% (1457 out of 2520) of LOC accidents that did not have 
triggers in the accident reports. In these cases where it is not possible to identify the 
necessary triggers from the accident report, I infer triggers based on the rules linking the 
LOC state and triggers (see Table 14 in Chapter 4 for a description of the rules). Table 45 
shows the inferred-triggers for the LOC state. 
Table 45: Inferred Triggers for the LOC State 
Triggers that are inferred 
Presence in 
Accidents 
Clipping of object/terrain 16.7% 
Limited/no control after system failure 7.7% 
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Triggers that are inferred 
Presence in 
Accidents 
Improper use of throttle and/or collective 3.1% 
Improper use of collective and cyclic 3.1% 
Improper use of anti-torque control 2.8% 
1874 out of 2520 (74.3%) LOC accidents involved collision with terrain/water or object. 
From a conventional analysis of the database, it is not possible to determine if these 
collisions caused the accident or were end states. Using the grammar linking states and 
triggers (see Table 21 in Chapter 4), I inferred the “clipping” trigger in 16.7% of LOC 
accidents. LOC accidents involving this trigger occurred when pilots failed to maintain 
clearance from an object/terrain, resulting in “clipping” the object/terrain. Consider for 
example the fatal LOC accident that occurred near Umpqua, OR, during an external load 
operation (NTSB ID: SEA95LA10). During the mission, the pilot failed to maintain 
clearance from an object (in this case, a tree). He “clipped” the object and subsequently 
lost control of the aircraft, and collided with the terrain.32 
Limited or no control after system failure is the top inferred trigger, with a presence of 7.7% 
in LOC accidents. I inferred this trigger when the LOC accident involved the system failure 
state. Consider a 1996 accident that occurred near Gretna, VA (NTSB ID: IAD96LA094). 
During flight, the main rotor drive shaft failed, jammed the flight controls, and triggered a 
system failure state. The pilot had limited control authority over the aircraft and 
subsequently entered the LOC state. He attempted an autorotation, but collided with the 
terrain. Similarly, I inferred this trigger in LOC accidents that did not have trigger 
information in the accident reports. 
                                                 
32 To ensure the correct working of the clipping object/terrain rule, I read multiple accident reports that were 
identified by this rule. The NTSB IDs for a sample of these accident reports are: SEA96LA070, 
FTW96LA274, FTW96TA383, and CEN09CA339. 
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Improper use of throttle and/or collective is the second most frequent inferred trigger, 
appearing in 3.1% of LOC accidents. I inferred this trigger only when the accident: (1) did 
not involve loss of engine power; and (2) the low RPM state preceded LOC. Describing 
how to recover from a low RPM state, the FAA’s helicopter flying handbook states that 
“While in flight, RPM may be regained by lowering the collective slightly and increasing 
the RPM” (of the engine) (FAA, 2016c).  
Improper use of collective and cyclic triggered the LOC state in 3.1% of accidents, as 
shown in Table 10. I inferred this trigger when an improper autorotation (not maintaining 
RPM after loss of engine power) appeared before LOC in the accident sequence. A recent 
addendum to the helicopter flying handbook states that during an autorotation, the pilot 
must apply simultaneous aft cyclic (along with collective pitch) to prevent lowering of the 
nose and associated loss of RPM (FAA, 2016d). 
The improper use of anti-torque control trigger appears in 2.8% of LOC accidents. As 
mentioned earlier, failure to compensate for winds using the anti-torque pedal can trigger 
a loss of directional control. I inferred this trigger when the aircraft experience a loss of tail 
rotor effectiveness (LTE) before LOC. The pilot’s failure to effect anti-torque/tail rotor 
control after LTE can result in a loss of directional control. 
In some accidents, the NTSB mentioned that pilots in a spatially disoriented state lost 
control of the aircraft. In such cases, I inferred the “no action after being disoriented” 
trigger. This trigger appears at least once in 1.7% of LOC accidents. 
Inferring triggers for LOC accounted for 17.4% or 440 LOC accidents, leaving us with a 
deficit of 600 accidents (23.8% of all LOC accidents) which did not have any triggers—
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neither from the database, nor inferred. The computer program stores these accidents for 
future review. 
5.2.3 Summary 
In sections 5.2, I conducted a conventional analysis of NTSB database and identified the 
top causes and contributing factors for LOC. Then, I applied the state-based approach to 
identify the top triggers for the LOC state. Table 46 compares and summarizes the results 
from both analyses. 
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A comparison of the results from the conventional database analysis and state-based 
approach revealed some key differences. Results from the conventional analysis provide 
little insight into the causal mechanism for LOC. For instance, listing “aircraft 
control/directional control not maintained” as the top cause does not help further our 
understanding of LOC accidents. 
Results from the state-based analysis showed that pilots’ tendency to clip objects frequently 
triggered LOC. The high presence of this trigger is not surprising, considering the nature 
of helicopter operations (often in proximity to terrain/objects). However, this information 
was not available from a conventional analysis of the database because it does not take into 
the account the sequence of states in an accident; i.e., the state-based approach helps 
differentiate between a collision with terrain/object that is an end state, or a trigger in the 
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accident. Further, the frequent occurrence of LOC after system failure highlights the 
importance of aircraft maintenance and preflight checks. 
The frequent citing of inflight planning/decision-making (in both approaches) could be due 
to a lack of information available to investigators about the actual reason for LOC. I argue 
that the use of this code is not helpful; on the contrary, it potentially takes away analysts’ 
and operators’ focus from specific triggers/causes such as not maintaining tail rotor control. 
5.3 State-based Analysis of Improper Autorotation 
An autorotation is a state of helicopter flight where the helicopter’s main rotor blades are 
driven by aerodynamic forces, and not by the engine. Pilots are instructed to perform an 
autorotative descent as part of numerous emergency procedures (FAA, 2016c).  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the NTSB’s use of the autorotation code in accidents does not 
always distinguish between a successful and improper autorotation. Also, the accident 
codes often do not indicate the reasons for improper autorotations. In this section, I provide 
background on accidents in the database that involved autorotations. Then, I apply the 
state-based approach to potentially better identify improper autorotations, and understand 
the reasons behind improper autorotations. 
5.3.1 Background on Accidents that Involved Autorotations 
Analyzing 6200 helicopter accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015 reveals that 
24.2% of accidents involved autorotations. I begin my discussion of autorotation accidents 
recorded under the pre-2008 system. Later in this section, I briefly discuss autorotation 
accidents recorded in the post-2008 system. 
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In the pre-2008 system, the NTSB used the subject code 24520: Autorotation 
(accompanied by 25 different modifiers) to identify 1277 accidents that involved 
autorotative descent. Table 47 shows the top five modifiers associated with the autorotation 
code. 
Table 47: Top Modifiers for the NTSB Autorotation Code (pre-2008) 




3135: Performed 48.2% 
3118: Initiated 17.5% 
3100: Attempted 10.8% 
3109: Improper  4.9% 
3001: “Blank” modifier 4.3% 
 
Three of the top five modifiers only suggest that pilots “performed”, “initiated”, or 
“attempted” to Autorotate. The frequent use of these modifiers with the autorotation code 
may lead one to incorrectly conclude that a majority of autorotations did not involve any 
problems. The “improper” code appeared only in 4.9% of accidents that involved 
autorotations. Table 48 provides a distribution of the top modifiers that suggested improper 
autorotation. 
Table 48: Top Modifiers that suggested Improper Autorotation (pre-2008) 




3109: Improper 4.9% 
3131: Not possible 3.1% 
3120: Misjudged 1.7% 
3128: Not performed 1.0% 
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3104: Delayed33 0.9% 
 
The top modifiers that suggest improper autorotation accounted for only 11.7% of the 1277 
autorotation accidents (in fact, including the all the modifier that suggested improper 
autorotation accounted for only 13.5% of accidents). Further, the autorotation code does 
not provide any additional insight into the cause for improper autorotations (e.g., did the 
pilot not maintain RPM during the autorotative descent?). 
The post-2008 coding system further obscures the role of autorotations in accidents. The 
NTSB uses a phase of flight code “601: Autorotation” to indicate that the accident involved 
an autorotation. This code is not accompanied by any modifiers, making it impossible to 
determine if accidents involved improper autorotations. There were 227 autorotation 
accidents in the post-2008 system. 
5.3.2 State-based Analysis of Autorotation Accidents 
In this section, I present the results from the state-based analysis of autorotation accidents. 
Specifically, I want to identify accidents that involved “improper” autorotations. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the key elements to a successful autorotation are: maintaining (1) 
rotor RPM, (2) airspeed, (3) altitude, (4) descent profile/rate, (5) distance from the landing 
site, and (6) executing a correct flare/level-off. Thus, I classify an autorotation as “improper” 
                                                 
33 The other modifiers that suggested improper/incorrect autorotations are: “3115: inadequate”, “3122: not 
attained”, “3140: uncontrolled”, “3136: poor”, “3145: restricted”, “3011: not obtained”, “3030: not 
successful”, “3110: improper use of”, “3125: not identified”, “3127: not maintained”, “3137: premature”, 
and “3144: discontinued”. 
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if one or more of these key elements are not maintained. Table 16 (Chapter 4) provides the 
definition for the improper autorotation state. 
I begin by identifying improper autorotation accidents from the set of 6200 helicopter 
accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015. After applying the definition for an 
improper autorotation, I identified 632 accidents that involved the improper autorotation 
state—an increase of 458 accidents when compared to the 174 obtained using NTSB 
modifiers. Table 49 shows the presence of the key elements in improper autorotations. 
Table 49: Distribution of Key Elements in Improper Autorotations 




Improper RPM 37.5% 
Improper flare 28.6% 
Improper altitude 11.7% 
Improper descent 11.6% 
Improper airspeed 5.4% 
Improper distance from landing site 1.7% 
Operating in the hazardous region of the height-velocity curve 1.7% 
Improper level-off 1.6% 
 
Failure to maintain RPM appeared at least once in 37.5% of accidents that involved 
improper autorotations. Consider an instructional accident that occurred near Englewood, 
CO, in March 1999 (NTSB ID: DEN99LA058). The student and flight instructor were 
practicing autorotations when the flight instructor failed to maintain rotor RPM. He was 
not able to perform a power recovery (during which the pilot roll-up the throttle and lowers 
the collective to gain RPM), and landed hard. While the subject and modifier codes in the 
accident report indicate that the “autorotation was performed”, the state-based approach 
provides a more complete picture of the accident. Reading the narrative for the accident 
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reveals that “the flight instructor allowed the RPM to decay during the autorotation”—
confirming the findings from the state-based approach. 
In preparation for landing, the pilot decelerates the helicopter with the use of appropriate 
aft cyclic control. During this “flare” state, the pilot needs to avoid a nose-high and tail-
low attitude, which can result in a tail strike. Table 49 shows that failure to perform a proper 
flare appeared in 28.6% of improper autorotation accidents. 
Not maintaining the proper descent angle or descent rate can result in an improper 
autorotation. 11.7% of improper autorotation accidents involved improper descent. During 
descent, pilots should carefully adjust cyclic control to maintain the correct glide attitude, 
and adjust the collective pitch to maintain RPM—any sudden collective movements can 
trigger an improper autorotation. 
In some cases, the NTSB mentions the height-velocity curve (also known as the Deadman’s 
curve) in the context of autorotation accidents. This curve shows the heights and airspeeds 
above the ground which, in the case of a loss of engine power or system failure, a pilot 
should be able to perform a safe autorotative landing. A 1995 accident involving a Bell 
206L illustrates this situation (NTSB ID: CHI95LA093). Shortly after takeoff from 
Maryland Heights, MO, the helicopter lost engine power. The pilot was unable to perform 
a proper autorotation as the helicopter was operating in the hazardous region of the height-
velocity curve. The helicopter sustained substantial damage after colliding with terrain. 
Fortunately, all five occupants walked away from this accident, uninjured. 
Next, I discuss the different triggers for the improper autorotation state. The rules linking 
the improper autorotation state and different triggers are shown in Table 262 (Appendix 
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C). Triggers were available from accident reports for 56.6% of improper autorotation 
accidents. Table 50 shows the top five triggers from the accident reports. 
Table 50: Top Triggers from the Database for Improper Autorotation (pre-2008) 




Not possible 11.6% 
Improper remedial action 9.2% 
Delayed action 5.9% 
Incorrect action 3.5% 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 3.5% 
 
In many accidents, circumstance prevent the pilot from performing a correct autorotation. 
The circumstances can include failure of vital components (e.g. collective pitch control 
lever) or phase of operation (e.g., hovering in the hazardous region of the Deadman’s 
curve). The presence of the “not possible” trigger in 11.6% of autorotation accidents 
suggests that it was impossible to make an autorotative landing. For example, in April 1990, 
a Bell 47 was involved in a serious accident near Oakdale, MN (NTSB ID: MKC90LA088). 
In this accident, the rotor drive system failed (specifically, the clutch assembly), forcing 
the pilot to attempt an autorotation. During the attempted autorotation, it was impossible 
for the pilot to maintain rotor RPM, resulting in a collision with terrain. 
Three of the top five trigger for improper autorotation point to some form of improper 
action by the pilot. Improper remedial action appears in 9.2% of improper autorotation 
accidents. Despite having a high presence in accidents, it provides little insight into the 
specific nature of the remedial action. The other two action-related triggers (i.e., delayed 
action and incorrect action) also have the same lack of specificity problem. 
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Improper use of collective appears sixth for improper autorotation. Correct use of collective 
pitch control is crucial to maintain rotor RPM during an autorotation (considering that 
engines are generally not operational during autorotations). As I noted earlier (in Table 49), 
many autorotations failed because the pilots did not maintain rotor RPM. 
Next, I discuss the remaining 43.4% of improper autorotation accidents that did not have 
triggers in the accident reports. In these cases where it is not possible to identify the 
necessary triggers from the accident report, I infer triggers based on the rules linking the 
improper autorotation state and triggers. 
Table 51: Inferred Triggers for Improper Autorotation (pre-2008) 




Improper use of collective (during simulated autorotation) 10.3% 
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 7.1% 
 
Table 51 shows the presence of the two inferred triggers in improper autorotation accidents. 
I inferred the Improper use of collective (during simulated autorotation) when the pilot 
failed to maintain rotor RPM after initiating a practice autorotation. Consider the example 
of a test-flight, where the company pilot was simulating an autorotation on a newly 
manufacture Bell L4 helicopter (NTSB ID: FTW91LA154). During the simulated 
autorotation, he failed to maintain rotor RPM (now in an improper autorotation state), and 
subsequently landed hard. In this accident, I infer that the pilot’s improper use of the 
collective led to the RPM decay. 
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The improper use of collective and/or cyclic trigger appears in 7.1% of accidents. As 
mentioned in Table 251 (Appendix B), I inferred this trigger only when the pilot failed to 
maintain rotor RPM or descent profile/rate after experiencing a loss of engine power. 
5.3.3 Summary 
In sections 5.3, I identified accidents that involved incorrect autorotations by using the 
modifiers in the NTSB accident database. Then, I applied the state-based approach to 
identify accidents with improper autorotations, and analyzed these accidents to identify the 
top reasons for poor autorotations. Table 52 summarizes the results from both analyses. 
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can trigger improper 
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Applying the state-based model helps us identify a larger set of accidents that involved 
improper autorotation accidents. As I mentioned earlier in this section, the NTSB used the 
“performed” modifier in almost half the accidents that involved autorotations. This 
modifier lends little information beyond the fact that pilots carried out autorotations. Using 
the NTSB modifiers for poor autorotations suggests that only a small proportion (13.6%) 
of accidents involved improper autorotations. Further, the change in the NTSB coding 
system (with the use of autorotation as a phase of flight) made it difficult to identify 
improper autorotations from a conventional analysis. 
Results from the state-based analysis showed that not maintaining rotor RPM and improper 
flare were among the top reasons for improper autorotations. This information is not easily 
discerned using the conventional analysis because it (conventional analysis) does not take 
into account the key flight parameters (elements) that are part of the definition of an 
improper autorotation in the state-based model. 
In 11.6% of improper autorotation accidents, circumstances (e.g., component failures, 
hazardous height-velocity regime) made it impossible for the pilot to execute a correct 
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autorotation. Four of the top five triggers from the database involve some form of incorrect 
action or decision by the pilot. These triggers, while suggesting that the pilot “made a 
mistake”, do not provide additional information about the nature of the mistake. 
5.4 Limitations of Data Source 
5.4.1 NTSB Coding Manual 
I developed the state-based accident model by using the codes provided in the NTSB 
coding manual. The state-based approach, while highlighting key differences compared to 
a conventional analysis, inherits some of the problems associated with the coding system.  
The NTSB coding manual contains several non-informative/non-specific codes that 
translate to triggers such as improper inflight planning/decision-making or incorrect action. 
The broad nature of these triggers makes it difficult to link them to specific states—in other 
words, these triggers can potentially trigger multiple states in the same accident. 
5.4.2 NTSB Dataset Analyzed 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, I applied the state-based accident model to 6200 
helicopter accidents that occurred in the US in 1982–2015. The frequent appearance of 
certain non-informative/non-specific triggers limits our ability fully understand the causes 
for accidents. For example, the presence of triggers such as inflight planning/decision-
making or delayed action in many fatal and non-fatal accidents do not provide any specific 




CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE WORK 
US General Aviation (GA) has a diverse fleet composition and various mission types. GA 
aircraft account for almost 97% of all civil aviation aircraft in the US. GA operations 
involve more accidents (and fatalities) compared to commercial aviation (Part 121) 
operations. Recognizing the relatively high risk in GA operations, safety agencies (e.g., 
NTSB) and regulators (e.g., FAA) have called for improved safety levels. 
One way to improve GA safety is to better understand accidents that have occurred. Several 
studies have used the NTSB’s accident database to carry out retrospective accident 
analyses. These studies, generally, analyzed the accidents in the database using the NTSB 
accident coding manual—a guidebook that lends itself to event-based analyses of accidents. 
However, these studies, while providing some useful insights into accident causation, limit 
themselves by adhering to this event-based system. 
This thesis has a developed an alternative approach to modeling aviation accidents by using 
a state-based approach. The method moves beyond an event-based approach by viewing 
aviation accidents as a set of hazardous states of a system (pilot and aircraft), and triggers 
that cause the system to move between hazardous states. As part of this approach, I used 
the NTSB’s accident coding manual (that contains nearly 4000 different codes) to develop 
a “dictionary” of hazardous states, triggers, and information codes. Then, I created the 
“grammar”, or a set of rules, that: (1) arranges hazardous states in accidents; and, (2) links 
triggers to different hazardous states. This approach helps: (1) provide a more correct count 
of the causes for accidents in the NTSB database; and, (2) checks for gaps or omissions in 
NTSB accident data, and fills-in some of these gaps using logic-based rules. These rules 
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also help identify and count causes for accidents that were not discernable from previous 
analyses of historical accident data. 
6.1 Summary 
Chapter 1 introduced GA accidents and motivated the need to better understand GA 
accident causation. 
Chapter 2 reviewed literature on aviation accident causation, with particular emphasis on 
studies that have looked at historical GA accidents. The second half of Chapter two 
reviewed the different accident modeling techniques—many of which have been used to 
understand the causes for aviation accidents. 
The first part of Chapter 3 served as a “beginners guide to the NTSB database”. The second 
part of Chapter 3 analyzed over 6000 historical helicopter accidents to determine “common 
themes” or chains of occurrences. While this occurrence chain approach moved beyond a 
root cause analysis, it showed that helicopter accidents recorded in the database had short 
stories (i.e., occurrence chains with short chain lengths). This approach highlighted one of 
the shortcomings of the event-based approach to analyzing historical aviation accidents. 
To move beyond an event-based analysis, Chapter 4 presented a state-based accident 
modeling approach. Chapter 4 developed a dictionary of hazardous states, triggers, and 
information codes. The latter part of Chapter 4 developed the grammar (or rules) that 
arranged hazardous states, and linked triggers to hazardous states. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the state-based accident model when applied to 6200 historical 
helicopter accidents. The first part of this chapter identified and compared the top 
hazardous states and triggers in fatal and non-fatal accidents. The second part of this 
chapter demonstrated that we can learn more about the causes for inflight loss of control 
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accidents by using the state-based accident modeling approach. The third (and final) part 
of Chapter 5 applied the state-based approach and presented insights into the reasons for 
improper autorotation accidents. 
6.2 Contributions 
Despite many years of retrospective accident analysis, helicopter (and fixed wing GA) 
accidents continue to occur frequently, often resulting in fatalities and damage to property. 
The pursuit of trying to better understand the reasons behind these accidents raised the 
following fundamental question: 
The NTSB database contains a wealth of data, but is not always logically complete 
and omissions—can we develop an approach that enables logical checking and 
potentially removes the omissions? 
To address this question, I broke it down into two research questions: 
1. The current accident coding system limits our understanding of accident 
causation—can a different approach help? 
2. Can we provide a more correct count and hence a more accurate ranking of the 
causes for accidents in the NTSB database? 
To address the first question, I developed a state-based accident model. To build this model, 
I translated the codes in the NTSB coding manual, and created a dictionary of hazardous 
states, triggers, and information codes. After creating the vocabulary of states and triggers, 
I developed the grammar that: (1) sequences hazardous states in accidents; and (2) links 
triggers to hazardous states. This state-based accident model (complete with its dictionary 
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and grammar) facilitates the analysis of historical accident data without needing to rely 
on/being restricted by the NTSB coding manual. 
To address the second question, I applied the state-based accident modeling technique to 
better understand if we are correctly identifying and counting the causes for two of the top 
hazardous states in helicopter accidents: (1) infight loss of control (LOC); and (2) Improper 
autorotations. Results from the state-based analyses highlighted causes such as “clipping 
of object/terrain” that were not available from a conventional analysis of the database. 
Further, the state-based approach also inferred triggers for particular states, in accidents, 
when all the information was not in the coded accident reports. The state-based approach, 
while highlighting key differences compared to a conventional analysis, also points out 
issues that need to be addressed in future research. Examples of such issues include the 
frequent use of codes relating to poor decision-making or incorrect actions. 
6.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
The work in this research has unearthed several interesting research questions to consider 
in future work. Building on the work completed in this thesis, I present some of the ideas 
for future research in this chapter. It is my intent for each of these ideas to serve as stepping-
stones for future research proposals. 
6.3.1 Suggested Refinements of the State-based Approach 
In the current version of the model, I used the grammar to infer triggers (that I defined) for 
specific states in an accident that did not have any triggers in the accident report. In future 
work, I propose creating more sophisticated rules that will allow us to infer triggers (for 
specific states) from the list of triggers that were translated from the NTSB coding manual. 
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For example, if an accident involves an improper descent state after the disoriented/lack of 
awareness state (and there is no code in the accident report that corresponds to a trigger for 
this state), then I could potentially infer the lack of action trigger that is coded in the coding 
manual. 
Another suggested improvement is to develop a set of rules that could potentially help infer 
missing states in accident reports. For example, if an accident involves a loss of engine 
power followed by a hard landing, then, we can infer that accident might have involved an 
improper autorotation state. 
6.3.2 Extending the Application of the State-based Approach 
In this thesis, I showed that the state-based approach can help identify triggers for 
hazardous states that cannot be obtained from a conventional analysis of the accident 
database. I propose the following ideas as some of the logical next-steps for this research: 
1. Applying the state-based approach to fixed-wing GA accident data. Fixed-wing 
aircraft account for nearly 80% of the GA fleet (and over 82% of the accidents 
recorded in the NTSB database in 1982–2015). I recommend using the state-based 
model to identify trigger events for high-risk hazardous states such as inflight loss 
of control (LOC) and controlled flight into terrain (CFIT). The nature of fixed-wing 
and helicopter operations is different; however, it might be worthwhile to explore 
similarities (if any) in the triggers for the top hazardous states. 
2. The state-based approach can also be used to model accidents that occurred during 
towered/un-towered airport operations. I recommend using this approach to 
potentially capturing issues with communication between pilots and air traffic 
controllers (ATC) or between pilots, and estimating the frequency of trigger events 
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such as misinterpreted information, incorrect phraseology, or poor crew resource 
management (CRM) techniques.  
3. Many accidents involve runway incursions, excursions, undershoot, and overruns. 
The state-based model can also capture hazardous states of the system when 
operating in different surface conditions.  
4. The state-based model could also be used to model incidents. In this extension of 
the model, I would use incident data from the NTSB, FAA Accident and Incident 
Data System (AIDS), and NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). I 
would begin by mapping the different incident coding systems to the states and 
triggers that I defined in this thesis. Then, I would use these incident data to track 
different hazardous states (and trigger events) that ended in near misses, and 
compare them with accident data.  
6.3.3 Bridging the Divide: Mapping the FDM World to Accident Data 
Traditionally, researchers associate the terms Flight Operations Quality Analysis (FOQA) 
and Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) with the commercial aviation sector. Generally, aircraft 
used in commercial operations have on-board Flight Data Recorders (FDRs) that record 
several flight parameters at predefined frequencies. In the interest of safety and 
performance improvements, many commercial operators (in the US) voluntarily contribute 
their data to an Aviation Safety Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) repository. Researchers 
have used these data to identify key parameters to be monitored during flight, and have 
also defined several FDM events—combinations of flight parameters that help capture 
unsafe situations during flight (e.g., High airspeed at low altitude). 
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More recently, there has been a concerted effort from regulators and members of the safety 
community to incorporate FDM analysis in the General Aviation (GA) sector. As I 
mentioned during my review of safety literature (Section 2.2), few GA aircraft are equipped 
with FDRs—making it challenging to collect flight data (and hence draw meaningful 
conclusion from analyses). However, I believe that careful analysis of historical GA 
accident data can provide us meaningful information about flight parameters that should 
be monitored. Here, I recommend the following: 
1. A map between the codes used by the NTSB to record accident information and a 
predefined list of helicopter FDM events. This map could be used to potentially 
point us to high risk FDM events that have occurred frequently in past accidents. 
2. Using Subject Matter Expert (SME) opinion to establish a link between these FDM 
events and hazardous states that frequently resulted in accidents (e.g., loss of 
control). 
6.3.4 Basic Accident Plots: Using Historical Data to Build Aviation Accident Archetypes 
Most accident analysis techniques tend to focus on a single root cause or count the causes 
that appear most frequently in accidents. Through this thesis, I have demonstrated that the 
use of a state-based approach to model accidents potentially provides a richer 
understanding of accident causation. Building on the hazardous states and trigger events 
identified, I propose developing a set of GA accident archetypes that model the common 
stories (states and triggers) that often end in accidents. 
 These accident archetypes can also help capture organizational factors that contribute to 
accidents. While the term “Organizational influence” is more commonly used in accidents 
that involve the process industry (e.g., chemical plants, oil refineries), I believe that we can 
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extend the use of the term to the realm of GA and helicopter operations. I intend to use the 
term organizational influence to better understand the safety culture of pilots, aircraft 
maintenance technicians (AMTs), and operators (e.g., law enforcement, search and rescue). 
In our attempts to reduce fatal accident rates, we (safety community) often focus on the 
causes at the sharp end of accidents, often relegating the underlying role of the 
pilot/organizational attitudes towards safety.  
These archetypes, once developed, could be used to describe accidents. An example of a 
potential accident archetype is “Accidents that involved controlled flight into terrain or 
objects due to poor preflight planning”. In this example, I can explore the reasons for the 
poor preflight planning (e.g., management-induced time pressures, pure negligence). In 
addition, a time history of these archetypes might provide additional insight—if the number 
of accidents described by an archetype has increased, decreased, or remained the same, 
then we can track specific reasons for the change (or lack of it). Consider for example the 
above mentioned accident archetype; if the number of accidents per year has remained 
relatively unchanged, then I can explore reasons for the lack of change in the particular 
archetype (e.g., specific trigger events continue to occur despite changes in pilot training 
procedure). 
6.3.5 Improving General Aviation Safety by Building an Accident Ontology 
Greek philosophy defines “ontology” as the study of being or in existence. The domain of 
artificial intelligence defines it as a “specification of a conceptualization” (Gruber, 1993). 
Generally, ontologies are used to not just share data, but also establish semantics for using 
the data. Some researchers have developed ontologies that help with the aircraft design 
process, which involves mapping of data between various design tools. Using aircraft 
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design ontology, Ast (2012) created a central data model that contained all the mapped 
information from the different tools. In addition, this central data model also helped check 
the plausibility of the maps between the different tools. 
 Some research has looked into the use of ontologies in the safety domain, particularly in 
the road traffic safety domain. Barrachina et al. (2012) developed a vehicular accident 
ontology network that combined automobile specifications, operator information, 
operating environment, historical accident data, and on-board sensor data to alert nearby 
vehicles and emergency personnel. Unfortunately, I have not come across any similar 
approaches in the aviation safety domain. Therefore, I suggest building an accident 
ontology by leveraging information from historical accident data, flight recorder data, pilot 
information, operating environment, and air. 
 
Figure 28: Framework for notional accident ontology. The central data model contains 
mapped information from the different data sources depicted in the framework. 
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Figure 28 presents an initial outline for this ontology. The central data model helps map 
(and exchange) data between the different data sources. Analysis of flight data could 
potentially reveal FDM events that were “flagged” during operation of the aircraft. Using 
this ontology structure, I can combine the flagged FDM events, flight crew information, 
and operating environment, compare it with historical accident data and potentially 
determine the risk of an accident associated with a flight. Furthermore, this ontology also 
allows for the analysis of flights using an aircraft dynamics model to recreate the flight and 
estimate the “hazard level” for the entire time interval of the flight. 
6.3.6 The Pursuit of Completeness: Data Mining Applied to Accident Reports 
As I mentioned earlier in this document, in addition to recording accidents in a coded 
system, the NTSB also provides brief summaries and detailed factual reports regarding 
accidents. These reports generally contain detailed witness and survivor accounts (in non-
fatal accidents). To supplement the map between trigger events and hazardous states, I 
recommend using data mining approaches to identifying key information from accident 
reports. 
Consider for example a 2012 accident involving a Schweizer 269C near Asheville, NC 
(NTSB ID: ERA12LA362). The accident coding system indicates that the skid shoe came 
loose due to improper maintenance resulting in a roll-over end state. However, closer 
examination of the accident report provides additional insight into the causes for this 
accident: 
“The pilot conducted the approach for landing at about 40 knots and touched down left of 
the runway centerline on both skids. As he lowered the collective, the helicopter's right 
center skid shoe contacted a runway centerline light, shearing off the right skid and its 
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support arms. The pilot raised the collective, picked the helicopter up to a hover, and 
turned towards the taxiway in order to land. Shortly after, the engine and rotor RPM began 
to drop, and the pilot opened the throttle and lowered the collective, setting the helicopter 
onto the left skid. The helicopter rolled over and came to rest on its right side, resulting in 
substantial damage to the main rotor blades. A post-accident examination by the pilot 
revealed that, during the right skid's impact with the centerline light, the front landing gear 
crossbeam was pushed aft, crimping the fuel supply line”.  
While the coding system captures the fact that right skid sheared off, it does not indicate 
that the helicopter experienced low engine RPM due to crimping of the fuel line. The 
additional insight from the report helps complete the accident story by supplementing the 
information from the state-based model. 
While there has been extensive work in the field of text mining and natural language 
processing (Wallace et al., 2003; Kloptchenko et al., 2004; Tseng et al., 2005), only a 
limited amount of work apply these techniques to accident/incident report analysis. Melby 
(2011) outlines how he (and the MITRE Company) developed the Aviation Information 
Retrieval and Extraction System (AIRES) to identify keywords and phrase from NTSB 
reports. Jeske and Liu (2007) used a naïve Bayes classifier to mine text data from FAA 
aviation safety report project. Bazargan et al. (2013) applied the AIRES software and 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to identify some of the key causes associated with 
fatal GA accidents in 1983–2009. The authors also suggest implementing machine learning 
techniques such as Self Organizing Maps (SOM) to improve the quality of text mining 
results. I recommend building on this body of text mining research to identify key words 
and phrases that can supplement the information obtained from the state-based approach. 
149 
 
APPENDIX A. DEFINTIONS OF HAZARDOUS STATES 
Table 53: Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness (LTE) State Definition 
Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness (LTE) 
Hazardous state where the helicopter tail rotor does not provide the requisite thrust to maintain 
directional control. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24805: Loss of tail rotor effectiveness  I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “effectiveness” 
and “LTE”. 
24813: Tail rotor effectiveness AND (“not maintained”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
242: Loss of tail rotor effectiveness  
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “effectiveness” 
and “LTE”. 
 
Table 54: Vortex Ring State (VRS) Definition 
Vortex Ring State (VRS) 
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnut-
shaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24817: Vortex ring state  The circulation of air at the 
rotating blade tips is pushed 
downwards by aerodynamic 
forces resulting in a vortex, 
which reduces the lift and 
increases the drag on the 
blades. A rapidly descending 
helicopter experiences 
increased upward flow of air at 
the blade root and eventual 
blade root stall. Other 
contributing factors for VRS 
include increased collective 
pitch, high aircraft weight, low 
forward speed, and operating 
downwind. 
 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “vortex ring”, 
“loss of lift”, “settling with”, 
and the word “VRS”. 
24811: Settling with power  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
244: Settling with power/vortex ring state  Literature uses the terms loss 
of lift, vortex ring state, and 
settling with power 
interchangeably while 
describing this state.  
500: Loss of lift 
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Vortex Ring State (VRS) 
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnut-
shaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift. 
 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “vortex ring”, 
“loss of lift”, “settling with”, 
and the word “VRS”. 
 
Table 55: Improper RPM State Definition 
Improper RPM State 
Hazardous state where the main rotor RPM is either too low (or too high). 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
22308: Proper rotor RPM AND (“not maintained” OR “not possible” 
OR “not attained” OR “not available” OR “misjudged” OR “not 
followed” OR “delayed”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “rotor RPM” 
and the word “RPM”. 
 
In one case, the NTSB did not 
use any modifier while 
describing the improper RPM 
state.  
24558: Rotor RPM AND (“not maintained” OR “misjudged” OR 
“low” OR “high” OR “inadequate” OR “reduced” OR “excessive” OR 
“exceed” OR “improper” OR “diminished” OR “ not possible” OR 
“diminished” OR “not verified” OR “not identified” OR “not 
corrected” OR “not obtained/maintained” OR “not attained”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01062052XX: Performance/control parameters—Prop/rotor 
parameters AND (“not attained/maintained” OR “attain/maintain not 
possible” OR “capability exceeded”) 
Careful studying of several 
accident reports suggests that 
the NTSB use this code to 
indicate an improper rotor 
RPM situation. 
 
Table 56: Improper Altitude/Clearance State Definition 
Improper Altitude/Clearance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating too close to the ground, terrain, water, or object. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24518: Altitude AND (“inadequate” OR “misjudged” OR “low” OR 
“improper” OR “not maintained” OR “delayed” OR “below” OR 
“unavailable” ) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the words 
“altitude” and “clearance”. 
 
I also included “buzzing” and 
“low pass”, which suggest that 
flights occurred at low 
altitudes. 
 
In two cases, the NTSB used 
the modifier “inattentive” with 
this subject code. These cases 
suggest that the pilot was in a 
distracted state prior to the 
improper altitude/clearance 
state 
24519: Proper altitude AND (“not maintained” OR “not attained” OR 
“exceeded” OR “below” OR “misjudged”) 
24526: Clearance AND (“not maintained” OR “not attained” OR 
“exceeded” OR “inadequate” OR “not possible” OR “not obtained/not 
maintained” OR “improper” OR “misjudged”) 
24577: Altitude/clearance AND (“inadequate” OR “misjudged” OR 
“low” OR “improper” OR “not maintained” OR “not obtained/not 
maintained” OR “not verified”) 
24521: Buzzing AND (“intentional” OR “performed” OR 
“continued”) 
24541: Low pass AND (“performed” OR “intentional” OR 
“misjudged”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
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Improper Altitude/Clearance State 
01062012XX: Performance/control parameters-altitude AND (“not 
attained/maintained” OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “incorrect 
use/operation OR “related operating info”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the words 
“altitude” and “clearance”. 
290: Altitude deviation 
220: Low altitude operations 
 
Table 57: Rollover End State Definition 
Rollover State 
Hazardous state where when the helicopter skid/landing gear pivots about an object and exceeds the 
critical roll angle. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
380: Rollover  I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“rollover” and the phrase 
“dynamic rollover”. 
 
In two cases, the NTSB 
modified the dynamic rollover 
state code with “initiated” and 
“performed”, respectively, to 
indicate the onset of a dynamic 
rollover. 
24801: Dynamic rollover  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
097: Rollover 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“rollover” and the phrase 
“dynamic rollover”. 
 
Table 58: Improper Climb State Definition 
Improper Climb State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s climb was incorrect/climb capability was exceeded/climb rate was 
incorrect. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17303: Aircraft performance-climb capability AND (“exceeded” OR 
“lack of” OR “deteriorated” OR “inadequate”)  
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the words 
“climb”. 
 
In one case, the NTSB 
modified this subject code with 
“other” to indicate an improper 
climb state 
24527: Climb AND (“not maintained” OR “not attained” OR 
“improper” OR “inadequate” OR “not possible” OR “delayed” OR 
“excessive” OR “not performed” OR “initiated”) 
24528: Proper climb rate AND (“not attained” OR “not maintained” 
OR “not possible” OR “not obtained”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01061010XX: Climb capability AND (“capability exceeded” OR 
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “not attained/maintained”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the words 
“climb”. 





Table 59: Improper Distance State Definition 
Improper Distance State 
Hazardous state where the distance from the runway/helipad/landing site is incorrect. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24523: Distance AND (“misjudged” OR “not obtained/maintained”)  
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “distance”. 
24580: Distance/altitude AND (“misjudged” OR “not maintained” OR 
“low”) 
24581: Distance/speed AND (“misjudged”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 60: Improper Heading State Definition 
Improper Heading State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01062047XX: Performance/control parameters-heading/course I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “course” and 
“heading”. 
280: Course deviation 
 
Table 61: Improper Airspeed State Definition 
Improper Airspeed State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft airspeed is either too low (or too high). 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24506: Airspeed AND (“not maintained” OR “excessive” OR 
“inadequate” OR “low” OR “misjudged” OR “not attained” OR 
“reduced” OR “not obtained/maintained” OR “misjudged” OR 
“below” OR “exceeded” OR “initiated” OR “high” OR “excessive”)  
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “airspeed”. 
 
Maintaining correct airspeed is 
critical to safe aircraft 
operations. Not maintaining 
airspeed can result in other 
hazardous states such as 
aerodynamic stall, VRS, or 
operating in the unsafe region 
of the Height-Velocity curve 
(also known as the Deadman’s 
curve). 
24507: Airspeed-lift off speed AND (“not attained”) 
24509: Airspeed-minimum control speed with the critical engine 
inoperative AND (“not maintained”) 
24516: Airspeed-maximum operating limit speed AND (“exceeded”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01062010XX: Airspeed AND (“not attained/maintained” OR 
“capability exceeded”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “airspeed”. 
 
Table 62: Improper Descent State Definition 
Improper Descent State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s descent was incorrect/descent rate was incorrect. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
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Improper Descent State 
24524: Descent AND (“excessive” OR “not maintained” OR 
“exceeded”, “improper” OR “inadvertent” OR “intentional” OR 
“misjudged” OR “premature” OR “not maintained/obtained” OR “not 
possible” OR “not corrected” OR “intentional” OR “premature”)  
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “descent”. I did 
not include the “uncontrolled 
descent” phase of flight as I 
grouped it with the inflight loss 
of control state. 
24525: Proper descent rate AND (“excessive” OR “not maintained” 
OR “exceeded” OR “improper” OR “inadvertent” OR “intentional” 
OR “misjudged” OR “not maintained/obtained” OR “not possible” 
OR “not corrected”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01062037XX: Descent rate AND (“not attained/maintained” OR 
“incorrect use/operation” OR “capability exceeded” OR 
“attain/maintain not possible” OR “not specified” OR “related 
operating info”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “descent”. 01062040XX: Descent/approach/glide path AND (“not 
attained/maintained” OR “incorrect use/operation” OR “capability 
exceeded” OR “attain/maintain not possible” OR “not specified”) 
 
I classified the poor weather state into: 
1. Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state: This state appears in 
accidents where pilots knowingly or inadvertently flew through poor weather 
conditions.  
Table 63: Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state Definition 
Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state 
Hazardous state where the pilot intentionally or inadvertently flew into poor weather conditions. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
240: Inflight encounter with weather  I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase that contained 
the words “VFR” and IMC”. I 
supplemented this search with 
the careful study of accident 
reports to identify the phrase 
“adverse weather” that 
captures the other two codes. 
 
In many instances, these 
subject codes are accompanied 
by “20000: Weather 
condition”, which provides 
additional information about 
the nature of poor weather 
(e.g., clouds, whiteout, icing) 
that the pilot 
intentionally/inadvertently 
flew into. 
24015: VFR flight into IMC AND (“continued” OR “intentional” OR 
“inadvertent” OR “attempted” OR “initiated” OR “encountered” OR 
“improper” OR “misjudged”) 
24036: Flight into adverse weather AND (“continued” OR 
“intentional” OR “inadvertent” OR “attempted” OR “initiated” OR 
“performed” OR “selected”) 
24023: Flight into known adverse weather AND (“continued” OR 
“intentional” OR “inadvertent” OR “attempted” OR “initiated”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
401: VFR encounter with IMC I identified this codes by 
searching the coding manual 210: Icing encounter 
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Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state 
for the phrase that contained 
the words “VFR” and IMC”. I 
also included the occurrence 
code that corresponded to icing 
(coded as a modifier in the pre-
2008 system). 
The search for “adverse 
weather” returned no results. 
 
2. Prevailing/Existing weather and light state: Not all poor weather accidents need 
necessarily involve intentional/inadvertent flight through poor weather. While flight in 
the prevailing weather (or light) state (e.g., high density altitude, tailwind, or glare) can 
be considered less hazardous (than, say, VFR flight into IMC), they may still play a 
role in the accident.  
Table 64: Prevailing/Existing weather state Definition 
Prevailing/Existing weather and light state 
Hazardous weather state that existed during the flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
20000: Weather condition I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase that contained 
the words “weather” and 
“light”. I excluded the codes 
corresponding to 
inadvertent/intentional flight 
into adverse weather. 
I also excluded the codes 
relating to aircraft lighting 
(e.g., panel lights). 
20100: Light condition  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
0303YYYYXX: Environmental issues-conditions/weather/phenomena 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase that contained 
the words “weather” and 
“light”. I excluded the codes 
corresponding to 
inadvertent/intentional flight 
into adverse weather. 
I also excluded the codes 
relating to aircraft lighting 
(e.g., panel lights). 
 
Here, YYYY represents that 
different weather and light 
conditions that are recorded 
under the Environmental 
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Prevailing/Existing weather and light state 
issues-
conditions/weather/phenomena 
hierarchy. YYYY ranges from 
“0000: general” to “6030: 
Light condition-glare” 
 
Table 65: Wake Turbulence state Definition 
Wake turbulence State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft flew through the wake vortices of another aircraft. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24715: Wake turbulence AND (“encountered” OR “inadvertent”) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “wake 
turbulence” and “vortex 
turbulence”. 
410: Vortex turbulence encountered 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
361: Aircraft wake turbulence 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “wake 
turbulence” and “vortex 
turbulence”. 
 
Table 66: Improper Turn/Bank state Definition 
Improper Turn/Bank State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its banking/roll performance during flight 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17305: Aircraft performance-turn capability AND (“total loss” OR 
“exceeded”)  
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
words “turn”, “roll”, and 
“bank”. 
17306: Aircraft performance-rolling maneuvers AND (“dynamic 
imbalance” OR “extraneous”) 
24804: Hovering turn AND (“low” OR “abrupt” OR “uncontrolled”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 67: Runway Overshoot State Definition 
Runway Overshoot State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft departed the runway surface during takeoff or landing. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
390: Overrun 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “overrun” and 
“excursion”. The terms overrun 
and excursion are used 
interchangeably. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
370: Landing area overshoot I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “overrun” and 
“excursion”. The terms overrun 
300: Runway excursion 
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Runway Overshoot State 
and excursion are used 
interchangeably. 
 
Table 68: Loss of Engine Power State Definition 
Loss of Engine Power State 
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s engine is not operational. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
350: Loss of engine power I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “loss of 
engine” and “powerplant”. I 
do not include the codes 
relating to powerplant 
control, powerplant fire 
systems and extinguishers  
 
Note that despite grouping 
mechanical and non-
mechanical losses of engine 
power, I can count the 
instances where each of the 
codes appeared in accidents. 
351: Loss of engine power (total)-mechanical failure/malfunction 
352: Loss of engine power (partial)-mechanical failure/malfunction 
353: Loss of engine power (total)—non-mechanical 
354: Loss of engine power (partial)—non-mechanical 
16902: Powerplant AND (“failure, total” OR “seized” OR “fire” OR 
“overspeed” OR “output low”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
340: Powerplant system/component malfunction/failure I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “loss of 
engine” and “powerplant”. 
 
Note that despite grouping 
mechanical and non-
mechanical losses of engine 
power, I can count the 
instances where each of the 
codes appeared in accidents. 
341: Loss of engine power (total) 
342: Loss of engine power (partial) 
 
Table 69: System Failure State Definition 
System Failure State 
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
130: Airframe/component/system failure/malfunction I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “malfunction”, 
“failure/malfunction”, and 
“failure”. I do not include 
powerplant failures in this 
category. 
 
Note that despite grouping 
codes that convey the same 
meaning (i.e., system failure 
state), I can count the 
131: Propeller failure/malfunction 
132 Rotor failure/malfunction 
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System Failure State 
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned. 
instances where each of the 
codes appeared in accidents. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
330: System/component malfunction/failure (non-powerplant) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “malfunction”, 
“failure/malfunction”, and 
“failure”. I do not include 
powerplant failures in this 
category. 
 
Note that despite grouping 
codes that convey the same 
meaning (i.e., system failure 
state), I can count the 
instances where each of the 
codes appeared in accidents. 
331: Pressure/environmental system malfunction/failure 
332: Electrical system malfunction/failure 
333: Flight control system malfunction/failure 
334: Flight instrument malfunction/failure 
335: Navigation system malfunction/failure 
336: Communication system malfunction/failure 
337: Aircraft structural failure 
 
Table 70: Preflight Mechanical Issue State Definition 
Preflight Mechanical Issue State 
Hazardous state where the flight begins with a pre-existing mechanical problem with the aircraft. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24006: Aircraft weight and balance AND (“exceeded” OR 
“disregarded” OR “high” OR “improper” OR “misjudged” OR 
“excessive” OR “selected” OR “attempted” OR “not verified” OR 
“inaccurate” OR “not corrected” OR “not calculated”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching in the coding manual 
for NTSB codes that suggested 
mechanical issues before the 
flight began (note that I 
consider improper weight a 
mechanical issue). I also 
studied several accident reports 
and noticed that the NTSB 
used these codes while 
referring to preflight 
mechanical problems. 
 
In addition to these two subject 
codes, I define the preflight 
mechanical issue state using 
following triggers: improper 
maintenance (24100–24124, 
24703), improper design by the 
manufacturer/builder (82000–
82200), improper use of 
material (84000–84200), 
insufficiently defined 
procedure for maintenance 
personnel (80000–80400), 
insufficient/unclear 




24007: Operation with known deficiencies AND (“continued” OR 
“attempted” OR “intentional” OR “performed” OR “attempted” OR 
“improper use of” OR “poor” OR “selected” OR “disregarded”) 
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Preflight Mechanical Issue State 
Hazardous state where the flight begins with a pre-existing mechanical problem with the aircraft. 
certification/standards (91000, 
91200, 91400, 92000, and 
92400). 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01061040XX: CG/weight distribution AND (“capability exceeded”) I identified these codes by 
searching in the coding manual 
for NTSB codes that suggested 
mechanical issues before the 
flight began (note that I 
consider improper weight a 
mechanical issue). I also 
studied several accident reports 
and noticed that the NTSB 
used these codes while 
referring to preflight 
mechanical problems 
01061035XX: Maximum weight AND (“capability exceeded OR “not 
specified” OR “incorrect use/operation”) 
 
Table 71: Preflight Pilot Hazardous State Definition 
Preflight Pilot Hazardous State 
Hazardous pilot state that does not involved psychological conditions, physical impairment, confidence, 
fatigue, or qualification/experience related states. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
 I identified this state using the triggers shown in the 
notes column. This state does not correspond to any 
of the other pilot-related hazardous states. 
I identified this code by using the 
triggers: 
 35200: Information 
unavailable. 
 35100: Information insufficient. 
 I excluded the non-pilot related 
personnel codes. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
 I identified this state using the triggers shown in the 
notes column. This state does not correspond to any 






















Preflight Pilot Hazardous State 
 04032015XX: 
Support/oversight/monitoring—
oversight of operation 
 04035010XX: 
Support/oversight/monitoring—
Availability of safety programs 
 04035015XX: 
Support/oversight/monitoring—
Adequacy of safety programs 
 04035020XX: 
Support/oversight/monitoring—
Adherence to safety programs 
 030: Preflight or dispatch event 
 I only included modifiers 
corresponding to the “operator” 
 
 Table 72: Aircraft Stall/Spin State Definition 
Aircraft Stall/Spin State 
Hazardous state where the lifting surfaces of an aircraft (i.e., wings or rotor blades) exceed a critical 
angle of attack they experience a loss of lift, and enter a stalled state 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24551: Stall AND (“inadvertent” OR “uncontrolled” OR “not 
corrected”)  
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “stall”, 
“stall/spin”, “spiral”, and 
“rotation”. I exclude codes 
relating to engine/compressor 
stalls. 
 
When the lifting surfaces of an 
aircraft (i.e., wings or rotor 
blades) exceed a critical angle 
of attack they experience a loss 
of lift, and enter a stalled state. 
Any yawing motion in this 
stalled state can induce a spin. 
The NTSB uses the 
“uncontrolled” modifier to 
suggest that loss of control 
followed the stall/spin state 
24552: Stall/spin AND (“uncontrolled” OR “inadvertent”) 
24550: Spiral AND (“not possible” OR “uncontrolled” OR 
“inadvertent”) 
24548: Rotation AND (“uncontrolled”) 
24809: Retreating blade stall AND (“encountered”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
241: Aerodynamic stall/spin I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “stall”, 
“stall/spin”, “spiral”, and 
“rotation”. I exclude codes 
relating to engine/compressor 
stalls. 
243: Retreating blade stall 
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Table 73: Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State Definition 
Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State 
Hazardous state where the pilot is lost, disoriented, unable to maintain visual reference/perception. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
33400: Spatial disorientation  I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“disorient” and “aware”, and 
the words “lost”, “perception”, 
and “illusion”. 
24014: Became lost/disoriented  
31210: Visual/aural perception 
31211: Visual illusion 
33500: Visual/aural detection 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02022000XX: Perception/orientation/illusion—general  I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“disorient” and “aware”, and 




02022025XX: Perception/orientation/illusion—spatial disorientation  
02022035XX: Perception/orientation/illusion—Situational awareness  
02022040XX: Perception/orientation/illusion—Perception  
 
Table 74: Physically Impaired/Incapacitated State Definition 
Physically Impaired/Incapacitated State 
Hazardous state where the pilot was impaired or incapacitated. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
33200: Incapacitation (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“impair” and “incapacitate”. 
Note that I do not include the 
code “33141: Use of drugs”—I 
term this code a trigger.  
33212: Incapacitation (cardiovascular) 
33214: Incapacitation (carbon monoxide) 
33218: Incapacitation (motion sickness) 
33221: Incapacitation (other organic problem) 
33100: Physical impairment 
33115: Physical impairment (other toxic) 
33116: Physical impairment (hypoglycemia/diet) 
33119: Physical impairment (stroke) 
33120: Physical impairment (visual deficiency) 
33121: Physical impairment (other organic problem) 
33130: Impairment (alcohol) 
33140: Impairment (drugs) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02012000XX: Impairment/incapacitation (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“impair” and “incapacitate”. 
02012010XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Illness/injury 
02012020XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Illicit drug 
02012025XX: Impairment/incapacitation—Prescription medication 









Table 75: Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State Definition 
Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain visual lookout for terrain/other aircraft or was 
distracted. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24610: Monitoring AND (“inadequate” OR “inattentive” OR “not 
maintained”)  
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“monitor”, “divert”, and 
“distract”. I supplemented this 
search by looking for instances 
where pilot’s failed to maintain 
“lookout” or “separation”. 
31110: Diverted attention  
31120: Inattentive 
24021: Visual lookout AND (“inadequate” OR “not maintained” OR 
“not possible” OR “restricted” OR “reduced” OR “diminished” OR 
“poor” OR “inaccurate” OR “improper” OR “not attained” OR 
“restricted” OR “inattentive” OR “not performed” “attempted” OR 
“not received” OR “inadvertent” OR “disregarded” OR “misjudged” 
OR “not understood”) 
24618: Visual separation AND (“not maintained” OR “inadequate” 
OR “inattentive”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02021500XX: Attention/monitoring (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“monitor”, “divert”, and 
“distract”. 
02021525XX: Monitoring equipment/instruments 
02021530XX: Monitoring other person 
02021535XX: Monitoring other aircraft 
02021540XX: Monitoring environment 
 
Table 76: Overconfident/Lack of Confidence State Definition 
Overconfident/Lack of Confidence State 
Hazardous state where the pilot demonstrated lack of/overconfidence in his/her/aircraft’s ability. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
31140: Complacency  I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“confidence” and 
“complacent”. I included 
ostentatious display as it 
suggests a hazardous pilot 
attitude.  
31150: Under-confidence in personal ability  
31170: Overconfidence in aircraft’s ability 
31260: Ostentatious display 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02021010XX: Personality/attitude self-confidence I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“confidence” and 
“complacent”. 
02021015XX: Confidence/reliance on equipment 
02021020XX: Complacency 
 
Table 77: Insufficient Qualification/Training State Definition 
Insufficient Qualification/Training State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not meet the qualification/training requirements to perform the flight 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
34000: Qualification I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
34001: Lack of certification 
34100: Improper training 
162 
 
Insufficient Qualification/Training State 
34110: Improper initial training “train”, “knowledge”, and 
“experience”.  
 
Note that I do not include 
codes relating to the lack of 
training procedure provided by 
the company, management, or 
regulator. 
34200: Inadequate training 
34210: Inadequate initial training 
34220: Inadequate recurrent training 
34230: Inadequate transition/upgrade training 
34240: Inadequate training (emergency procedure(s)) 
34300: Lack of experience 
34310: Lack of familiarity with aircraft 
34320: Lack of familiarity with geographic area 
34330: Lack of total experience 
34331: Total (experience) 
34332: Lack of total experience in kind of aircraft 
34333: Lack of total experience in type of aircraft 
34334: Lack of total instrument time 
34335: Lack of total experience in type operation 
34340: Lack of recent experience 
34341: Lack of recent total experience 
34342: Lack of recent experience in kind of aircraft 
34343: Lack of recent experience in type of aircraft 
34344: Lack of recent instrument time 
34345: Lack of recent experience in type operation 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02030000XX: Experience/knowledge (general)  
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“train”, “knowledge”, and 
“experience”.  
 
Note that I do not include 
codes relating to the lack of 
training procedure provided by 
the company, management, or 
regulator. 
02031000XX: Experience/qualifications (general) 
02031010XX: Qualification/certification 
02031015XX: Total experience 
02031020XX: Total experience in position 
02031025XX: Total experience w/ equipment 
02031030XX: Total instrument experience 
02031035XX: Recent experience 
02031045XX: Recent experience w/ equipment 
02031515XX: Initial instruct/training 
02031530XX: Training with equipment 
02032000XX: Knowledge (general) 
02032010XX: Knowledge of procedures 
02032015XX: Knowledge of equipment 
02032025XX: Knowledge of regulatory requirements 
02032030XX: Knowledge of geographic area 
02032035XX: Aeronautical knowledge 
 
Table 78: Fatigued/Overworked State Definition 
Fatigued/Overworked State 
Hazardous state where the pilot was fatigued/overworked. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
33600: Fatigue 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “fatigue”, 
“overworked”, and 
“workload”. 
33601: Fatigue (conditions conducive to pilot fatigue) 
33610: Fatigue (chronic) 
33620: Fatigue (lack of sleep) 
33630: Fatigue (flight schedule) 
33650: Fatigue (flight and ground schedule) 




NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02013500XX: Alertness/Fatigue (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “fatigue”, 
“overworked”, and 
“workload”. 
02013510XX: Lack of sleep 
02013520XX: Fatigue due to work schedule 
02064000XX: Workload management (general) 
02064010XX: Task scheduling 
02064015XX: Task load shedding 
02064020XX: Task allocation 
02064025XX: Task overload 
 
Table 79: Anxiety/Under Pressure State Definition 
Anxiety/Under Pressure State 
Hazardous state where the pilot was anxious or under pressure while operating the aircraft 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
31200: Pressure 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the words 
“pressure” and “anxiety”, and 
the word “panic”. 
31201: Self-induced pressure 
31203: Pressure induced by others 
31204: Pressure induced by conditions/events 
31180: Anxiety/apprehension 
31190: Panic 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
03042000XX: Pressure/demands (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the words 
“pressure” and “anxiety”, and 
the word “panic”. 
03042035XX: Personal pressure 
03042040XX: Other pressure/demand 
02022515XX: Anxiety/panic 
 
Table 80: Poor Psychological State Definition 
Poor Psychological State 
Hazardous state where the pilot was in poor state of mind prior to the flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
31000: Psychological condition  I defined this state to capture 
the codes corresponding to 
general psychological 
conditions that did not have 
accompanying modifiers. 
31280: Other psychological condition 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02020000XX: Psychological (general) 
I defined this state to capture 
the codes corresponding to 
general psychological 
conditions that did not have 
accompanying modifiers. 
 
Table 81: Exceeding Slope Limitation State Definition 
Exceeding Slope Limitation State 
Hazardous state where the pilot operated the aircraft beyond its design capability in inclined/sloped 
terrain. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
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Exceeding Slope Limitation State 
24576: Slope capability AND (“exceeded”) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “slope”.  
 
These codes describe the 
hazardous state where the pilot 
operated the aircraft beyond its 
capability on sloped terrain. 
Not recognizing (and 
correcting) this hazardous state 
can result in a roll over. 
24812: Slope limitations AND (“exceeded”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 82: Improper Aircraft Weight and Balance State Definition 
Improper Aircraft Weight and Balance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s balance is affected due to improper loading or shifting of the center 
of gravity. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24006: Aircraft weight and balance AND (“exceeded” OR 
“disregarded” OR “high” OR “improper” OR “misjudged” OR 
“excessive” OR “selected” OR “attempted” OR “not verified” OR 
“inaccurate” OR “not corrected” OR “not calculated”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “weight” and 
“balance”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01061040XX: CG/weight distribution AND (“capability exceeded”) I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “weight” and 
“balance”. 
01061035XX: Maximum weight AND (“capability exceeded OR “not 
specified” OR “incorrect use/operation”) 
 
Table 83: Wheels-up Landing State Definition 
Wheels-up Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot performs a landing without extending the landing gear. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
232: Wheels-up landing I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “wheels-up”. 
24556: Wheels-up landing  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
095: Landing gear not configured  
In the post-2008 system, the 
NTSB used this code to 
indicate situations where there 
were wheels-down landings in 
water and wheels-up landings. 
 
Table 84: Runway Incursion State Definition 
Runway Incursion State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from forward flight to landing. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
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Runway Incursion State 
310: Runway incursion by animal I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “incursion”. 
320: Runway incursion by vehicle/person/aircraft 
 
Table 85: Low Fuel State Definition 
Low Fuel State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low fuel level. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17001: Fuel AND (“low level”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “fuel”. I also 
included those instances that 
had the modifier “low level”. 
I did not include codes 
corresponding fuel systems.  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01071010XX: Fuel AND (“fluid level”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “fuel”. I also 
included those instances that 
had the modifier “fluid 
level”. 
I did not include codes 
corresponding fuel systems. 
 
Table 86: Low Oil State Definition 
Low Oil State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low oil level. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17002: Oil AND (“low level”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “Oil”. I also 
included those instances that 
had the modifier “low level”. 
I did not include codes 
corresponding oil systems.  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01071020XX: Oil AND (“fluid level”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “Oil”. I also 
included those instances that 
had the modifier “fluid 
level”. 
I did not include codes 
corresponding oil systems. 
 
Table 87: Low Hydraulic Fluid State Definition 
Low Hydraulic Fluid State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low hydraulic fluid level. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
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Low Hydraulic Fluid State 
17003: Hydraulic AND (“low level”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “hydraulic”. I also 
included those instances that 
had the modifier “low level”. 
I did not include codes 
corresponding hydraulic 
reservoir capacity and systems. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01071015XX: Hydraulic fluid AND (“fluid level”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “hydraulic”. I also 
included those instances that 
had the modifier “fluid level”. 
I did not include codes 
corresponding hydraulic 
reservoir capacity and systems. 
 
Table 88: Improper Flare State Definition 
Improper Flare State 
Hazardous state where the pilot executed an improper flare prior to landing. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24535: Flare AND (“misjudged” OR “not possible” OR “not 
attained”, “delayed” OR “inadequate” OR “low” OR “high” OR 
“premature” OR “reduced” OR “abrupt” OR “improper” OR “not 
possible” OR “excessive” OR “not performed” OR “abrupt” OR 
“inaccurate” OR “not successful” ) 
In one case, the NTSB used the 
modifier “inattentive” with this 
subject code. This cases 
suggests that the pilot was in a 
distracted state prior to the 
improper flare/level-off state. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01062041XX: Landing flare AND (“not attained/maintained” OR 
“incorrect use/operation” OR “not specified”) 
 
 
Table 89: Improper Supervision State Definition 
Improper Supervision State 
Hazardous state where the instructor failed to correctly supervise the student pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24627: Supervision 
I identified this state by 
searching the coding manual for 
derivatives of the word 
“supervise”.  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 90: Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State Definition 
Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating in the unsafe region of the “Deadman’s curve”. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24803: Height/velocity curve 
In some accidents that involved 
loss of engine power or 
167 
 
Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State 
improper autorotation, the 
NTSB used this code to 
indicate that at the aircraft was 
operating in a hazardous region 
of the Deadman’s curve. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 91: On-ground Loss of Control State Definition 
On-ground Loss of Control State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain control of the aircraft on the ground. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
260: On-ground loss of control 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “loss of control” 
and “ground” 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
230: Loss of control on ground 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “loss of control” 
and “ground” 
 
Table 92: On-ground Poor Weather Definition 
On-ground Poor Weather State 
Hazardous state where the pilot intentionally/inadvertently flew through poor weather on the ground. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
330: On-ground encounter with weather 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “weather” and 
“ground” 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 93: Improper Run-on Landing State Definition 
Improper Run-on Landing State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from forward flight to landing. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24559: Run-on landing AND (“improper” AND “inadvertent” OR 
“misjudged” OR “inadequate” OR “not performed”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “run-on”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 94: Improper Vertical Takeoff State Definition 
Improper Vertical Takeoff State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct vertical takeoff. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
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Improper Vertical Takeoff State 
24559: Vertical takeoff AND (“improper” AND “uncontrolled” OR 
“not possible” OR “restricted” ) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “vertical takeoff”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 95: Improper Go-around State Definition 
Improper Go-around State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct go-around. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24536: Go-around AND (“inadvertent” OR “improper” OR “not 
possible”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “go-around”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 96: Exceeding Design Stress Limits State Definition 
Exceeding Design Stress Limits State 
Hazardous state where aerodynamic loads on the aircraft exceed the design stress limits. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24538: Design stress limits of aircraft AND (“exceeded”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “design” and 
“stress”. 
I exclude codes relating to 
improper aircraft design and 
pilot stress/anxiety. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 97: Improper Translational Lift State Definition 
Improper Translational Lift State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from hover to forward flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24815: Translational lift AND (“not attained/maintained” OR “not 
maintained” OR “not attained” OR “not obtained”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “translational lift”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 98: Improper Precautionary Landing State Definition 
Improper Precautionary Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not execute a proper precautionary landing. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24546: Precautionary landing AND (“not performed” OR 
“misjudged”) 
The NTSB used this code to 
indicate that the pilot had the 
option of choosing an 
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Improper Precautionary Landing State 
appropriate landing area (unlike 
during a forced landing). 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 99: Mental Overload State Definition 
Mental Overload State 
Hazardous state where the pilot’s abilities are limited as he/she is overwhelmed mentally. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
31220: Mental performance overload 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “mental overload”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 100: Unattended Aircraft State Definition 
Unattended Aircraft State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is left unattended with the engines running. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24005: Aircraft unattended/engine(s) running 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “unattended”.  
This state is a preflight 
hazardous state as it involves 
leaving the controls of the 
aircraft unattended when on the 
ground (with engines running), 
before flight. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 101: Hazardous Powerplant Operation State Definition 
Hazardous Powerplant Operation State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft powerplant parameters are in excess of the specified operational 
limits. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01062050XX: Performance/control parameters—powerplant 
parameters 
The NTSB introduced this code 
in the post-2008 system to 
indicate that the powerplant 
parameters exceeded their 
specified operational limits.  
This state was generally 
followed by a loss of engine 




Table 102: Near Midair Collision State Definition 
Near Midair Collision State 
Hazardous state where two or more aircraft almost collided with each other during flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
260: Near midair collision 
The NTSB introduced this code 
in the post-2008 system to 
highlight situations where 
aircraft almost collided with 
each other. 
 
Table 103: Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State Definition 
Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design hover performance. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17310: Helicopter hover performance AND (“exceeded” OR “lack 
of” OR “deteriorated”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “hover 
performance”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 104: Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Capability State Definition 
Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design takeoff performance. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17301: Aircraft takeoff capability AND (“exceeded” OR 
“inadequate” OR “deteriorated”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “takeoff capability”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 105: Exceeding Aircraft Landing Capability State Definition 
Exceeding Aircraft Landing Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design landing performance. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17302: Aircraft landing capability AND (“exceeded” OR 
“inadequate” OR “deteriorated” OR “low”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “landing capability”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 106: Improper Lift-off State Definition 
Improper Lift-off State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not lift-off correctly. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
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Improper Lift-off State 
24533: Lift-off AND (“not attained” OR “not possible” OR “not 
corrected”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “lift-off”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 107: Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State Definition 
Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17300: Aircraft performance (general) AND (“exceeded” OR 
“deteriorated” OR “vibration”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “aircraft 
performance”.  
 
The NTSB used this “general” 
code to indicate that the aircraft 
was operated beyond its design 
performance. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 108: Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State Definition 
Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24800: Rotorcraft operations AND (“improper” OR “excessive” OR 
“exceeded”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “rotorcraft 
operations”. 
 
 The NTSB used this “general” 
code to indicate that the aircraft 
was not operated correctly by 
the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 109: Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State Definition 
Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design yaw performance capabilities. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17306: Yawing maneuvers (performance) AND (“exceeded” OR 
“deteriorated” OR “erratic”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
derivatives of the word “yaw”.  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
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Table 110: Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State Definition 
Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its performance capabilities after the loss of 
engine power. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17304: Aircraft performance—engine out capability AND 
(“exceeded”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “engine out”.  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 111: Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Capability State Definition 
Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design crosswind performance capabilities. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01061015XX: Maximum crosswind capability AND (“capability 
exceeded”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the “crosswind”. 
 
Table 112: Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State Definition 
Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design capabilities for a given configuration. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01061017XX: Configuration AND (“capability exceeded”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “configuration”. 
 
Table 113: Improper Power-on Landing State Definition 
Improper Power-on Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot performs an improper landing with engine(s) operational. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24557: Power-on landing AND (“not possible” OR “not maintained” 
OR “uncontrolled” OR “improper”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “power-on landing”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 114: Poor Interpersonal Relations State Definition 
Poor Interpersonal Relations State 
Hazardous state where the pilot has poor relations with his co-pilot/crew. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
31240: Interpersonal relations  
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “interpersonal”. 
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Poor Interpersonal Relations State 
Hazardous state where the pilot has poor relations with his co-pilot/crew. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
Table 115: Runway Undershoot State Definition 
Runway Undershoot State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed short of the runway. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
390: Undershoot 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “undershoot”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
370: Landing area undershoot 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “undershoot”. 
 
Table 116: Wheels-down Landing in Water State Definition 
Wheels-down Landing in Water State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed short of the runway. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
231: Wheels-down landing in water 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “wheels-down”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
095: Landing gear not configured  
In the post-2008 system, the 
NTSB used this code to 
indicate situations where there 
were wheels-down landings in 
water and wheels-up landings. 
 
Table 117: On-ground Loss of Control State Definition 
On-ground Loss of Control State 
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain control of aircraft heading and attitude when on the 
ground. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
260: On-ground loss of control 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “loss of control” and 
“ground”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
230: Loss of control on ground 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “loss of control” and 
“ground”. 
 
Table 118: Improper Level-off State Definition 
Improper Level-off State 




Improper Level-off State 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24534: Level-off AND (“improper” OR “not maintained” OR 
“misjudged” OR “not attained” OR “not possible” OR “delayed” OR 
“not obtained” OR “premature” OR “high” OR “inadequate” 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “level-off”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
Table 119: Low Oil State Definition 
Low Oil State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low oil level 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available   
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01071020XX: Oil AND (“fluid level”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “oil”. I also 
included those instances that 
had the modifier “fluid 
level”. 
I did not include codes 
corresponding to the oil 
system. 
 
Table 120: Low Coolant State Definition 
Low Coolant State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low coolant level 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available   
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01071025XX: Coolant AND (“fluid level”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “coolant”. I 
also included those instances 
that had the modifier “fluid 
level”. 
 
Table 121: Low Grease State Definition 
Low Grease State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low grease level. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01071035XX: Fuel AND (“fluid level”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “grease”. I also 
included those instances that 
had the modifier “fluid 
level”. 
Table 122: Inflight Collision with Terrain/Water/Object End State Definition 
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Inflight Collision with Terrain/Water/Object State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft collided with terrain/water/object during flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
230: Inflight collision with terrain/water I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “collision”, “terrain”, 
and “object”.  
220: Inflight collision with object 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
470: Inflight collision with terrain/object 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “collision”, “terrain”, 
and “object”. The NTSB 
combined the codes for object 
and terrain in the post-2008 
system. 
 
Table 123: Hard Landing End State Definition 
Hard Landing State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft landing gear impacted the ground with great force. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
200: Hard landing 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “hard landing”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
092: Hard landing 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “hard landing”. 
 
Table 124: Forced/Emergency Landing End State Definition 
Forced/Emergency Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot is unable to choose the landing site and is forced to perform an 
emergency landing. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
180: Forced landing 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “forced landing” and 
“emergency landing”.  
This code is used 
interchangeably by the NTSB 
to indicate an emergency 
landing or emergency descent. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
440: Off-field emergency landing 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “forced landing”. 
 
Table 125: On-ground collision with Terrain/Water/Object End State Definition 
On-ground collision with Terrain/Water/Object State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft collided with terrain/water/object while operating on the ground. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
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On-ground collision with Terrain/Water/Object State 
310: On ground/water collision with object I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “on-ground” and the 
words “collision”, “terrain”, 
and “object”. 
320: On-ground/water collision with terrain 
271: Collision between aircraft (other than midair) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
200: Ground collision 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “ground” and 
“collision”. The NTSB used 
this code to indicate accidents 
that involved collision on the 
ground in the post-2008 system. 
 
Table 126: Propeller/Rotor Contact to Person End State Definition 
Propeller/Rotor Contact to Person State 
Hazardous state where rotating rotor/propeller blades make contact with a person, resulting in injuries. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
370: Propeller/rotor contact to person 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “contact” and 
“person”. The NTSB used this 
code as end state to indicate 
that rotor/propeller blades made 
contact with a person during 
operation (generally while 
disembarking). 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
081: Aircraft/propeller/rotor contact with person 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “contact” and 
“person”. The NTSB used this 
code as end state to indicate 
that rotor/propeller blades made 
contact with a person during 
operation (generally while 
disembarking). 
 
Table 127: Dragged Wing/Rotor/Float End State Definition 
Dragged Wing/Rotor/Float State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s wing/rotor/float is dragged along the ground/water. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
160: Dragged wing/rotor/float/other 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “dragged-wing”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
093: Dragged wing/rotor/float/other 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 




Table 128: Nose Down/Over End State Definition 
Nose Down/Over State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s nose makes contact with the ground/water/runway surface: 
-without inverting the aircraft (nose down) 
-and inverts the aircraft (nose over) 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
290: Nose down I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “nose-down” and 
“nose-over”. 
300: Nose over 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
096: Nose down/over  
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the phrase “nose-down” and 
“nose-over”. The NTSB 
combined these codes into a 
single code in the post-2008 
system. 
 
Table 129: Midair Collision End State Definition 
Midair Collision State 
Hazardous state where two or more aircraft collide during flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
270: Midair collision  
Note that the midair collision 
code should appear in the end 
of the accident sequence in 
order to be classified as end 
state 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
250: Midair collision  
Note that the midair collision 
code should appear in the end 
of the accident sequence in 
order to be classified as end 
state 
 
Table 130: Ditching End State Definition 
Ditching 
Hazardous state where the crew makes a planned emergency landing in water. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
150: Ditching  
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “ditching”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
441: Ditching  
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 




Table 131: Collision during Takeoff/Landing End State Definition 
Collision during Takeoff/Landing State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft collides with terrain/object during the takeoff or landing phase of 
flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available   
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
490: Collision during takeoff/landing  
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “collision” and 
“takeoff/landing”. 
 
Table 132: Fire/Explosion End State Definition 
Fire/Explosion State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft explodes or catches fire after impact with terrain/object. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
170: Fire  I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “fire” and 
“explosion”. These codes are 
classified as end states when 
they appear in the end of the 
accident sequence.  
171: Fire/explosion 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
170: Fire/smoke (post-impact)  I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the words “fire” and 
“explosion”. These codes are 
classified as end states when 
they appear in the end of the 
accident sequence. 
180: Explosion (post-impact) 
 
Table 133: Abnormal Runway Contact End State Definition 
Abnormal Runway Contact State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to execute a correct landing (other than hard landing). 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
090: Abnormal runway contact 
Examples for abnormal runway 
contact include bouncing, and 
then skidding before coming to 
rest. 
 
Table 134: Missing Aircraft End State Definition 
Missing Aircraft State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was not recovered after the accident. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
420: Missing aircraft 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual for 
the word “missing”. 
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Missing Aircraft State 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 

















APPENDIX B. DEFINTIONS OF TRIGGERS 
Table 135: Improper Maintenance Trigger Definition 
Improper Maintenance 
This trigger represents maintenance-related errors or violation 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24003: Aircraft service AND (“improper” OR “inadequate” OR “not 
corrected”) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“maintain” and “inspect”. I did 
not include the codes 
corresponding to maintaining 
aircraft control and 
maintenance computers. I also 
included the codes for aircraft 
service and installation. 
24704: Installation AND (“improper” OR “inadequate”) 
24100–24124: Maintenance (hierarchy) AND (“improper” OR 
“inadequate” OR “not corrected” OR “not performed” OR “delayed” 
OR “not identified” OR “poor” OR “inattentive” OR “not possible” 
OR “information insufficient” OR “disregarded” OR “not followed” 
OR “not required” OR “not complied with” OR “overdue” OR 
“reduced” OR “incorrect” OR “not maintained” OR “excessive” OR 
inadvertent use of “ OR “not verified” OR “not approved” OR 
“intentional” OR “reversed” OR “low” OR “inaccurate” OR “note 
received” OR “not attained” 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
010105YYXX: Maintenance/inspections (hierarchy) 
Here, YY represents that 
different maintenance actions 
that are recorded under the 
Maintenance/inspections 
hierarchy. YY ranges from 
“00: general” to “20: scheduled 
maintenance checks” 
020615YYXX: Inspection (hierarchy) 
Here, YY represents that 
different maintenance actions 
that are recorded under the 
Inspection hierarchy. YY 
ranges from “00: general” to 
“20: scheduled/routine 
inspection” 
020620YYXX: Maintenance (hierarchy) 
Here, YY represents that 
different maintenance actions 
that are recorded under the 
Inspection hierarchy. YY 
ranges from “00: general” to 
“35: installation” 
02062415XX: Record keeping-aircraft/maintenance logs In addition to the subject codes 
and occurrences listed in this 
table, I used the following 
maintenance-related modifiers: 
(1) Incorrect 
service/maintenance, (2) not 
serviced/maintained, 
(3) inadequate inspection, and 
(4) not inspected 
04023025XX: Maintenance scheduling 
04032020XX: Oversight of maintenance  
04033025XX: Documentation/record keeping-maintenance records 
030: Aircraft servicing event 
040: Aircraft maintenance event 




Table 136: Improper Inflight Planning/Decision-making Trigger Definition 
Improper Inflight Planning/Decision-making 
This trigger represents incorrect planning or decisions taken by the pilot(s) during flight 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24000: Planning/decision I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the words 
“plan” and “decision”. I did 
not include the codes that 
corresponded to preflight 
planning and preparation. 
24010: Inflight planning/decision-making 
24031: Judgment 
60000: Improper decision 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02041510XX: Information processing/decision-
identification/recognition 
Unlike the pre-2008 system, 
which provided little insight 
into the types of actions that 
triggered hazardous states, the 
current system has subject 
codes such as “02041025XX: 
Delayed action”, “02041030: 
Lack of action”, and 
“02041035XX: Forgotten 
action/omission”. I present 




02041520XX: Information processing/decision-Decision 
making/judgment 
 
Table 137: Improper Use of Collective Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Collective 
This trigger represents the incorrect collective input by the pilot during flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
23202: Collective AND (“improper use of” OR “excessive” OR 
“improper” OR “delayed” OR “not used” OR “not possible” OR 
“premature” OR “uncontrolled” OR “inadvertent activation” OR 
“inadequate” OR “inattentive” OR “inadvertent use” OR “abrupt” OR 
“attempted”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “collective”. 
 
Raising or lowering the 
collective control in a 
helicopter changes the pitch of 
the main rotor blades, resulting 
in a change in the amount of 
lift force generated by the main 
rotor. Incorrect use of 
collective can potentially result 
in a low RPM state for the 
system. 
23206: Lowering of collective AND (“delayed” OR “restricted” OR 
“abrupt” OR “premature”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No code available  
 
Table 138: Improper Maneuvering Trigger Definition 
Improper Maneuvering 
This trigger represents sudden or incorrect maneuvering by the pilot during flight. 




100: Abrupt maneuver 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “abrupt” and 
“maneuver 
24543: Maneuver AND (“excessive” OR “misjudged” OR 
“uncontrolled” OR “abrupt” OR “improper” OR “poor” OR “delayed” 
OR “premature” OR “inaccurate”) 
24582: Evasive maneuver AND (“attempted” OR “performed” OR 
“intentional” OR “initiated”) 
24501: Aerobatic (maneuver) AND (“performed”) 
24537: Ground loop/swerve AND (“inadvertent”) 
24583: Low altitude flight/maneuver AND (“not successful” OR 
“attempted” OR “required” OR “performed” OR “intentional” OR 
“initiated”) 
24584: Maneuver to avoid obstructions AND (“misjudged” OR 
“intentional” OR “abrupt” OR “improper” OR “not performed”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
270: Abrupt maneuver 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “abrupt” and 
“maneuver”. 
 
Table 139: Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls 
This trigger represents incorrect use of throttle/powerplant controls by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
22300: Powerplant controls AND (“improper use of“ OR “not 
understood” OR “not used” OR “inadvertent deactivation” OR “not 
selected”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “throttle/power”. 
I did not include the codes 
corresponding to the failure of 
throttle, engine, or powerplant 
components. 
22301: Throttle/power control AND (“improper use of“ OR 
“improper” OR “delayed” OR “reduced” OR “inadvertent activation” 
OR “inadvertent deactivation” OR “not maintained” OR “not used” 
OR “removed” OR “excessive” OR “not possible” OR “inadequate” 
OR “uncontrolled” OR “not set” OR “exceeded” OR “incorrect” OR 
“restricted”) 
22303: Mixture control OR (“improper” OR “improper use of“ OR 
“improper deactivation” OR “inadvertent use”) 
22314: Throttle/power control friction lock AND (“excessive”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01057600XX: Aircraft power plant—Engine controls-general AND 
(“not used/operated” OR “incorrect use/operation”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “throttle/power”. 
I did not include the codes 
corresponding to the failure of 
throttle, engine, or powerplant 
components. 
01057602XX: Mixture control AND (“incorrect use/operation” OR 
“unintentional use/operation” OR “unnecessary use/operation”) 
01057603XX: Power lever AND (“incorrect use/operation”) 
 
Table 140: Improper Engine Shutdown Trigger Definition 
Improper Engine Shutdown 
This trigger represents incorrect shutdown of an engine. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
22309: Wrong engine shutdown AND (“performed”) 
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Improper Engine Shutdown 
23316: Engine shutdown OR (“inadvertent” OR “attempted” OR 
“performed” OR “simulated”) 
I identified this codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “shutdown”.  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
140: Engine shutdown 
I identified this codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “shutdown”.  
 
Table 141: Improper Use of Altimeter Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Altimeter 
This trigger represents the incorrect use/setting of the altimeter by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
23103: Altimeter setting AND (“improper” OR “incorrect”) First, I searched for the words 
“altimeter”. Then, I included 
those modifiers that suggested 
some form of improper pilot 
action (e.g., improper altimeter 
setting).  
23107: Altimeter AND (“not set”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01023416XX: Aircraft systems-Navigation system-Altimeter-
barometric/encoder AND (“not used/operated”) 
First, I searched for the words 
“altimeter”. Then, I included 
those modifiers that suggested 
some form of improper pilot 




Table 142: Improper Communication Trigger Definition 
Improper Communication 
This trigger represents incorrect communication by the pilot/crew 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24600: Communication with ATC AND (“inadequate” OR 
“improper”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the words 
“communicate” and 
“instruction”. 
24601: Interpretation of instructions AND (“not understood” OR 
“confusing” OR “improper” OR “incorrect”) 
24602: Instructions-written/verbal AND (“not understood” OR (not 
followed” OR “inadequate” OR “not obtained” OR “not verified” OR 
“inaccurate” OR “attempted” OR “disregarded”) 
24608: Communication AND (“inadequate” OR “poor” OR 
“incorrect” OR “inaccurate” OR “not understood”) 
24609: Communication-information AND (“not issued” OR 
“inadequate” OR “not available” OR “not obtained” OR “improper” 
OR “incorrect”) 
24611: Radio communication AND (“inadequate” OR “delayed” OR 
“not used” 
24621: Air/ground communication AND (“inadequate” OR “not 
available” OR “inaccurate” OR “disregarded” OR “initiated” OR “not 
performed” OR “poor”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02063510XX: Task performance—Communication—Lack of 
communication 
I identified these codes by 




02063515XX: Task performance—Communication—Accuracy of 
communication 
for derivatives of the words 
“communicate” and 
“instruction”. 02063538XX: Task performance—Communication—Issuing 
instructions 
 
Table 143: Improper Use of Procedure or Directives Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Procedure or Directives 
This trigger represents situation where the pilot/maintenance personnel failed to follow or disregarded 
the specified procedure 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24032: Procedures/directives AND (“not followed” OR “not complied 
with” OR “improper” OR “disregarded” OR “not performed” OR 
“poor” OR “not used” OR “misjudged” OR “improper use of”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “procedure”. 
 I only included the modifier 
that suggested that 
procedure/directive was not 
followed.  
24016: Visual flight rules (VFR) procedures AND (“improper” OR 
“not followed” OR “not maintained”) 
24018: Flight manuals AND (“not followed” OR “not complied with” 
OR “misjudged” OR “disregarded”) 
24024: Instrument flight rules (IFR) procedure AND (“not followed” 
OR “not performed” OR “improper”) 
24030: Checklist AND (“not followed” OR “not used” OR “not 
complied with” OR “not verified”) 
24301: Dispatch procedure AND (“not followed”) 
24545: Emergency procedure AND (“improper” OR “not followed” 
OR “not complied with” OR “not attained” OR “not selected” OR 
“poor” OR “disregarded” OR “inadequate” OR “delayed”) 
24549: Starting procedure AND (“improper” OR “initiated” OR 
“attempted” 
30000: Improper use of procedure 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
02063032XX: Task performance—Use of equip/info—Use of 
policy/procedure 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “procedure”. I did 
not include the corresponding 
to availability or adequacy of 
procedures. 
02063020XX: Task performance—Use of equip/info—Use of manual 
02063030XX: Task performance—Use of equip/info—Use of 
checklist 
 
Table 144: Insufficient Procedure or Directives Trigger Definition 
Insufficient Procedure or Directives 
This trigger represents situations where the pilot(s) or maintenance personnel had procedures, directives, 
or manuals that did not have requisite information. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24032: Procedures/directives AND (“inadequate” OR “not issued” OR 
“poor”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “procedure”. 
 I included those modifiers that 
suggested a lack of information 
in the procedures or directives. 
 
24017: Documentation AND (“inadequate”) 
24018: Flight manuals AND (“inadequate” OR “improper” OR 
“inaccurate” OR “information insufficient”) 
24030: Checklist AND (“inadequate” OR “improper” OR “poor”) 
21001: Approach charts AND (“unavailable”) 
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Insufficient Procedure or Directives 
24609: Information AND (“inadequate” OR “not available” OR “not 
obtained” OR “not compiled with” OR “incorrect” OR “poor”) 
I also included the codes for 
where the pilot/maintenance 
personnel did not have enough 
information. 
24300: Dispatch AND (“improper”) 
24301: Dispatch procedure AND (“inadequate”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
04021000XX: Organizational issues—Management-
Policy/procedure—General 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “procedure”. 
04021010XX: Availability of policy/procedure 
04021015XX: Adequacy of policy/procedure 
 
Table 145: Improper Use of Aerial Application/External Load Equipment Trigger 
Definition 
Improper Use of Aerial Application/External Load Equipment 
This trigger represents the improper use of external load equipment. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
17400: Aerial application equipment (general) AND (“not removed”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “aerial 
application”, “external load” 
and “pickup equipment”.  
 
I exclude the codes that refer to 
snagging/entanglement of the 
external load equipment. 
17500: Towing/advertising/external load equipment AND (“not 
secured” OR “reversed”) 
17503: Pickup equipment AND (“deployed inadvertently”) 
17505: External load sling/harness AND (“not dumped” OR “not 
disconnected”) 
17506: External load cable/hook AND (“not removed”) 
17507: External load release system AND (“not activated”) 
23311: External load equipment AND (“improper use” OR 
“improper” OR “not approved” OR “misjudged” OR “not removed” 
OR “encountered”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01022551XX: Equipment/furnishings—Agricultural/external load 
system 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “external load” 
and “pickup equipment”. I 
exclude the codes that refer to 
snagging/entanglement of the 
external load equipment. 
480: External load event (rotorcraft) 
 
Table 146: Fuel Contamination/Exhaustion Trigger Definition 
Fuel Contamination/Exhaustion   
This trigger represents fuel contamination or exhaustion 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17001: Fluids-Fuel AND (“exhaustion” OR “starvation” OR 
“improper” OR “water” OR “contamination” OR “contamination-
water” OR “contamination other than water” OR “leak” OR “flow 
restricted” OR “incorrect” OR “obstructed” OR “dumped” OR 
“movement restricted” OR “fumes” OR “fire” OR “blocked (partial)” 
OR “blocked (total)” OR “excessive flow/output”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “fuel”. I exclude 
codes that refer to the failure of 
the fuel system or low fuel 
level. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01071010XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-fuel AND (“fluid 
management” OR “fuel condition” OR “inadequate inspection” OR 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
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Fuel Contamination/Exhaustion   
This trigger represents fuel contamination or exhaustion 
“not serviced/maintained” OR “fluid type” OR “incorrect 
service/maintenance”) 
for the word “fuel”. I exclude 
codes that refer to the failure of 
the fuel system or low fuel 
level. 
191: Fuel starvation 
192: Fuel exhaustion 
193: Fuel contamination 
 
Table 147: Landing Gear Collapse Trigger Definition 
Landing Gear Collapse   
This trigger represents landing gear collapse 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
191: Main gear collapsed 
I identified these code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “gear collapse”. 
192: Nose gear collapsed 
193: Tail gear collapsed 
194: Complete gear collapsed 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
094: Landing gear collapse 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “gear collapse”. 
 
Table 148: Aerial Application/External Load Equipment Failure/Entanglement Trigger 
Definition 
Aerial Application/External Load Equipment Failure/Entanglement Failure   
This trigger represents the failure or snagging of external load equipment 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17400: External load equipment (general) AND (“snagged” OR 
“entangled” OR “improper” OR “failure-total”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “external load” 
and “pickup equipment”. 
 
 I defined this trigger by 
grouping these when they 
indicated external load system 
failure/entanglement with the 
rotor system. 
17401: Spray/dusting equipment AND (“blocked (total)” OR “blocked 
(partial)” OR “corroded” OR “extraneous” OR “malfunction” OR 
“overload”) 
17500: Towing/advertising/external load equipment AND (“snagged” 
OR “entangled”) 
17503: Pickup equipment AND (“inadequate” OR “failure-total” OR 
“incorrect” OR “separation” OR “movement restricted”) 
17505: External load sling/harness AND (“entangled” OR “slipped” 
OR “inadequate” OR “separation” OR “improper” OR “shifted” OR 
“oscillation”) 
17506: External load cable/hook AND (“entangled” OR “snagged” 
OR “failure” OR “blade strike” OR “binding” OR “separation” OR 
“incorrect” OR “fouled”) 
17507: External load release system AND (“inoperative” OR 
“jammed” OR “malfunction”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01022551XX: Equipment/furnishings—Agricultural/external load 
system AND (“malfunction” OR “inoperative”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrases “external load” 
and “pickup equipment”. 
 
410: External load event (rotorcraft) 
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Aerial Application/External Load Equipment Failure/Entanglement Failure   
This trigger represents the failure or snagging of external load equipment 
 I defined this trigger by 
grouping these when they 
indicated external load system 
failure/entanglement with the 
rotor system. 
 
Table 149: Improper Loading/Securing of Cargo Trigger Definition 
Improper Loading/Securing of Cargo 
This trigger represents incorrect loading or securing of cargo by the pilot or ground personnel. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
24035: Security of cargo AND (“inadequate” OR “not verified” OR 
“inaccurate”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “cargo”. 
24040: Loading of cargo AND (“excessive” OR “improper”) 
23317: Load tie-down/security AND (“inadequate” OR “improper”) 
17116: Cargo/baggage AND (“not secured” OR “loose”) 
120: Cargo shift 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
No codes available  
 
Table 150: Improper Use of Deicing System Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Deicing System 
This trigger represents improper use of the deicing system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12305: Anti-ice/deice-carburetor heat AND (“not engaged”) These codes represent the 
improper use of the deicing 
system 
22600: Anti-ice/deice system AND(“not used” OR “improper use of” 
OR “not complied with”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01023020XX: Ice/rain protection system-intake anti-ice/deice AND 
(“not used/operated”) 
This code represents the 
improper use of the deicing 
system. 
 
Table 151: Poor Choice of Landing/Takeoff Area Trigger Definition 
Poor Choice of Landing/Takeoff Area 
This trigger represents a poor choice of landing/takeoff/taxi area by the pilot 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24028: Wrong runway AND (“selected”) This code indicates that the 
pilot chose an 
incorrect/inappropriate landing 
terrain. 
24029: Unsuitable terrain or takeoff/landing/taxi area AND 
(“selected” OR “attempted” OR “not verified” OR “not identified” OR 
“encountered” OR “not obtained” OR “misjudged”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  




Table 152: Improper Use of Protective Covering Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Protective Covering 
This trigger represents the improper use of protective covering for the aircraft 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17124: Miscellaneous-protective covering These codes represent the 
improper use of protective 
covering for the aircraft. 
23313: Aircraft protective covering AND (“not used” OR “not 
available” OR “unavailable” OR “disregarded”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 153: Improper Fuel Grade Trigger Definition 
Improper Fuel Grade 
This trigger represents water-contaminated fuel/oil 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17008: Fluids-Fuel grade 
This code represents the use of 
improper type of fuel. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01071010XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-fuel These codes represents the use 
of improper type of fuel. 194: Wrong fuel 
 
Table 154: Improper Aborted landing/takeoff Trigger Definition 
Improper Aborted landing/takeoff 
This trigger represents the entanglement of the helmet. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24502: Abort I identified these codes by 
searching for derivatives of the 
word “abort”. 
24504: Aborted landing 
24505: Aborted takeoff 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 155: Improper Touchdown Trigger Definition 
Improper Touchdown 
This trigger represents an improper touchdown by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24531: Proper touchdown point I identified these codes by 
searching for the word 
“touchdown”. 
24567: Touchdown 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 156: Improper use of Equipment (Unspecified) Trigger Definition 
Improper use of Equipment (Unspecified) 
This trigger represents improper use of unspecified equipment. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24700: Miscellaneous 
The NTSB used this code 
suggest improper use of 
aircraft equipment, but did not 
24702: Equipment—other 
23300: Miscellaneous equipment 
40000: Improper use of equipment/aircraft 
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Improper use of Equipment (Unspecified) 
This trigger represents improper use of unspecified equipment. 
specify the nature of 
equipment in the codes. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 157: Warning/Safety System Failure Trigger Definition 
Warning/Safety System Failure 
This trigger represents the improper use of the auxiliary power unit. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
13107: Warning system This trigger indicates the 
failure of warning systems 13108: Safety system 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 158: Improper Action (Unspecified) Definition 
Improper Action (Unspecified) 
This trigger represents the failure of the oil system. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
02040000XX: Action/decision—general—general These codes are part of the 
action/decision hierarchy.  
 
However, I define them 
separately as they do not 
indicate the type of action 
(e.g., delayed) unlike other 
action-triggers. 
02041000XX: Action/decision—Action—general 
02041015XX: Incorrect action performance 
 
Table 159: Improper Gear Position Trigger Definition 
Improper Gear Position 
This trigger represents failure of the pilot extend/retract the landing gear. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
196: Gear not extended I identified these codes by 
searching for derivatives of the 
word “retract” and “extend” 
along with the phrase “landing 
gear”.  
 
I also included the codes 
associated with the subject 
code “22000: Landing gear” 
and modifiers that indicated 
improper gear use/position. 
197: Gear not retracted 
198: Gear retracted on ground 
22000: Landing gear AND (“misjudged” OR “not selected”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  




Table 160: Fuselage/Wing Failure Trigger Definition 
Fuselage/Wing Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of fuselage/wing components. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
10000: Fuselage (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “fuselage” and 
“wing” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 







10200: Nacelle/pylon (general) 
10203: plate 
10207: Fairing 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
01035302XX: Fuselage-Rotorcraft tail boom 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “fuselage” and 
“wing” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
01035310XX: Fuselage main structure 
01035311XX: Frames (main fuselage) 
01035340XX: Fuselage attach fittings system 
01035343XX: Gear attach fittings on fuselage 
01035400XX: Nacelles/pylons structure (general) 
 
Table 161: Flight Control Surfaces/Attachments Failure Trigger Definition 
Flight Control Surfaces/Attachments Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of fuselage/wing components. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
10300: Flight control surfaces/attachments I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “flight control” 
in the NTSB hierarchies. I 
exclude the codes under the 
“flight control system” 
hierarchy. 
10313: Flight control, rudder 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 162: Landing Gear Failure Trigger Definition 
Landing Gear Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the landing gear. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
10400: Landing gear 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “gear” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
 
10401: Main gear 
10402: Main gear shock absorbing strut 
10403: Main gear strut 
10404: Main gear attachment 
10405: Nose gear 
10406: Nose gear assembly 
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Landing Gear Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the landing gear. 
10413: Ski assembly 
10414: Float assembly 
10417: Skid assembly 
10418: Normal brake system 
10425: Steering system 
10431: Main gear strut scissors 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01023200XX: Landing gear system (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “gear” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
01023210XX: Main landing gear 
01023211XX: Main landing gear attachment section 
01023213XX: Main gear strut/axle/truck 
01023270XX: Auxiliary gear 
 
Table 163: Door/Window Failure/Contamination Trigger Definition 
Door/Window Failure/Contamination 
This trigger represents the failure of doors/windows, and contamination of windows 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
10500: Door (general) 
 I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “door” and 
“window” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
10502: Exterior crew door 
10503: Passenger door 
10505: Cargo/baggage door 
10506: Service door 
10510: Inspection door 
10601: Window-flight compartment window/windshield 
10602: Cabin window 
10603: Door-window (window in door) 
10604: Inspection/observation window 
10605: Canopy window 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01035200XX: Doors (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “door” and 
“window” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
01035210XX: Passenger/crew doors 
01035240XX: Service doors 
01035610XX: Windows-flight compartment windows 
 
Table 164: Flight Control System Failure Trigger Definition 
Flight Control  System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of flight control system components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
10700: Flight control system (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “flight control 
system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
These codes refer to the failure 
of flight the control system. 
10708: Stabilator control 
10711: Boost system 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
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Flight Control  System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of flight control system components 
01022700XX: Flight control system (general) I identified thee codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “flight control 
system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
These codes refer to the failure 
of flight the control system. 
01022701XX: Control column section 
01022770XX: Gust lock or damper 
 
Table 165: Improper Use of Flight Control System Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Flight Control System 
This trigger represents the improper use of the flight control system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available   
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01022700XX: Flight control system (general) AND (“incorrect 
use/operation” OR “unintentional use/operation”) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “flight control 
system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
01022770XX: Gust lock or damper AND (“incorrect use/operation”) 
 
Table 166: Stabilizer System Trigger Definition 
Stabilizer System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of stabilizer system components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
10800: Stabilizer (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “stabilizer” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
Each of these codes indicated 
failure of the stabilizer system. 
10802: Horizontal stabilizer attachment 
10803: Vertical stabilizer surface 
10804:: Vertical stabilizer attachment 
10805:Horizontal stabilizer 
10807: Vertical stabilizer 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01035500XX: Empennage structure (general) 
I included this code as the 
empennage is an analogy for 
vertical and horizontal 
stabilizer for an aircraft. 
This code indicated failure of 
the stabilizer system. 
 
Table 167: Rotor Drive System Failure Trigger Definition 
Rotor Drive System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of stabilizer system components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
11000: Rotor drive system (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
11001: engine to transmission drive 
11002: Main rotor mast (drive shaft) 
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Rotor Drive System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of stabilizer system components 
11003: Freewheeling sprag unit for the phrase “rotor drive” in 
the NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represents 
the failure of a specific part of 
the rotor drive system 
11004: Freewheeling unit (other) 
11005: Clutch assembly 
11006: Main gearbox/transmission 
11007: Combining gearbox 
11008: Intermediate gearbox (42 deg.) 
11009: Tail rotor gearbox (90 deg.) 
11011: Tail rotor drive shaft 
11013: Oil cooler drive shaft 
11014: Tail rotor drive shaft bearing 
11015: Main rotor driven pulley 
11016: Main rotor driving pulley 
11018: Main rotor drive belt 
11019: Isolation link 
11021: Tail rotor drive shaft coupling 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01046300XX: Main rotor drive (general)  I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “rotor drive” in 
the NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represents 
the failure of a specific part of 
the rotor drive system 
01046310XX: Engine/transmission coupling 
01046330XX: Main rotor trans mount 
01046500XX: Tail rotor drive system (general) 
01046510XX: Tail rotor drive shaft 
01046520XX: Tail rotor gear box 
 
Table 168: Rotorcraft Flight Control System Failure Trigger Definition 
Rotorcraft Flight Control System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of stabilizer system components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
11100: Rotorcraft flight control system I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “rotorcraft flight 
control system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
Each of these codes represents 
the failure of a specific part of 
the rotorcraft flight control 
system 
11101: Primary servo 
11103: Cyclic trim 
11104: Collective trim 
11107: Tail rotor servo 
11110: NOTAR 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No codes available  
 
Table 169: Rotor System Failure Trigger Definition 
Rotor System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of rotor system components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
11200: Main rotor (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 11201:  Main rotor blade 
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Rotor System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of rotor system components 
11202:  Main rotor blade spar for the phrase “rotor system” in 
the NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represents 
the failure of a specific part of 
the rotor system. 
11203:  Main rotor blade skin 
11206:  Main rotor blade abrasion strip 
11207:  Main rotor blade cuff 
11208:  tail rotor blade 
11209:  tail rotor blade spar 
11211:  tail rotor blade abrasion strip 
11212:  tail rotor blade cuff 
11213:  Main rotor hub 
11214:  Main rotor hub yoke (spindle) 
11215:  Main rotor hub grip (sleeve) 
11217:  Main rotor hub lead-lag stop/damper 
11218:  Main rotor hub stop (static/dynamic) 
11219:  Main rotor hub flapping hinge/stop(s) 
11221:  Main rotor hub pillow block 
11222:  Tail rotor hub 
11223:  Tail rotor hub counterweight 
11224:  Tail rotor hub pitch link 
11225:  Tail rotor hub pitch change mechanism 
11226:  Tail rotor hub pitch actuating shaft 
11227:  stabilizer bar 
11228:  rotor vibration absorber 
11229:  Main rotor blade balance weights 
11230:  Tail rotor blade balance weights 
11231:  Main rotor hub retaining nut 
11232:  Tail rotor hub retaining nut 
11233:  Main rotor blade retaining pin/bolt 
11234:  Main rotor blade drag brace 
11235:  Main rotor 
11236:  star flex arm 
11237:  Tail rotor 
11238:  Main rotor tension torsion bar 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01046200XX: Main rotor system (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “rotor system” in 
the NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represents 
the failure of a specific part of 
the rotor system. 
01046210XX:Main rotor blade system 
01046220XX: Main rotor head system 
01045230XX: Main rotor mast/swashplate 
01046400XX: Tail rotor (general) 
01046410XX: Tail rotor blade 
01046420XX: Tail rotor head 
 
Table 170: Airframe Component Failure Trigger Definition 
Airframe Component Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of specific airframe components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
11300: Miscellaneous-airframe Here, I grouped the different 
airframe/hardware-related 







Airframe Component Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of specific airframe components 
11304: Dowel/pin 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01071430XX: Miscellaneous hardware—fasteners Here, I grouped the different 
airframe/hardware-related 
codes that the NTSB classified 
as “miscellaneous”. 
01071400XX: Miscellaneous hardware (general) 
01071410XX: Hoses and tubes 
 
Table 171: Electrical System Failure Trigger Definition 
Electrical System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of electrical system components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12000: Electrical system (general) Each of these codes represent 
the failure of a specific 
component in the electrical 
system. 
 
I excluded the modifiers that 
indicated incorrect use of the 
electrical system (and used 





12013: Electric wiring 
12015: Electric switch 
12017: Circuit breaker 
12019: Drive/belt 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01022430XX: Electrical power system-DC generation system Each of these codes represent 
the failure of a specific 
component in the electrical 
system. 
 
I excluded the modifiers that 
indicated incorrect use of the 
electrical system (and used 
them in a separate trigger) 
01022440XX: External power system 
 
Table 172: Improper Use of Electrical System Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Electrical System  
This trigger represents the improper use of the electrical system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
22400: Electrical system AND (“inadvertent deactivation”) I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “electrical” and 
“system”.  
 
Note that I used the AND logic 
to associate the electrical 
system code with the 
“inadvertent activation” 
modifier. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01022430XX: Electrical power system-DC generation system  
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Improper Use of Electrical System  
This trigger represents the improper use of the electrical system 
01022440XX: External power system 
 
Table 173: Hydraulic System Failure Trigger Definition 
Hydraulic System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of hydraulic system components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12100: Hydraulic system (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “hydraulic” and 
“system in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
These codes correspond to the 
failure of the hydraulic system 
and not its improper use. 
12102: Pump 
12104: Reservoir 
12105: Hydraulic line 
12113: Filter 
12114: Actuator 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01022900XX: Hydraulic power system (general) 
 
01022910XX: Hydraulic main system 
 
Table 174: Improper Use of Hydraulic System Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Hydraulic System 
This trigger represents the improper use of the hydraulic system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12100: Hydraulic system (general) AND (“disabled”) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “hydraulic” and 
“system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
Note that I used the AND logic 
to associate the hydraulic 
system codes with modifiers 
that suggest incorrect use. 
12102: Pump 
12104: Reservoir 
12105: Hydraulic line 
12113: Filter 
12114: Actuator 
22500: Hydraulic system AND (“inadvertent deactivation”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  




Table 175: Navigation Instrument Failure Trigger Definition 
Navigation Instrument Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of navigation instruments 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12201: Flight/navigation instruments—altimeter AND (“inadequate”) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “navigation” and 
“system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
12202: Radio AND (“failure-partial”) 
12204: Turn and bank indicator AND (“inoperative”) 
12206: Attitude indicator AND (“inoperative”) 
12210: Compass AND (“inoperative”) 
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Navigation Instrument Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of navigation instruments 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01023416XX: Navigation system—Altimeter, barometric/encode 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “navigation” and 
“system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Table 176: Deicing System Failure Trigger Definition 
Deicing System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the deicing system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12300: Anti-ice/deice system (general) AND (“leak”) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “deice” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
12303: Anti-ice/deice system-windshield AND (“not installed”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 177: Engine Assembly Failure Trigger Definition 
Engine Assembly Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of engine assembly components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
14000: Engine assembly (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “engine 
assembly” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
Each of these codes represent 






14006: Connecting rod 
14007: Cylinder 
14008: Piston 
14009: Push rod 
14010: Ring 
14011: valve-intake 
14012: Blower/impeller/integral supercharger 
14013: Mount 
14014: Engine assembly-other 
14015: Connecting rod bolt 
14016: Valve-exhaust 
14017: Rocker arm/tappet 
14019: Valve keeper 
14020: Crankshaft counterweights/vibration damper 
14022: Connecting rod cap 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01058300XX: Engine (reciprocating) (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “engine 
01058520XX: Reciprocating engine power section 
01058530XX: Reciprocating engine cylinder section 
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Engine Assembly Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of engine assembly components 
assembly” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
engine assembly. 
 
Table 178: Compressor Assembly Failure Trigger Definition 
Compressor Assembly Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the compressor assembly 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
14100: Compressor assembly (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “compressor 
assembly” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
compressor assembly. 
14101: Casting 
14102: Stator vane retainer 
14103: Rotor disc 
14104: Blade 
14105: Blade retention 
14107: Impeller 
14109: Air seal 
14113: Stator vane 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057230XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—Compressor section 
In the post-2008 system, I 
identified the code 
corresponding to compressor 
failure by searching for the 
word “compressor”. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
compressor assembly. 
 
Table 179: Combustion Assembly Failure Trigger Definition 
Combustion Assembly Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the combustion assembly 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
14200: Combustion assembly (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “combustion 
assembly” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
combustion assembly. 
14201: Combustion liner 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057240XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—Combustion section 
In the post-2008 system, I 
identified the code 
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Combustion Assembly Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the combustion assembly 
corresponding to compressor 
failure by searching for the 
word “combustion”. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
combustion assembly. 
 
Table 180: Turbine Assembly Failure Trigger Definition 
Turbine Assembly Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the turbine assembly 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
14300: Turbine assembly (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “combustion 
assembly” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 






14308: Turbine wheel 
14309: Turbine blade 
14311: Air seal 
14313: Shaft 
14314: Shaft bearing 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057250XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—Turbine section 
In the post-2008 system, I 
identified the code 
corresponding to compressor 
failure by searching for the 
word “turbine”. 
 
Table 181: Exhaust System Failure Trigger Definition 
Exhaust System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the exhaust assembly 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
14400: Exhaust system (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “exhaust 
system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 





14408: End plate 
14411: Probe 
14415: External supercharger 
14416: Turbocharger 
14419: Waste gate 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
011057800XX: Engine exhaust (general) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “exhaust 
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Exhaust System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the exhaust assembly 
system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Table 182: Propeller System Failure Trigger Definition 
Propeller System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the propeller 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
14501: Propeller system/accessories-blade I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “propeller 
system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
14513: Planetary gear 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 183: Accessory Drive Assembly Failure Trigger Definition 
Accessory Drive Assembly Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the accessory drive assembly 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
14700: Accessory drive assembly (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “accessory 
drive” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
accessory drive system. 
14705: Drive shaft 
14706: Drive bearing 
14707: Drive gear 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057260XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—Accessory drives 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “accessory 
drive” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
accessory drive system. 
 
Table 184: Ignition System Failure Trigger Definition 
Ignition System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the ignition system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
14800: Ignition system (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 14801: Magneto 
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Ignition System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the ignition system 
14803: Spark plug for the word “ignition” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
ignition system. 
14805: Low tension wiring 
14806: High tension wiring 
14808: Ignition harness 
14809: Ignition switch 
14810: Ignition lead 
14813: Magneto grounding lead (p-lead) 
14814: Auto re-light system  
14815: Ignition points 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057414XX: Ignition system—magneto/distributor I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “ignition” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
ignition system. 
01057421XX: Spark plugs/igniters 
 
Table 185: Engine Accessories Failure Trigger Definition 
Engine Accessories Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of engine accessories 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
14900: Engine accessories (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “engine 
accessories” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific engine 
accessories 
14906: Engine starter 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 186: Bleed Air System Failure Trigger Definition 
Bleed Air System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the bleed air system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
15000: Bleed air system (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “bleed air” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
bleed air system. 
15001: Valve 







Bleed Air System Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the bleed air system 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057500XX: Engine bleed air system (general) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “bleed air” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
failure of a specific part of the 
bleed air system. 
 
Table 187: Fuel System Failure/Contamination Trigger Definition 
Fuel System Failure/Contamination  
This trigger represents the failure/contamination of the fuel system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
15100: Fuel system (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “fuel system” in 
the NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure/contamination of a 
specific component in the fuel 
system. 
 
Note that this trigger definition 
does not include the improper 
use of the fuel system. 
15101: Tank 
15102: Line 












15115: Dump valve 
15116: Ram air/induction air 
15118: Nozzle 
15119: Fuel control 
15121: Fuel shutoff 
15124: Electric boost pump 
15125: Transfer pump 
15127: Fuel flow divider/distributor 
15128: Fuel quantity float/sensor 
15131: PC line 
15134: Low fuel warning light 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01022800XX: Fuel system (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “fuel system” in 
the NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure/contamination of a 
01022810XX: Fuel storage 
01022820XX: Fuel distribution 
01022821XX: Fuel-filter strainer 
01022822XX: Fuel pumps 
01022823XX: Fuel selector/shutoff valve 
01022840XX: Fuel indication system 
01022841XX: Fuel quantity indicator 
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Fuel System Failure/Contamination  
This trigger represents the failure/contamination of the fuel system 
01022841XX: Fuel quantity indicator specific component in the fuel 
system. 
 
Note that this trigger definition 
does not include the improper 
use of the fuel system. 
01022842XX: Fuel pressure  
01022897XX: Fuel system wiring 
 
Table 188: Lubricating System Failure/Contamination Trigger Definition 
Lubricating System Failure/Contamination  
This trigger represents the failure/contamination of the lubricating system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
15200: Lubricating system (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “lubricating 
system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure/contamination of a 
specific component in the 
lubrication system. 
15202: Oil line 
15204: Oil pressure pump 
15205: Oil scavenge pump 
15206: Oil cooler 
15208: Oil seal 
15209: Oil gasket 
15210: Oil regulator 
15211: Oil tubing 
15212: Oil filler cap 
15213: Oil port/passage, internal 
15214: Oil filter/screen 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 189: Engine Installation Failure Trigger Definition 
Engine Installation Failure  
This trigger represents the failure of the engine installation 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
15302: Engine installation—suspension mounts I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “engine 
installation” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
15303: Fire shield 
15304: Mounting bolt 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 190: Improper Reading from/Failure of Engine Instruments Trigger Definition 
Improper Reading from/Failure of Engine Instruments   
This trigger represents the failure or improper readings from engine instruments 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
15400: Engine instruments (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 15402: Tachometer 
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Improper Reading from/Failure of Engine Instruments   
This trigger represents the failure or improper readings from engine instruments 
15404: Fuel quantity gage for the phrase “engine 
instrument” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure of an engine 
instrument. 
15405: Fuel flow gage 
15410: Exhaust gas temperature 
15412: Torquemeter 
15413: Carburetor air temperature gage 
15414: N1 (RPM) 
15420: Engine RPM gage 
15500: Torquemeter system AND (“failure-partial”) 
13002: Transmission oil pressure indicator AND (“no pressure”) 
13005: Dual tachometer AND (“false indication” OR “erratic” OR 
“failure-partial” 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057710XX: Engine indicating system—power indicating system 
 
This code represent the failure 
of an engine instrument. 
 
Table 191: Reduction Gear Assembly Failure Trigger Definition 
Reduction Gear Assembly Failure   
This trigger represents the failure of the reduction gear assembly 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
15603: Reduction gear assembly—reduction gear I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “reduction gear” 
in the NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure of a specific 
component in the reduction 
gear assembly. 
15606: accessory drive gear 
15607: accessory drive bearing  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057210XX: Engine (turbine/turboprop)—reduction gear and shaft 
This code represents the failure 
of a specific component in the 
reduction gear assembly. 
 
Table 192: Cooling System Failure Trigger Definition 
Cooling System Failure   
This trigger represents the failure of the cooling system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
15700: Cooling system (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “cooling 
system” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 





Cooling System Failure   
This trigger represents the failure of the cooling system 
component in the cooling 
system. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 193: Turboshaft engine component Failure Trigger Definition 
Turboshaft engine component Failure   
This trigger represents the failure of turboshaft engine components 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
15900: Turboshaft engine (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “turboshaft 
engine” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure of a specific 
component in the turboshaft 
engine. 
15901: Gas generator 
15902: Gas generator turbine 
15903: Combustion chamber 
15904: Gas generator turbine shaft 
15905: Free (power) turbine 
15906: Fee turbine shaft 
15907: Reduction gear box 
15908: Power output shaft 
15909: Free turbine governor 
15910: Gas generator overspeed sensor/governor 
15911: Free turbine overspeed sensor 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 194: Throttle/Power Control Failure Trigger Definition 
Throttle/Power Control Failure   
This trigger represents the failure of the throttle/power control 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
16000: Throttle/power lever (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “throttle”, 
“power”, and “control” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure of a specific 
component in the 
throttle/power system. 
 
Note that this trigger definition 
does not include the improper 
use of throttle/power control. 




NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057600XX: Engine controls (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “throttle”, 
01057602XX: Mixture control 
01057603XX: Power lever 
01057697XX: Engine control system wiring 
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Throttle/Power Control Failure   
This trigger represents the failure of the throttle/power control 
“power”, and “control” in the 
NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure of a specific 
component in the 
throttle/power system. 
 
Note that this trigger definition 
does not include the improper 
use of throttle/power control. 
 
Table 195: Carburetor Heat Control Failure Trigger Definition 
Carburetor Heat Control Failure   
This trigger represents the failure of the carburetor heat control 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
16400: Carburetor heat control (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “carburetor” and 
“control” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure of a specific 
component in the carburetor 
heat control system. 
 
Note that this trigger definition 
does not include the improper 
use of carburetor heat control 
16404: Cable/Push-pull rod 
16405: Linkage 
16407: Air box 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
Table 196: Fuel Injection System Contamination/Failure Trigger Definition 
Fuel Injection System Contamination/Failure   
This trigger represents the failure of the fuel injection control system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
16600: Fuel injection control/system I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the phrase “fuel injection” 
in the NTSB hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure of a specific 




NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
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Fuel Injection System Contamination/Failure   
This trigger represents the failure of the fuel injection control system 
01057313XX: Engine and fuel control-fuel injector nozzle 
This code represents the failure 
of a specific component in the 
fuel injection system. 
 
Table 197: Induction Air System Contamination/Failure Trigger Definition 
Induction Air System Contamination/Failure   
This trigger represents the failure or contamination of the induction air system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
16700: Induction air control/system (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “intake” and 
“induction” in the NTSB 
hierarchies. 
 
Each of these codes represent 
the failure of a specific 
component in the induction air 
system. 
 
16709: Intake manifold 
16711: Induction air ducting 
16712: Engine inlet assembly 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057160XX: Powerplant-air intake This code represents the failure 
of the air induction/intake 
system 
01057220XX: Air inlet section (core engine) 
 
Table 198: Aircraft Light Not Available/Failure Trigger Definition 
Aircraft Light Not Available/Failure   
This trigger represents the unavailability or failure of aircraft lights 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17200: Light(s) These codes represent the 
failure of aircraft lights. 
 
Note that these codes do not 
include the ambient light or 
airport lighting. 
17202: Instrument light(s) 
17206: Landing light(s) 
17207: Exterior light(s) 
17208: Annunciator panel light(s) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 199: Improper use of Rotorcraft Flight Controls 
Improper Use of Rotorcraft Flight Controls 
This trigger represents the improper use of rotorcraft flight controls 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
10901: Rotorcraft flight control-cyclic control AND (“not safetied”) 
This code represents the 
improper use of rotorcraft 
flight controls 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
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Improper Use of Rotorcraft Flight Controls 
This trigger represents the improper use of rotorcraft flight controls 
01046700XX: Rotorcraft flight control  (general) AND (“incorrect 
use/operation”) 
These codes represents the 
improper use of rotorcraft 
flight controls 
01046710XX: Rotorcraft flight control-Main rotor control AND 
(“unintentional use/operation”) 
01046720XX: Rotorcraft flight control-Tail rotor control AND 
(“incorrect use/operation”) 
 
Table 200: Pneumatic System Failure Trigger Definition 
Pneumatic System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the pneumatic system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
13103: Pneumatic system  
This code represents the failure 
of the pneumatic system. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01023600XX: Pneumatic system (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “pneumatic” in 
the NTSB hierarchies. 
 
01023610XX: Pneumatic distribution system 
01023620XX: Pneumatic indicating system 
01023697XX: Pneumatic system wiring  
 
Table 201: Improper Use of Fuel System Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Fuel System   
This trigger represents the improper use of the fuel system 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
22200: Fuel system (general) AND (“improper use of” OR 
“inadvertent deactivation” OR :disregarded”) 
These codes represent the 
improper use of the fuel 
system. 
22201: Fuel tank selector position AND (“improper” OR “insufficient 
information” OR “inadvertent” OR “inadvertent activation”) 
22202: Fuel boost pump selector position AND (“improper” OR 
“improper use of” OR “not selected”) 
22204: Fuel supply AND (“inadequate” OR “misjudged” OR 
“improper” OR “inattentive” OR “not maintained” OR “not 
identified” OR “misread” OR “inadvertent deactivation”) 
22205: Fuel management AND (“inaccurate” OR “improper” OR 
“inadequate”) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01022823XX: Fuel selector/shutoff valve AND (“unintentional 
use/operation”) 
This code represent the 
improper use of the fuel 
system. 
 
Table 202: Inadequate Facilities Provided by Organization Trigger Definition 
Inadequate Facilities Provided by Organization  
This trigger represents the inadequate facilities provided by the organization 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
70000: Facility inadequate (general) 
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Inadequate Facilities Provided by Organization  
This trigger represents the inadequate facilities provided by the organization 
70110: Inadequate design The lack of facilities generally 
prevented the ground 
personnel, maintenance 
personnel, or builder from 
performing their tasks 
correctly—triggering the 
preflight mechanical issue 
state. 
70118: Inadequate external lighting 
70122: Equipment interference 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
04022025XX: Resources-adequacy of equipment  
The lack of facilities generally 
prevented the ground 
personnel, maintenance 
personnel, or builder from 
performing their tasks 
correctly—triggering the 
preflight mechanical issue 
state. 
 
Table 203: Improper Design and Development of Aircraft Trigger Definition  
Improper Design and Development of Aircraft  
This trigger represents the inadequate design of an aircraft 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
82000: Aircraft/equipment inadequate (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “design” and 
“development” 
 
The poor design triggers the 
preflight mechanical state. 
82100: Inadequate design 
82110: Inadequate standards/requirements 
82111: Inadequate instrument display 
82114: Inadequate control location 
82115: Inadequate control shape/size 
82122: Equipment interference 
82125: Inadequate handling/performance capabilities 
82126: Inadequate airframe 
82128: Inadequate aircraft component 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
04011010XX: Development-Design-equipment design  I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “design” and 
“development”. The poor 
design triggers the preflight 
mechanical state. 
01012025XX: Selection/certification/testing-document information 
verification 
04013000XX: Manufacture/production (general) 
04013020XX: Document/information production 
 
Table 204: Improper Use of Material Trigger Definition  
Use of Improper Material  
This trigger represents the inadequate design of an aircraft 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
84000: Material inadequate (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “material”. 
84100: Material defect 
84110: Inadequate quality control 
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Use of Improper Material  
This trigger represents the inadequate design of an aircraft 
84120: Material defect   
 The use of improper material 
triggers the preflight 
mechanical state. 
84200: Improper 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 205: Inadequate Oversight/Surveillance by Management/Regulator Trigger 
Definition  
Inadequate Oversight/Surveillance by Management/Regulator 
This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
90000: Inadequate surveillance of operations (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “oversight” and 
“surveillance”. 
90100: Insufficient staff 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
04032000XX: Oversight (general) 
I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “oversight” and 
“surveillance”.  
04032010XX: Oversight of personnel 
04032015XX: Oversight of operation 
04032020XX: Oversight of maintenance 
04032025XX: Equipment monitoring 
04032035XX: Document/revision tracking 
04032040XX: Oversight of regulation compliance 
 
Table 206: Inadequate Pilot Training by Management Trigger Definition  
Inadequate Pilot Training by Management/Regulator 
This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
04030000XX: Support/oversight/monitoring (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for derivatives of the word 
“train”. I did not include the 
codes corresponding to lack of 
experience/training 
04031000XX: Training (general) 
04031010XX: Inadequate initial training 
04031020XX: Inadequate upgrade training 
04031030XX: Emergency procedure training  
 
Table 207: Insufficient Standards/Requirement Trigger Definition  
Insufficient Standards/Requirement 
This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
91000: Insufficient standards/requirements I identified these codes by 




This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management 
91200: Insufficient standards/requirements-aircraft for the phrase 
“standards/requirements”. 91300: Insufficient standards/requirements-operation/operator 
91400: Insufficient standards/requirements-manufacturer  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 208: Inadequate Certification by Regulator Trigger Definition  
Inadequate Certification by Regulator 
This trigger represents the lack of oversight by the management 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
92000: Inadequate certification/approval (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “certification” 
and “approval”. 
92100: Inadequate certification/approval -airman 
92200: Inadequate certification/approval -aircraft 
92300: Inadequate certification/approval –operation/operator 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 209: Inadequate Documentation/Record-Keeping Trigger Definition  
Inadequate Documentation/Record-Keeping 
This trigger represents the lack of record-keeping by the management 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
93000: Inadequate substantiation process I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “compliance”, 
“substantiation”, “records, and 
“documentation”. 
 
These codes represent 
inadequate documentation by 
the management. 
93100: Inadequate compliance determination record-keeping 
93200: Insufficient review (documentation) 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
04033000XX: Documentation/record keeping (general) I identified these codes by 
searching the coding manual 
for the words “compliance”, 
“substantiation”, “records, and 
“documentation”. 
 
These codes represent 
inadequate documentation by 
the management. 
02062500XX: Record keeping (general) 
04033020XX: Testing records 
04033025XX: Maintenance records 
 
Table 210: Oil Contamination/Exhaustion Trigger Definition 
Oil Contamination/Exhaustion   
This trigger represents oil contamination or exhaustion 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
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Oil Contamination/Exhaustion   
This trigger represents oil contamination or exhaustion 
17002: Fluids-oil 
This code represents fluid 
exhaustion/contamination. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01071020XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-oil 
This code represents fluid 
exhaustion/contamination. 
 
Table 211: Hydraulic Fluid Contamination/Exhaustion Trigger Definition 
Hydraulic Fluid Contamination/Exhaustion   
This trigger represents hydraulic fluid contamination or exhaustion 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17003: Fluids-hydraulic 
This code represents fluid 
exhaustion/contamination. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01071015XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-hydraulic fluid 
This code represents fluid 
exhaustion/contamination. 
 
Table 212: Contamination by Water Trigger Definition 
Contamination by Water 
This trigger represents water-contaminated fuel/oil 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17005: Fluids-water 
This code represents fluid 
exhaustion/contamination. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 213: Insufficient Grease Trigger Definition 
Insufficient Grease 
This trigger represents water-contaminated fuel/oil 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17012: Fluids-Grease 
This code represents fluid 
exhaustion/contamination. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01071035XX: Fluids/miscellaneous hardware-grease 
This code represents fluid 
exhaustion/contamination. 
 
Table 214: Improper Use of Carburetor Heat Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Carburetor Heat 
This trigger represents the improper use of carburetor heat 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
22304: Carburetor heat AND (‘not used” OR “delayed” OR “improper 
use of “ OR “not deployed” OR “not selected” OR “unavailable”) 
This code represents the 
improper use of carburetor heat 
control by the pilot. 
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Improper Use of Carburetor Heat 
This trigger represents the improper use of carburetor heat 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057231XX: Engine and fuel control—fuel control/carburetor AND 
(“not used/operated” OR “incorrect use/operation”) 
This code represents the 
improper use of carburetor heat 
control by the pilot 
 
Table 215: Improper Weather Forecast Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Weather Forecast 
This trigger represents an inaccurate/improper use of weather forecast 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24401: Weather forecast AND (“inaccurate” OR “not obtained” OR 
“disregarded”) 
I identified this code by 
searching the coding manual 
for the word “forecast”. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 216: Improper Weather Observation Trigger Definition 
Improper Weather Observation 
This trigger represents improper observation of the weather 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24402: Weather observation AND (“not possible”) 
This code indicates improper 
observation of the weather by 
the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 217: Improper Use of Inflight Briefing Service Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Inflight Briefing Service 
This trigger represents the improper use of briefs/information received during flight 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24406: Inflight briefing service AND (“not used”) 
This code represents improper 
use of inflight briefing.  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 218: Improper Use of Inflight Weather Advisories Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Inflight Weather Advisories 
This trigger represents the improper use of weather advisories received during flight 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24407: Inflight weather advisories AND (“not obtained” OR “not 
followed”) 
This code represents the 
improper use of inflight 
weather advisories. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
214 
 
Improper Use of Inflight Weather Advisories 
This trigger represents the improper use of weather advisories received during flight 
No code available  
 
Table 219: Improper Aircraft Handling Trigger Definition 
Improper Aircraft Handling 
This trigger represents incorrect handling of the aircraft by the pilot 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24500: Aircraft handling AND (“poor” OR “not successful” OR 
“improper” OR “not maintained” OR “not possible” OR “abrupt” OR 
“inadequate” OR “not understood” OR “misjudged”) 
This code represents improper 
handling of the aircraft by the 
pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 220: Improper Use of Cyclic Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Cyclic 
This trigger represents incorrect use of the cyclic control by the pilot 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
23201: Cyclic AND (“improper use of” OR “excessive” OR 
“improper” OR “restricted” OR “uncontrolled” OR “excessive” OR 
“not possible” OR “abrupt” OR “premature” OR “not understood” OR 
“delayed” OR ”inadvertent use” OR “inadvertent activation” OR “not 
available”) 
This code represents improper 
use of cyclic control by the 
pilot. 
 
This code is not the same as 
the one that is inferred in the 
absence of a trigger in certain 
accidents. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 221: Improper Use of Tail Rotor/Anti-Torque Control Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Tail Rotor/Anti-Torque Control 
This trigger represents incorrect use of pedals to control the tail rotor 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
23203: Tail rotor/anti-torque control AND (“improper use of” OR 
“excessive” OR “improper” OR “restricted” OR “uncontrolled” OR 
“excessive” OR “not possible” OR “abrupt” OR “not maintained” OR 
“premature” OR “not understood” OR “delayed” OR “inadvertent 
activation” OR “not available”) 
This code represents improper 
use of anti-torque control by 
the pilot. 
 
This code is not the same as 
the one that is inferred in the 
absence of a trigger in certain 
accidents. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
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Table 222: Improper Use of Control Friction Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Control Friction 
This trigger represents incorrect use of control friction for the collective 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
23205: Control friction AND (“not set” OR “improper use of” OR 
“inadvertent activation” OR “inadvertent” OR “diminished”) 
This code represents the 
improper use of control friction 
by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 223: Improper Use of Wind Information Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Wind Information 
This trigger represents situations where the pilot did not acquire or use the correct wind information 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24011: Wind information AND (“not followed” OR “disregarded” OR 
“misjudged” OR “misread” OR “not understood” OR “inaccurate” OR 
“not obtained”) 
This code indicates improper 
use of wind information by the 
pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 224: Improper Fuel Calculation Trigger Definition 
Improper Fuel Calculation 
This trigger represents situations where the pilot did not correctly calculate the rate of fuel consumption 
during the mission 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24012: Fuel consumption calculation AND (“inaccurate” OR 
“inadequate” OR “improper” OR “not performed” OR “poor” OR 
“misjudged”) 
This code represents improper 
fuel calculations by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 225: Assistance not Used/not Available Trigger Definition 
Assistance not Used/not Available 
This trigger represents situations where the pilot did not seek proper assistance or did not have access to 
assistance 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24009: Proper assistance AND (“not used” OR “not obtained” OR 
“not performed” OR “not available”) 
This codes indicates that 
assistance was either 
unavailable or not used by the 
pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  




Table 226: Improper Understanding of performance Data Trigger Definition 
Improper Understanding of performance Data 
This trigger represents improper understanding and use of the aircraft’s performance capabilities 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24019: Performance data AND (“not understood” OR “not followed” 
OR “misjudged” OR “disregarded” OR “exceeded” OR “inaccurate” 
OR “not complied with” OR “not followed” OR “not verified” OR 
“not obtained” OR “not identified”) 
This code indicates that the 
pilot failed to 
understand/disregarded the 
performance data.  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 227: Improper Use of Emergency Light Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Emergency Light 
This trigger represents incorrect use of emergency lights by the pilot 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
23310: Emergency lights AND (“improper use of”) 
This code indicates the 
improper use of emergency 
lights by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 228: Improper Refueling Trigger Definition 
Improper Refueling 
This trigger represents improper refueling of the aircraft prior to flight 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24020: Refueling AND (“not performed” OR “delayed” OR 
“improper” OR “excessive” OR “not verified” OR “inadequate” OR 
“inattentive” OR “not performed” OR “not obtained”) 
This cod represents the 
improper refueling before 
flight. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 229: Improper Weather Evaluation Trigger Definition 
Improper Weather Evaluation 
This trigger represents improper evaluation of the weather conditions by the pilot before making a 
decision to fly 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24022: Weather evaluation AND (“improper” OR “inadequate” OR 
“poor” OR “misjudged” OR “inaccurate” OR “not received” OR 
“disregarded” OR “not verified”) 
This code represents improper 
weather evaluation by the pilot 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  




Table 230: Improper Use of Exterior/Navigation Lights Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Exterior/Navigation Lights 
This trigger represents incorrect use of navigation lights by the pilot 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
23314: Exterior/navigation lights AND (“not used”) 
This code represents the 
improper use of 
exterior/navigation lights. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 231: Delayed Flight to Alternate Destination Trigger Definition 
Delayed Flight to Alternate Destination 
This trigger represents a delayed decision by the pilot to fly to an alternate destination 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24025: Flight to alternate destination AND (“delayed”) 
This code indicates that the 
pilot delayed the decision to go 
to an alternate destination 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 232: Improper Ice/Frost Removal Trigger Definition 
Improper Ice/Frost Removal 
This trigger represents the failure to remove ice/defrost components before flight 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24004: Ice/frost removal from aircraft AND (“not removed” OR “not 
performed”) 
This code indicates that the 
pilot/ground crew failed to 
remove ice/frost before flight. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 233: Improper Compensation for Winds Trigger Definition 
Improper Compensation for Winds 
This trigger represents the pilot’s improper compensation for winds during flight 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24026: Compensation for winds AND (“inadequate” OR “improper” 
OR “not performed” OR “misjudged” OR “disregarded” OR “not 
identified” OR “not maintained” OR “not performed” OR “not 
attained” OR “not obtained” OR “not understood” OR “inaccurate” 
OR “inattentive”) 
This code indicates that the 
pilot failed to compensate 
correctly for winds. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  




Table 234: Improperly Planned Approach Trigger Definition 
Improperly Planned Approach 
This trigger represents a poorly planned approach by the pilot 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24034: Planned approach AND (“improper” OR “poor” OR 
“inadequate” OR “misjudged” OR “inaccurate”) 
This code indicates an 
improperly planned approach 
by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 235: Engine Compartment Failure Trigger Definition 
Engine Compartment Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the engine compartment 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
16903: Engine compartment AND (“fire” OR “not secured”) 
This code represents the failure 
of the engine compartment. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 236: Improper Use of Emergency Equipment Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Emergency Equipment 
This trigger represents the improper use of emergency equipment  
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
23000: Emergency equipment AND (“not used” OR “delayed” OR 
“inadequate” OR “not deployed”) 
This code represents the 
improper use of emergency 
equipment. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 237: Improper Use of Emergency Floats Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Emergency Floats 
This trigger represents the improper use of emergency floats 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
23002: Emergency floats AND (“not deployed” OR “not activated”) 
This code indicates that the 
pilot failed to deploy the floats 
in a timely manner when 
executing a water landing. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 238: Improper Use of Fire Extinguisher Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Fire Extinguisher 
This trigger represents the incorrect use of a fire extinguisher 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
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Improper Use of Fire Extinguisher 
This trigger represents the incorrect use of a fire extinguisher 
22800: Fire extinguishing equipment AND (“not possible”) 
This code indicates the 
improper use of the fire 
extinguishing equipment. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 239: Engine Compressor Stall/Surge Trigger Definition 
Engine Compressor Stall/Surge 
This trigger represents the failure of the engine compartment 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
16911: Engine compressor stall/surge 
This code represents a 
compressor stall. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 240: Engine Pre-Ignition/Detonation Trigger Definition 
Engine Pre-Ignition/Detonation 
This trigger represents engine pre-ignition/detonation 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
16912: Engine Pre-Ignition/Detonation  
This code represents a pre-
ignition/detonation in the 
engine. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 241: Uncontained Engine Failure Trigger Definition 
Uncontained Engine Failure 
This trigger represents uncontained engine failure 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
16913: Uncontained engine failure  
This code represents the 
uncontained failure of the 
engine. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
343: Uncontained engine failure 
This code represents the 
uncontained failure of the 
engine. 
 
Table 242: Improper Use/Failure of Furnishing Trigger Definition 
Improper Use/Failure of Furnishing 
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of furnishings 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
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Improper Use/Failure of Furnishing 
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of furnishings 
17100: Miscellaneous-equipment/furnishing   
This code represents the failure 
of on-board furnishing. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 243: Entanglement of Cargo Restraints Trigger Definition 
Entanglement of Cargo Restraints 
This trigger represents the entanglement of cargo restraints 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17102: Miscellaneous-cargo restraints AND (“entangled”) 
This code represents the 
entanglement of cargo 
restraints. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 244: Improper Use/Failure of Rafts Trigger Definition 
Improper Use/Failure of Rafts 
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of rafts 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17107: Miscellaneous-rafts 
This code indicates the 
improper use/failure of life raft 
after water landing. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 245: Improper Use/Failure of Seat Belts Trigger Definition 
Improper Use/Failure of Seat Belts 
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of seat belts 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17110: Miscellaneous-seat belt 
This code represents the 
improper use/failure of the seat 
belt. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 246: Improper Use/Failure of Shoulder Harness Trigger Definition 
Improper Use/Failure of Shoulder Harness 
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of shoulder harness 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17111: Miscellaneous-shoulder harness 
This code indicates 




Improper Use/Failure of Shoulder Harness 
This trigger represents the improper use/failure of shoulder harness 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 247: Improper Use of Engine Inlet Covers Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Engine Inlet Covers 
This trigger represents the improper use of engine inlet covers 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17119: Miscellaneous-engine inlet covers 
This code indicates improper 
use of engine inlet covering. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 248: Entanglement of Helmet Trigger Definition 
Entanglement of Helmet 
This trigger represents the entanglement of the helmet 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17120: Miscellaneous-helmet AND (“entangled”) 
This code suggest helmet 
entanglement. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 249: Entanglement of Helmet Trigger Definition 
Not Possible 
This trigger represents situations where the NTBS used the “not possible” modifier to indicate that the 
pilot could not have executed a particular action. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
3131: Not possible (modifier) 
The NTSB used this modifier 
to indicate that the pilot could 
not have possibly carried out a 
particular action. For example, 
they used this code with 
subject codes for aircraft 
control and rotor RPM. Both 
cases suggest that the pilots 
found it “impossible” to 
maintain control or RPM. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
021: Not possible (modifier) 
The NTSB used this modifier 
to indicate that the pilot could 
not have possibly carried out a 
particular action. For example, 
they used this code with 
subject codes for aircraft 
control and rotor RPM. Both 




This trigger represents situations where the NTBS used the “not possible” modifier to indicate that the 
pilot could not have executed a particular action. 
found it “impossible” to 
maintain control or RPM. 
 
Table 250: Incorrect Use of Throttle and/or Collective Input Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Throttle and/or Collective Input 
This trigger represents improper throttle setting and/or collective input that triggers an improper RPM 
hazardous state. 
User-defined Code Notes 
I defined this trigger by combining two other triggers: 
 Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls  
 Improper use of collective 
This trigger is inferred only if a 
trigger is not available from 
the accident report. 
 
This trigger is used when 
helicopter engine is 
operational, and when there is 
no mechanical issue with the 
collective control. 
 
Table 251: Incorrect Use of Collective and/or Cyclic Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Collective and/or Cyclic 
This trigger improper use of the collective or cyclic that can trigger an improper autorotation or inflight 
loss of control. 
User-defined Code Notes 
I defined this trigger by combining two other triggers: 
 Improper use of collective  
 Improper use of cyclic 
This trigger is inferred only if a 
trigger is not available from 
the accident report. 
 
This trigger can cause the 
system to transition to an 
inflight loss of control state. 
 
It can also trigger an improper 
autorotation after a loss of 
engine power (or during 
simulated autorotation). 
 
  Table 252: Impossible/reduced control authority after system failure Trigger Definition 
Impossible/reduced control after system failure 
This trigger represents the situations where the pilot has limited or no control over the aircraft after the 
failure of critical flight control components 
User-defined Code Notes 
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Impossible/reduced control after system failure 
I defined this trigger by: 
 System failure state appears before inflight loss of control 
System failure is associated 
with several accidents 
(including those that involved 
inflight loss of control). Failure 
of critical flight control 
components (e.g., cyclic) 
afford the pilot reduced control 
authority over the aircraft (if 
not impossible to control). 
 
I inferred this trigger if:  the 
NTSB did not use the “not 
possible” modifier, and the 
accident involved an inflight 
loss of control after a system 
failure. 
 
 I capture this situation by 
defining the 
“Impossible/reduced control 
authority after system failure” 
trigger.  
 
Table 253: No/Failed Recovery Action from Uncontrolled Descent Trigger Definition 
No/Failed Recovery Action from Uncontrolled Descent 
This trigger represents no action/failed attempt by the pilot to recover from an inflight loss of control, 
and triggers an end state. 
User-defined Code Notes 
I defined this trigger by combining two other triggers: 
 Lack of action by the pilot 
 Improper remedial action by the pilot 
Many accident reports do not 
specify the types of pilot action 
that causes (triggers) the 
system to move from an 
inflight loss of control state to 
an end state. 
 
 For completeness, I defined 
the “No/failed recovery action 
from uncontrolled descent” 
trigger. 
 
This trigger is inferred when 
the NTSB accident report does 
not mention any remedial 
action by the pilot to recover 






Table 254: Improper Load Jettison Trigger Definition 
Improper Load Jettison 
This trigger represents an improper jettison of external load by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24540: Load jettison 
This code represents incorrect 
or delayed jettison of external 
load/attachment by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 255: Improper Remedial Action Trigger Definition 
Improper Remedial Action 
This trigger represents an improper corrective action by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24542: Remedial action 
This trigger, as the name 
suggests, represents 
incorrect/insufficient remedial 
action by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
060: Attempted remedial action  
This trigger, as the name 
suggests, represents 
incorrect/insufficient remedial 
action by the pilot. 
 
Table 256: Improper Pull-up Trigger Definition 
Improper Pull-up 
This trigger represents an improper pull-up by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24547: Pull-up 
This trigger suggests incorrect 
pull-up action by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 257: Improper Recovery from Bounced Landing Trigger Definition 
Improper Recovery from Bounced Landing 
This trigger represents an improper recovery from a bounced landing. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24562: Recovery from bounced landing 
This trigger represents the 
inability of the pilot to recover 
from a bounced landing. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 258: Improper Touch-and-go Trigger Definition 
Improper Touch-and-go 
This trigger represents an improper touch-and-go. 




This trigger represents an improper touch-and-go. 
24563: Touch-and-go 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot did not perform a proper 
touch-and-go maneuver. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 259: Improper Use of/Inadequate Flight Advisories Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of/Inadequate Flight Advisories 
This trigger represents improper use or inadequate flight advisories. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24605: Flight advisories 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot failed to follow advisories 
during flight. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 260: Improper Use of/Inadequate ARTCC Service Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of/Inadequate ARTCC Service 
This trigger represents improper use of or inadequate ARTCC service. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24606: ARTCC service 
This trigger indicates that pilot 
did not use/receive sufficient 
information from the ARTCC 
service. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 261: Improper Use of/Inadequate Traffic Advisory Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of/Inadequate Traffic Advisory 
This trigger represents improper use or inadequate traffic advisory. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24612: Traffic advisory 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot did not use/receive proper 
traffic information. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 262: Improper Use of/Inadequate Safety Advisory Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of/Inadequate Safety Advisory 
This trigger represents improper use or inadequate traffic advisory. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24615: safety advisory 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot did not use/receive proper 
safety advisory. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
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Table 263: Improper Use of/Inadequate Radar Assistance to VFR Aircraft Trigger 
Definition 
Improper Use of/Inadequate Radar Assistance to VFR Aircraft 
This trigger represents improper use of/inadequate radar assistance to VFR aircraft. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24616: Radar assistance to VFR aircraft 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot did not use/receive proper 
radar assistance. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 264: Improper Use of/Inadequate Assistance from Flight Service Station Trigger 
Definition 
Improper Use of/Inadequate Assistance from Flight Service Station 
This trigger represents improper use of/inadequate assistance from flight service station. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24613: Flight service station (FSS) service 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot did not use/receive proper 
FSS service. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 265: Improper Use of Inflight Weather Information Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Inflight Weather Information  
This trigger represents improper use of inflight weather information. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24620: Improper inflight weather information 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot did not properly use the 
inflight weather information. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 266: Improper Crew Coordination Trigger Definition 
Improper Crew Coordination  
This trigger represents improper crew coordination. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24624: Crew/group coordination  
This trigger indicates that the 
crew did not coordinate 
properly. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 267: Improper Crew/Passenger Briefing Trigger Definition 
Improper Crew/Passenger Briefing 
This trigger represents improper crew or passenger briefing. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24625: Crew/group briefing 
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Improper Crew/Passenger Briefing 
This trigger represents improper crew or passenger briefing. 
24626: Passenger briefing 
I identified these codes by 
searching for the word 
“briefing”. I excluded weather 
briefings. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 268: Not Recognizing Hazardous Condition Trigger Definition 
Not Recognizing Hazardous Condition 
This trigger represents the crew not recognizing or heeding a hazardous condition/warning. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24628: Unsafe hazardous condition The NTSB used these generic 
codes to suggest that the pilot 
failed to recognize (and act) on 
hazardous condition warnings. 
24629: Unsafe/hazardous condition warning 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 269: Disturbance Trigger Definition 
Disturbance 
This trigger represents a disturbance/disruptive event for the crew/pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24701: Disturbance 
Trigger indicates disturbance 
by another crew member or 
passenger. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
 
Table 270: Control Interference Trigger Definition 
Control Interference 
This trigger represents control interference during flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24705: Control interference 
This trigger indicates the pilot 
experienced some form of 
interference with the aircraft 
flight controls. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 271: Relinquishing Control Trigger Definition 
Relinquishing Control 
This trigger represents relinquishing control of the aircraft. 




This trigger represents relinquishing control of the aircraft. 
24706: Relinquishing control 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot relinquished control of 
the aircraft improperly. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 272: Suicide Trigger Definition 
Suicide 
This trigger represents suicide by the pilot or passenger. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24707: Suicide 
Trigger indicates suicide by 
occupant/pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 273: Improper Security Trigger Definition 
Improper Security 
This trigger represents improper security of the aircraft. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24711: Security 
Trigger indicates lack of 
security. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 274: Sabotage Trigger Definition 
Sabotage 
This trigger represents sabotage before or during flight. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24710: Sabotage 
Trigger indicates intentional 
tampering with the system to 
cause harm. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 275: Improper Rescue/Evacuation Trigger Definition 
Improper Rescue/Evacuation 
This trigger represents improper rescue and evacuation.  
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24712: Evacuation The NTSB used the codes to 
indicate improper evacuation 
or rescue of occupants after an 
accident. 
24714: Rescue 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  




Table 276: Encounter with Jet/Propeller Blast Trigger Definition 
Encounter with Jet/Propeller Blast 
This trigger represents improper rescue and evacuation. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24718: Propeller/jet blast encounter 
Trigger indicates that a crew 
member/passenger encountered 
the rotor blades. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 277: Mast Bumping Trigger Definition 
Mast Bumping 
This trigger represents mast bumping. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24806: Mast bumping 
Trigger indicates that the main 
rotor made contact with the 
fuselage of the aircraft. 
Generally occurs during blade 
divergence. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 278: Engine Tearaway Trigger Definition 
Engine Tearaway 
This trigger represents engine tearaway. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
355: Engine tearaway 
This trigger indicates that 
separation of the engine from 
the aircraft fuselage. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 279: Fire Warning System Failure Trigger Definition 
Fire Warning System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the fire warning system. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12400: Fire warning system 
Trigger indicates failure of the 
warning system. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 280: Oxygen System Failure Trigger Definition 
Oxygen System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the oxygen system. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12500: Oxygen system 
Trigger indicates failure of the 
oxygen system. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
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Oxygen System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the oxygen system. 
No code available  
 
Table 281: Improper Use of Cabin Heater Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Cabin Heater 
This trigger represents the improper use of cabin heater. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12910: Cabin heater AND (“not activated”) 
Trigger indicates improper use 
of cabin heating. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 282: Fire Extinguisher Failure Trigger Definition 
Fire Extinguisher Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the fire extinguisher. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12606: Fire extinguisher—portable AND (“exhaustion” OR 
“improper” OR “inadequate”) 
Trigger indicates failure of the 
fire extinguisher. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 283: Fire Extinguisher Failure Trigger Definition 
Air conditioning System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the air conditioning system. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
12901: Air conditioning/heating/pressurization   
Trigger indicates failure of AC 
system. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 284: Tail Boom Failure Trigger Definition 
Tail boom Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the tail boom. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
13007: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—Tail boom   
Trigger indicates tailboom 
failure 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 285: Tail Cone Failure Trigger Definition 
Tail Cone Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the tail cone. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
13009: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—Tail cone 
Trigger indicates failure of the 
tail cone. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
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Tail Cone Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the tail cone. 
No code available  
 
Table 286: Tail Pylon Failure Trigger Definition 
Tail Pylon Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the tail pylon. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
13008: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—Tail pylon 
Trigger indicates failure of tail 
pylon 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 287: Improper Use/Failure of Emergency Floatation Gear Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Floatation Gear 
This trigger represents the improper use of floatation gear. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
13006: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—floatation gear 
Trigger indicates 
failure/improper use of 
emergency floatation gear. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 288: Improper Use of Chip Detector System Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Chip Detector System 
This trigger represents the improper use of chip detector system. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
13010: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—chip detector system—gear box 
Trigger indicates improper use 
of chip detector system. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 289: Transmission Tube Failure Trigger Definition 
Transmission Tube Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the transmission tube. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
13014: Miscellaneous rotorcraft—transmission support 
tube/attachment 
Trigger indicates failure of the 
transmission tube. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 290: Pitot-Static System Failure Trigger Definition 
Pitot-static System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the pitot-static system. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
13101: Pitot/Static system  




Pitot-static System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the pitot-static system. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 291: Improper Use of Flight Controls Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Flight Controls 
This trigger represents the improper use of flight controls. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
22100: Flight controls AND (“improper use of” OR “improper” OR 
“restricted” OR not possible” OR “not received”) 
Trigger indicates improper use 
of flight controls. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 292: Pitot-Static System Failure Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Trim Setting 
This trigger represents the improper use of trim setting by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
22120: Trim setting 
Trigger indicates improper use 
of the trim setting by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 293: Improper Use of Unspecified Fluid Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Unspecified Fluid 
This trigger represents the improper use of unspecified fluid. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17000: Fluid   
The NTSB used the general 




NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 294: Unspecified Engine Component Failure Trigger Definition 
Unspecified Engine Component Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of an unspecified engine component. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
16900: Miscellaneous  These codes indicate that an 
engine component failed. The 
NTSB codes do not always 
specify the component that 
failed. 
16910: Miscellaneous—engine 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  




Table 295: Improper Use of the Parachute/Drag Chute Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of Parachute/Drag Chute 
This trigger represents the improper use of the drag chute 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
17115: Miscellaneous equipment/furnishing—parachute/drag chute 
This trigger indicates the 
improper use of the parachute. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 296: Improper Use of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Trigger Definition 
Improper Use of the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) 
This trigger represents the improper use of the auxiliary power unit. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
23303: Auxiliary power unit (APU) 
This trigger indicates the 
improper use of the APU. 
Generally, this subject code is 
associated with failing to 
remove APU tubes before 
departure (in helicopter 
operations). 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
 
Table 297: Improper/Inadequate Radar Altimeter Trigger Definition 
Improper/Inadequate Radar Altimeter 
This trigger represents the improper use of the auxiliary power unit. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
23102: Radar altimeter AND (“poor”) 
This trigger indicates a 
malfunctioning altimeter 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 298: Not Identifying Crosswind Component Trigger Definition 
Not Identifying Crosswind Component 
This trigger represents the pilot’s failure to recognize the crosswind component during flight 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24579: Crosswind component AND (“not identified”) 
This trigger indicates the 
pilot’s failure to recognize (and 
correct for) the crosswind 
component during flight 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  




Table 299: Disregarding Minimum Descent Altitude Trigger Definition 
Disregarding Minimum Descent Altitude 
This trigger represents the pilots disregard for the minimum descent altitude. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
24529: Minimum descent altitude 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot disregarded the minimum 
descent altitude. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
No code available  
 
Table 300: Tailstrike Trigger Definition 
Tailstrike 
This trigger represents the tail striking an object or terrain. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available 
This trigger indicates that the 
tail struck an object/terrain 
(generally the ground during 
an improper flare). 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
091: Tailstrike 
This trigger indicates that the 
tail struck an object/terrain 
(generally the ground during 
an improper flare). 
 
Table 301: Oil System Failure Definition 
Oil System Failure 
This trigger represents the failure of the oil system. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
01057261XX: Oil system 
This trigger indicates the 
failure of the oil system. 
 
Table 302: Incorrect Action Selection Definition 
Incorrect Action Selection 
This trigger represents an incorrect choice made by the pilot to perform a particular action. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
02041010XX: Action—incorrect action selection 
This trigger is not informative. 
It only suggests that he pilot 
“did something wrong”. 
 
Table 303: Incorrect Sequence of Actions Definition 
Incorrect Sequence of Action  
This trigger represents an incorrect sequence of actions taken by the pilot/maintenance personnel. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
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Incorrect Sequence of Action  
This trigger represents an incorrect sequence of actions taken by the pilot/maintenance personnel. 
80400: Conditions/step(s)—improper sequence 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot performed an incorrect 
sequence of actions. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
02041010XX: Action—incorrect action sequence 
This trigger indicates that the 
pilot performed an incorrect 
sequence of actions. 
 
Table 304: Delayed Action Definition 
Delayed Action 
This trigger represents delayed action by the pilot. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available 
Note that in the pre-2008 
system, the NTSB indicated 
delayed action as a modifier. 
This modified was associated 
with subject codes. For 
example, “Collective—
delayed” would be a subject-
modifier combination. 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
02041025XX: Action—delayed action 
The NTSB had a separate 
subject code for the nature of 
action taken by the pilot. It no 
longer uses “delayed” as a 
modifier. 
 
Table 305: Lack of Action Definition 
Lack of Action 
This trigger represents delayed action by the pilot/maintenance personnel. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available 
Note that in the pre-2008 
system, the NTSB did not 
explicitly point out a “lack of” 
action. They used the “lack of” 
modifier with multiple subject 
codes (e.g., fuel, collective 
control). 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
02041030XX: Action—lack of action 
The NTSB had a separate 
subject code for the nature of 
action taken by the pilot. It no 





Table 306: Forgotten Action/Omission Definition 
Forgotten Action/Omission 
This trigger represents a missed/forgotten action by the pilot/maintenance personnel. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available 
The NTSB did not use a 
subject code specify 
forgotten/omitted actions in the 
pre-2008 system  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
02041035XX: Action—forgotten action/omission 
The NTSB had a separate 
subject code to indicate 
forgotten or omitted actions. 
 
Table 307: Incomplete Action Definition 
Incomplete Action 
This trigger represents an action that the pilot/maintenance personnel failed to complete. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
02041040XX: Action—incomplete action 
The NTSB had a separate 
subject code to indicate 
incomplete actions. 
 
Table 308: Unnecessary Action Definition 
Unnecessary Action 
This trigger represents an action that the pilot/maintenance personnel failed to complete. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes  
No code available  
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes  
02041040XX: Action—unnecessary action 
The NTSB had a separate 











APPENDIX C. SEQUENCING OF HAZARDOUS STATES 
Table 309: Sequencing Rules for Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State 
Disoriented/lacking Awareness State  
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct altitude/clearance from terrain or objects. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Lack of visual lookout/distracted After becoming disoriented, 
pilots were generally not able to 
maintain visual reference.  
 
In some accidents, the pilots 
failed to monitor key flight 






Inflight loss of control 
 
Table 310: Sequencing Rules for Improper Climb State  
Improper Climb State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s climb was incorrect/climb capability was exceeded/climb rate was 
incorrect. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper altitude/clearance Failure to maintain proper 
climb can result in descent and 
improper altitude/clearance. 
 
In many accidents, pilots failed 
to recognize that they were in a 
hazardous climb state, and 
failed to take appropriate 
remedial actions that triggered 
other hazardous states such as 
improper airspeed, improper 




Improper rotor RPM 
Inflight loss of control 
On-ground loss of control 
 
Table 311: Sequencing Rules for Improper Distance State  
Improper Distance State 
Hazardous state where the distance from the runway/helipad/landing site is incorrect. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper flare After aircraft entered an 
improper distance state, pilots 
tried to take corrective 
measures by flaring 
excessively, or were unable to 
level-off in time. 
Improper level-off 




Table 312: Sequencing Rules for Improper Descent State  
Improper Descent State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s descent was incorrect/descent rate was incorrect. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper altitude/clearance In many accidents that did not 
involve vortex ring state or 
clipping object/terrain, the 
positions of improper 
altitude/clearance and 
improper descent are 
interchangeable.  
 
If the accident sequence 
involves the loss of engine 
power state, then the improper 
descent follows. 
Improper airspeed 
Vortex ring state 
Improper RPM 
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness  




Table 313: Sequencing Rules for Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state  
Intentional/Inadvertent flight through poor weather state 
Hazardous state where the pilot intentionally or inadvertently flew into poor weather conditions. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Disoriented/lacking awareness After intentional/inadvertent 
flight through poor weather 
states, pilots generally were 
disoriented and unable to 
maintain visual reference. 
 
In some accidents, pilots 
exceeded the helicopter’s 
hover performance capabilities 
after flight through poor 
weather. 
 
In certain accidents, the 
subsequent state could have 
been as a result of the impact 
of poor weather on the aircraft 
(e.g., system failure, loss of 
engine power). 
Lack of visual lookout/distracted 





Vortex ring state 
System failure  
Loss of engine power 
Improper autorotation 
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness 
Aircraft stall/spin state 
Inflight loss of control 
Improper flare 
 
Table 314: Sequencing Rules for Prevailing/Existing weather state  
Prevailing/Existing weather and light state 
Hazardous weather state that existed during the flight. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper vertical takeoff 
After flight through prevailing 
weather and light states, pilots 
generally were disoriented and 




Lack of visual lookout/distracted 






Prevailing/Existing weather and light state 
Improper RPM In some accidents, pilots 
exceeded the helicopter’s 
hover performance capabilities 
after flight through poor 
weather. 
 
In certain accidents, the 
subsequent state could have 
been as a result of the impact 
of poor weather on the aircraft 
(e.g., system failure, loss of 
engine power). 
Vortex ring state 
System failure  
Loss of engine power 
Improper autorotation 
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness 
Aircraft stall/spin state 
Inflight loss of control 
Improper flare 
 
Table 315: Sequencing Rules for Improper Altitude/Clearance State 
Improper Altitude/Clearance State  
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain the correct altitude/clearance from terrain or objects. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Midair collision In many accidents, pilots failed 
to maintain altitude, followed 
by the loss of airspeed or RPM.  
 
Subsequently, the aircraft enters 
the LOC state. 
 
Generally, if an accident did not 
involve LOC, but cited 
improper RPM improper 
airspeed, the: improper airspeed 




Exceeding aircraft yaw performance 
Improper airspeed 
Improper RPM 
Aircraft stall/spin state 
Inflight loss of control 
Improper flare 
 
Table 316: Sequencing Rules for Wake Turbulence state  
Wake turbulence State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft flew through the wake vortices of another aircraft. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Loss of engine power In some accidents, the aircraft 
engine “flamed out” after 
flying through wake 
turbulence. 
 
Flight through wake turbulence 
resulted in the pilot losing 
control of the aircraft. In the 
post-2008 system, the NTSB 
introduced the “inflight upset” 
code, which I use to trigger the 
system from the wake 
turbulence state, and into the 
LOC state. 




Table 317: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State  
Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design yaw performance capabilities. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Loss of engine power In one accident, the aircraft 
entered a state where it was 
operating its design yaw 
capabilities. When in this state, 
an engine component failed, 
triggering a loss of engine 
power state. 
 
In many accidents, pilots failed 
to recognize the exceeding yaw 
performance state, and 
subsequently failed to maintain 
airspeed, rotor RPM. 
 
As mentioned in the rules for 
airspeed and RPM, failure to 
maintain either of these 




Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) 
Inflight loss of control 
 
Table 318: Sequencing Rules for Improper Turn/Bank state  
Improper Turn/Bank State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its banking/roll performance during flight. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper altitude/clearance Similar to the improper climb 
states, not executing a proper 
turn can be followed by an 
improper descent and/or loss of 
altitude. 
 
Not correcting for an improper 
turn can results in a loss of 
airspeed and decay in rotor 
RPM. 
 
As mentioned in the rules for 
airspeed and RPM, failure to 
maintain either of these 




Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) 
Inflight loss of control 
 
Table 319: Sequencing Rules for Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness State  
Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness State 
Hazardous state where the helicopter tail rotor does not provide the requisite thrust to maintain 
directional control. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Inflight loss of control 
In many accidents that 
involved loss of tail rotor 
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Loss of Tail Rotor Effectiveness State 
effectiveness, the pilot was 
unable to recover the aircraft 
and subsequently lost control. 
 
Table 320: Sequencing Rules for Loss of Engine Power State  
Loss of Engine Power State 
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s engine is not operational. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper autorotation In accidents that involved 




If the codes do not suggest an 
improper autorotation, then 
any of the states (that 
compose the key elements of 
an improper autorotation) can 
follow. 
 
A combination of improper 
descent and airspeed can 
result in a vortex ring state. 
 
As mentioned in the rules for 
airspeed and RPM, failure to 
maintain either of these 
parameters resulted in LTE or 
LOC. 





Hazardous height-velocity regime 
Vortex ring state 
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) 
Aircraft stall/spin state 
Inflight loss of control 
Improper flare 
 
Table 321: Sequencing Rules for System Failure State  
System Failure State 
Hazardous state where an aircraft’s system(s)/component(s) have failed/malfunctioned. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper autorotation In accidents that involved 




If the codes do not suggest an 
improper autorotation, then 
any of the states (that 
compose the key elements of 
an improper autorotation) can 
follow. 
 
Note that in the case of many 
system failure accidents, the 
pilots are not able to maintain 
flight parameters (e.g., RPM, 




Vortex ring state 
Improper RPM 
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) 
Aircraft stall/spin state 




System Failure State 
generally have the “not 
possible” trigger. 
 
In many accidents where the 
LOC state followed system 
failure, pilots were not able to 
control the aircraft. 
 
Table 322: Sequencing Rules for Improper Autorotation State  
Improper Autorotation 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to execute a safe autorotative landing. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Vortex ring state If the aircraft enters an 
improper autorotation state, 
then the hazardous states that 
can follow are: vortex ring 
state, loss of tail rotor 
effectiveness, stall/spin, or 
inflight loss of control. 
 
Note that, generally, LOC 
followed improper autorotation 
if an accident involved loss of 
engine power or system 
failure. 
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) 
Aircraft stall/spin state 
Inflight loss of control 
 
Table 323: Sequencing Rules for Aircraft Stall/Spin State  
Aircraft Stall/Spin State 
Hazardous state where the lifting surfaces of an aircraft (i.e., wings or rotor blades) exceed a critical 
angle of attack they experience a loss of lift, and enter a stalled state. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Inflight loss of control 
After the blade/aircraft stall or 
spin, the aircraft enters the 
inflight loss of control state. 
 
 
Table 324: Sequencing Rules for Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State  
Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain visual lookout for terrain/other aircraft or was 
distracted. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper altitude/clearance A pilot in this state generally 
failed to maintain clearance 
from objects/terrain or failed to 
monitor key flight parameters. 
 
In some cases, the NTSB used 
this code to describe the 
distracted nature of 
Improper descent 
Midair collision 
Low fuel state 
Improper airspeed 
Improper RPM 
Inflight loss of control 
On-ground loss of control 
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Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State 
Improper distance 
maintenance personnel. The 
state-based approach uses the 
information code for the 
“personnel” associated with 
this state. 
 
Table 325: Sequencing Rules for Low Fuel State  
Low Fuel State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low fuel level. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Loss of engine power After the aircraft entered the 
low fuel state, it generally 
experienced a fuel 
exhaustion, triggering a loss 
of engine power. 
 
In one accident, the low fuel 
state promoted the pilot to 
make an incorrect decision 
and fly into IMC conditions. 
Intentional/inadvertent flight through poor weather 
 
Table 326: Sequencing Rules for Low Oil State  
Low Oil State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low oil level. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Loss of engine power After the low oil state, the oil 
starvation/exhaustion can 
trigger a loss of engine 
power.  
 
In some cases, depending on 
the nature of oil (e.g., 
transmission oil), the system 




Table 327: Sequencing Rules for Low Hydraulic Fluid State  
Low Hydraulic Fluid State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low hydraulic fluid level. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
System failure 
After the low hydraulic fluid 
state, the system transitioned to 





Table 328: Sequencing Rules for Improper Height-Velocity Regime State  
Improper Height-Velocity Regime State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating in the unsafe region of the “Deadman’s curve”. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper altitude/clearance This hazardous indicates that 
the system was operating in 
hazardous region of the height-
velocity curve.  
 
This state is part of the 
definition for the improper 
autorotation state. 
 
If the accident codes do not 
mention 24520: Autorotation, 
then the improper height-
velocity curve state can appear 




Loss of tail rotor effectiveness (LTE) 
Inflight loss of control 
 
Table 329: Sequencing Rules for Improper Heading State  
Improper Heading State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Inflight loss of control 
After entering the improper 
heading state, and failing to 
correct improper heading can 
trigger an inflight loss of 
control. 
 
Table 330: Sequencing Rules for Improper Lift-off State  
Improper Lift-off State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not lift-off correctly. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Exceeding aircraft takeoff capability In helicopter accidents, an 
improper lift-off was 
immediately followed by 
exceeding takeoff capability, or 
inflight loss of control. 
 
In some situations, improper 
lift-off resulted in loss of 
control when on the ground. 
Inflight loss of control 




Table 331: Sequencing Rules for Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State  
Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper turn  This hazardous state translates 
from the generic “operation of 
rotorcraft” code in the NTSB 
coding manual. 
 
In helicopter accidents, this 
state was followed by improper 
turn, loss of engine power, or 
system failure state. 
Loss of engine power 
System failure 
 
Table 332: Sequencing Rules for On-ground Poor Weather  
On-ground Poor Weather State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Inflight loss of control 
The aircraft encountered poor 
weather during takeoff and 
subsequently lost control. 
 
Table 333: Sequencing Rules for Improper Run-on Landing State  
Improper Run-on Landing State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from forward flight to landing. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
This state is always followed by an end state  
 
Table 334: Sequencing Rules for Improper Vertical Takeoff State  
Improper Vertical Takeoff State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct vertical takeoff. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Lack of visual lookout/distracted After an improper vertical 
takeoff, pilots failed to maintain 
visual look out for objects. 
 
Failing to maintain lookout 
(and take corrective action) 




In some accidents, pilots failed 
to correct the improper vertical 




Vortex ring state (VRS) 
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Improper Vertical Takeoff State 
improper airspeed or improper 
RPM state. 
 
Table 335: Sequencing Rules for Improper Go-around State  
Improper Go-around State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct go-around. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper descent Pilots perform a go-around to 
abort an approach into an 
airport/landing site. 
 
After an improper go-around, in 
many accidents, pilots were not 
able to arrest the descent. 
 
In some accidents, pilots failed 
to maintain airspeed, or rotor 
RPM. Failing to maintain these 
flight parameters subsequently 
resulted in LOC. 
Improper airspeed 
Improper RPM 
Inflight loss of control 
 
Table 336: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Design Stress Limits State  
Exceeding Design Stress Limits State 
Hazardous state where aerodynamic loads on the aircraft exceed the design stress limits. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Loss of engine power When pilots operated aircraft 
outside the design stress range, 
it generally resulted in a loss of 
engine power or system failure. 
System failure 
 
Table 337: Sequencing Rules for Improper Translational Lift State  
Improper Translational Lift State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from hover to forward flight. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper airspeed Translational lift state happens 
when the helicopter transitions 
from vertical flight to forward 
flight. 
 
A Federal Aviation Advisory 
Circular states that “loss of 
translational lift results in 
increased power demand” and 
“while operating near 
maximum power demand, the 
increased power demand could 
Improper RPM 
Vortex ring state 
Loss of tail rotor effectiveness 
Inflight loss of control 
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Improper Translational Lift State 
result in decreased rotor RPM” 
(NTSB ID: CHI00LA132). 
 
In many accidents, pilots failed 
to maintain rotor RPM or 
airspeed after not attaining 
proper translational lift. 
 
Table 338: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State  
Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design hover performance. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper altitude/clearance When a helicopter is operated 
in excess of its hover 
performance capabilities, 
generally, it experiences a loss 
of altitude and begins to 
descend. 
 
After exceeding hover 
performance, pilots are 
generally not able to maintain 
translational lift. 
Improper descent 
Improper translational lift 
Improper airspeed 
Vortex ring state 
Improper RPM 
Inflight loss of control 
On-ground loss of control 
 
Table 339: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design takeoff performance. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Loss of engine power When a helicopter exceeds its 
takeoff performance, it can 
result in an improper takeoff. 
 
In some cases, after exceeding 
takeoff performance, the 
aircraft experienced a loss of 
engine power, failed to 
maintain RPM, or improper 
autorotation. 
 
In some accidents, if the aircraft 
took-off after exceeding takeoff 
performance, the pilots lost 
control. 
Improper vertical takeoff 
Improper RPM 
Improper autorotation 




Table 340: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Landing Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Landing Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design landing performance. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Exceeding design stress limits After exceeding the landing 
performance, the aircraft can 
enter the state where it was 
being operated beyond its stress 
limits. 
 
In some cases, the NTSB codes 
indicated that the helicopter 
entered a ground resonance 
state, which was generally 
followed by a system failure. 
 
In some accidents, the pilot lost 
control of the aircraft after the 
landing performance had 
deteriorated (the report 
indicated that helicopter had 
flown into the rotor wash of  a 
larger helicopter—not captured 
in the codes) 
Ground resonance 
System failure 
Inflight loss of control 
 
Table 341: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State  
Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper descent This state is obtained from the 
generic NTSB code “17300: 
Aircraft performance 
(general)”. Generally, after this 
state, the aircraft can experience 
a loss of altitude or improper 
descent. 
 
In some cases, the pilots were 
not able to fly in the prevailing 
weather conditions, failed to 
maintain requisite RPM, 





Improper rotor RPM 
Inflight loss of control 
 
Table 342: Sequencing Rules for Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State  
Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper turn/bank  This state is obtained from the 
generic NTSB code “24800: System failure 
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Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State 
Rotorcraft operations”. The 
NTSB used this code to 
indicate that the “rotorcraft was 
not operated correctly”. 
 
From accident data, the states 
that can follow are, improper 
turn/bank or a system failure 
state. 
 
Table 343: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State  
Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design yaw performance capabilities. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Exceeding design stress limits 
Exceeding yawing performance 





Inflight loss of control 
 
Table 344: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its performance capabilities after the loss of 
engine power. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper autorotation 
This state usually appears in 
multi-engine aircraft. 
 
This state can appear after a 
loss of engine power state, and 
is used to indicate exceeding 




Table 345: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design crosswind performance capabilities. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Exceeding design stress limits If the pilot failed to recognize 
that the aircraft was being 
operated beyond its crosswind 
performance limits, the system 
could transition to an improper 
airspeed, improper RPM, or 
eventually an inflight loss of 
control. 




Table 346: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design capabilities for a given configuration. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.  
 
Table 347: Sequencing Rules for Wheels-up Landing State  
Wheels-up Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot performs a landing without extending the landing gear. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.  
 
Table 348: Sequencing Rules for Exceeding Slope Limitation State  
Exceeding Slope Limitation State 
Hazardous state where the pilot operated the aircraft beyond its design capability in inclined/sloped 
terrain. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
On-ground loss of control 
After entering the state where 
the helicopter had exceeded its 
slope limitations, the aircraft 
either experienced an on-
ground loss of control or 
transitioned to an end state. 
 
Table 349: Sequencing Rules for Runway Overshoot State  
Runway Overshoot State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft departed the runway surface during takeoff or landing. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.  
 
Table 350: Sequencing Rules for Improper Power-on Landing State  
Improper Power-on Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot performs an improper landing with engine(s) operational. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Improper flare Improper flare or failure to 
level-off correctly can appear 
after the pilot performs an 
incorrect power-on landing. 
The NTSB used the power-on 







Table 351: Sequencing Rules for Runway Undershoot State  
Runway Undershoot State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed short of the runway. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.  
 
Table 352: Sequencing Rules for Runway Incursion State  
Runway Incursion State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft entered runway incorrectly/without clearance 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.  
 
Table 353: Sequencing Rules for On-ground Loss of Control State  
On-ground Loss of Control State 
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain control of aircraft heading and attitude when on the 
ground. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.  
 
Table 354: Sequencing Rules for Improper Level-off State  
Improper Level-off State 
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to bring the helicopter to a level attitude (usually in preparation for 
a landing). 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
In accidents, this state is always followed by an end state.  
 
Table 355: Sequencing Rules for Low Coolant State  
Low Coolant State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low coolant level. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
System failure After entering a low coolant 
state, the system can enter a 
loss of engine power state or 
system failure state. 
Generally, the failure occurs 
due to overheating. 
Loss of engine power 
 
Table 356: Sequencing Rules for Low Grease State  
Low Grease State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low grease level. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
System failure In some accidents, engine or 
system components fail 
during the low grease state, 
transitioning the system to a 
Loss of engine power 
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Low Grease State 
system failure or loss of 
engine power state. 
 
Table 357: Sequencing Rules for Improper Precautionary Landing State 
Improper Precautionary Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not execute a proper precautionary landing. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 




In some accidents, the pilot 
failed to execute a proper 
precautionary landing, which 
was followed by an improper 
flare. 
 
The positions of RPM and/or 
airspeed can be interchanged 
with the position of the 
improper precautionary landing 
state (in accidents where failure 
to maintain RPM or airspeed 
resulted in an improper 
precautionary landing state)  
Improper rotor RPM 
Improper flare 
 
Table 358: Sequencing Rules for Hazardous Powerplant Operation State 
Hazardous Powerplant Operation State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft powerplant parameters are in excess of the specified operational 
limits. 
States that can appear immediately after are Notes 
Loss of engine power This code translates from the 
NTSB subject code that 
suggests operation of aircraft 











APPENDIX D. RULES LINKING HAZARDOUS STATES AND 
TRIGGERS 
Table 359: Triggers into the Intentional/Inadvertent Flight through Poor Weather State 
Intentional/Inadvertent Flight through Poor Weather State 
Hazardous state where the pilot intentionally or inadvertently flew into poor weather conditions 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making These triggers cause the system 
to enter the 
intentional/inadvertent flight 
into poor weather state. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight planning/decision-
making, delayed action) for this 
state can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
Improper weather evaluation 
Improper use of procedures/directives 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Table 360: Triggers into the Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State 
Disoriented/Lacking Awareness State 
Hazardous state where the pilot is lost, disoriented, unable to maintain visual reference/perception 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Time spent in poor weather 
In many cases, the system 
transitions to a disoriented state 
by virtue of the time spent in 
poor weather. I use a time-
bounded trigger to represent the 
system moving into the 
disoriented state. 
 
Table 361: Triggers into the Improper RPM State 
Improper RPM State 
Hazardous state where the main rotor RPM is either too low (or too high) 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of collective can 
trigger an improper RPM state. 
 
Improper use of 
throttle/powerplant controls 
triggers improper RPM only 
when the engine is operational. 
 
In some cases, the pilot failed 
put in the requisite cyclic 
control to maintain rotor RPM. 
Note that in accidents involving 
the LOC state, this trigger can 
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper use of rotorcraft flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 






Improper RPM State 
Hazardous state where the main rotor RPM is either too low (or too high) 
Not possible cause the system to enter the 
LOC state as well. 
 
The NTSB used generic codes 
that translated to improper use 
of rotorcraft flight controls and 
improper use of flight control. 
 
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or cyclic 
can be inferred if there 
was no engine power 
 No action after 
disoriented state can be 
inferred if the 




Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight planning/decision-
making, delayed action) for this 
state can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 
No action after disoriented state 
 
Table 362: Triggers into the Improper Autorotation State 
Improper Autorotation State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain key flight parameters like rotor RPM, descent, 
airspeed, altitude, or flare during autorotation. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of collective Improper use of collective can 
trigger an improper autorotation 
where the pilot failed to 
maintain rotor RPM. 
 
In some cases, the pilot failed 
put in the requisite cyclic 
control to maintain heading, 
descent angle/rate, rotor RPM.  
 
Note that in accidents involving 
the LOC state, this trigger can 
cause the system to enter the 
LOC state as well. 
 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper use of rotorcraft flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 
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Improper Autorotation State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain key flight parameters like rotor RPM, descent, 
airspeed, altitude, or flare during autorotation. 
Improper use of collective (during simulated autorotation) The NTSB used generic codes 
that translated to improper use 
of rotorcraft flight controls and 
improper use of flight control. 
 
 Improper use of 
collective (during 
simulated autorotation) 
can be inferred as long 
as there was no loss of 
engine power and the 
accident sequence 
began with a simulated 
autorotation. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or cyclic 
can be inferred if there 
was no engine power. 
 No action after 
disoriented state can be 
inferred if the 




Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight planning/decision-
making, delayed action) for this 
state can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
No action after disoriented state 
 
Table 363: Triggers into the Vortex Ring State 
Vortex Ring State 
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnut-
shaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of cyclic Improper use of the cyclic can 
cause an unusual attitude for 
helicopter, which may be 
conducive for vortex ring state. 
Improper use of the throttle can 
result in airspeed that is 
conducive to the vortex ring 
state. 
 
Improper use of collective can 
affect the RPM (which, along 
with other parameters) 
triggering a vortex ring state. 
 
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls 
Improper use of collective 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 







Vortex Ring State 
Hazardous state where a rapidly descending helicopter’s main rotor blades are engulfed by a doughnut-
shaped vortex, resulting in a loss of lift. 
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic The NTSB used generic codes 
that translated to improper use 
of rotorcraft flight controls and 
improper use of flight control. 
 
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or cyclic 
can be inferred if there 
was no engine power. 
 No action after 
disoriented state can be 
inferred if the 




Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight planning/decision-
making, delayed action) for this 
state can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
No action after disoriented state 
 
Table 364:  Triggers into the Improper Altitude/Clearance State 
Improper Altitude/Clearance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating too close to the ground, terrain, water, or object. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of cyclic  Improper use of the 
cyclic can cause an 
unusual attitude for 
helicopter, which can 
trigger a loss of 
altitude/clearance.  
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 No action after 
disoriented state can 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 
No action after disoriented state 
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Improper Altitude/Clearance State 
be inferred if the 




Note that some of the 
triggers (e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this 
state can be applied to 




Table 365: Triggers into the Improper Climb State  
Improper Climb State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s climb was incorrect/climb capability was exceeded/climb rate was 
incorrect. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of cyclic To execute a proper climb, 
pilots need to lower the 
collective, control the cyclic to 
maintain attitude, and maintain 
appropriate throttle setting. 
 
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 




Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
 
Improper use of collective 
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
 
Table 366: Triggers into the Improper Distance State  
Improper Distance State 
Hazardous state where the distance from the runway/helipad/landing site is incorrect. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
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Improper Distance State 
Improper use of cyclic In order to maintain proper 
distance from the landing site, 
pilots need to coordinate 
cyclic, collective, and throttle 
input. Failure to use any one of 
them correctly can trigger this 
hazardous state. 
 
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 No action after 
disoriented state can 
be inferred if the 




Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
Improper use of collective 
Improper Use of Throttle/Powerplant Controls 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 
Improper use of Throttle and/or Collective Input 
No action after disoriented state 
 
Table 367: Triggers into the Improper Heading State  
Improper Heading State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of cyclic 
In order to maintain correct 
heading or course, pilots need 
to use collective control or use 
the anti-torque pedals. 
 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 No action after 
disoriented state can 
be inferred if the 
preceding state was 
Improper use tail rotor/anti-torque control 
Improper compensation for winds 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 
Lack of action 
Forgotten/omitted action 






Improper Heading State 
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic “disoriented/lacking 
awareness”. 
 Improper use of anti-
torque control can be 
inferred when the 
improper heading 
state is preceded by 




Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
No action after disoriented state 
Improper use of anti-torque control 
 
Table 368: Triggers into the Improper Airspeed State  
Improper Airspeed State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft airspeed is either too low (or too high). 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls Choosing the correct throttle 
setting, and cyclic control input 
are key to maintaining airspeed 
during forward flight. 
 
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 
No action after disoriented state 
 
Table 369: Triggers into the Improper Descent State  
Improper Descent State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s descent was incorrect/descent rate was incorrect.  
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of collective 
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Improper Descent State 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls In a normal descent, a 
helicopter loses altitude at a 
controlled rate in a controlled 
attitude (FAA. 2016). 
 
To execute a proper a descent, 
the pilot should lower the 
collective to maintain RPM, 
cyclic control for airspeed, and 
anti-torque pedals to maintain 
attitude. Not performing any of 
these actions correctly can 
trigger an improper descent. 
 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
irrespective of the 
state of the engine. 
 If the accident did not 
involve a loss of 
engine power or 
improper RPM state 
(but involved 
improper descent), 
then I inferred the 
improper use of anti-
torque control.  
 No action after 
disoriented state can 
be inferred if the 




Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
 
Improper use of tail rotor/anti-torque 
Improper maneuvering 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
No action after disoriented state 
Improper use of anti-torque control 
 
Table 370: Triggers into the Wake Turbulence state  
Wake turbulence State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft flew through the wake vortices of another aircraft. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
This state occurred when the 
helicopter flew into the wake 
of a preceding aircraft. 
 
Improper maneuvering 
Improper remedial action 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
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Wake turbulence State 
Incorrect sequence of actions Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident.  
Delayed action 





Table 371: Triggers into the Improper Turn/Bank state  
Improper Turn/Bank State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its banking/roll performance during flight. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of cyclic Amount of bank depends on 
cyclic input 
Proper use of anti-torque 
essential during turn. 
 
Both, improper use of 
collective and/or cyclic, and 
improper anti-torque control 
could be inferred. Preference is 
given to anti-torque control if 
the accident involved LTE. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
Improper use of tail rotor/anti-torque control 
Improper compensation for winds 
Improper maneuvering 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
Improper use of anti-torque control 
 
Table 372: Triggers into the Runway Overshoot State  
Runway Overshoot State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft departed the runway surface during takeoff or landing. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper planned approach  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
Improper maneuvering  
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
 
 Table 373: Triggers into the Aircraft Stall/Spin State  
Aircraft Stall/Spin State 
Hazardous state where the lifting surfaces of an aircraft (i.e., wings or rotor blades) exceed a critical 
angle of attack they experience a loss of lift, and enter a stalled state. 
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Aircraft Stall/Spin State 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of collective Improper RPM is one of main 
reasons for blade stall. 
Excessive rotor RPM decay 
can stall all rotor blades and 
render the helicopter 
uncontrollable. 
The pilot can control the RPM 
by collective pitch control, 
proper use of powerplant 
controls (when the engine is 
operational). 
 
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can 
be inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of deicing system 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
Table 374: Triggers into the Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State  
Lack of Visual Lookout/Distracted State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain visual lookout for terrain/other aircraft or was 
distracted. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Disturbance  Time spent in poor 
weather state can 
trigger lack of visual 
lookout/distracted 
state only if the 
accident did not 
mention disoriented 
state. 
 No action after 
disoriented state can 
be inferred if the 




Time spent in poor weather state 
No action after disoriented state 
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Table 375: Triggers into the Exceeding Slope Limitation State  
Exceeding Slope Limitation State 
Hazardous state where the pilot operated the aircraft beyond its design capability in inclined/sloped 
terrain. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Choosing unsuitable terrain for takeoff/landing The pilot must exercise 
extreme caution when 
landing/taking off from 
inclined surfaces. 
 
 Exceeding the slope limitation 
(without appropriate corrective 
action) can transition the 
system to a rollover end state. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of collective 
Improper touchdown 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use collective and/or cyclic 
 
Table 376: Triggers into the Improper Aircraft Weight and Balance State  
Improper Aircraft Weight and Balance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft’s balance is affected due to improper loading or shifting of the center 
of gravity. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper load jettison In some accidents, the pilots 
failed to/improperly jettison the 
load. 
 
In some cases, improper 
preflight planning, or improper 
loading of cargo triggered this 
hazardous state.  
Improper cargo loading/tie-down 
Improper preflight planning 
Table 377: Triggers into the Wheels-up Landing State  
Wheels-up Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot performs a landing without extending the landing gear. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Gear not extended 
The pilot’s failure to extend the 
gear before landing or improper 
use of the landing gear can 
trigger a wheels-up landing. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of landing gear 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 







Table 378: Triggers into the Improper Run-on Landing State  
Improper Run-on Landing State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from forward flight to landing. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of cyclic  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 No/failed remedial 
action after LOC can 
be inferred if LOC was 
the preceding state. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
No/failed remedial action after LOC 
 
Table 379: Triggers into the Low Fuel State  
Low Fuel State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low fuel level. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of powerplant controls These triggers can cause the 
system to enter a low-fuel 
state. Note that a fuel system 
failure (e.g., fuel leak) will 




refueling trigger can be used 
when maintenance/ground 
personnel do not fill the 
correct amount of fuel. In 
this scenario, low oil state 
will be classified as a 
preflight hazardous state. 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Improper use of procedures/directives 
Improper fuel consumption calculation 
Improper refueling  
Improper maintenance 
Improper preflight planning 
 
Table 380: Triggers into the Low Oil State  
Low Oil State 
Hazardous state where the pilot executed an improper flare/level-off prior to landing. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of powerplant controls 
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Low Oil State 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making These triggers can cause the 
system to enter a low-oil 
state. Note that an oil system 
failure (e.g., oil leak) will 
trigger a system failure state. 
 
The improper maintenance 
trigger can be used when 
maintenance/ground 
personnel do not fill the 
correct amount of oil. In this 
scenario, low oil state will be 
classified as a preflight 
hazardous state. 
Improper use of procedures/directives 
Improper maintenance 
Improper preflight planning 
 
Table 381: Triggers into the Low Hydraulic Fluid State  
Low Hydraulic Fluid State 
Hazardous state where the pilot executed an improper flare/level-off prior to landing. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making These triggers can cause the 
system to enter a low hydraulic 
fluid state. Note that an oil 
system failure (e.g., hydraulic 
fluid leak) will trigger a system 
failure state. 
 
The improper maintenance 
trigger can be used when 
maintenance/ground personnel 
do not fill the correct amount of 
hydraulic fluid. In this scenario, 
low hydraulic fluid state will be 
classified as a preflight 
hazardous state. 
Improper maintenance 
Improper preflight planning 
Improper use of procedures/directives  
 
Table 382: Triggers into the Low Coolant State  
Low Coolant State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low coolant level. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making These triggers can cause the 
system to enter a low coolant 
state.  
 
The improper maintenance 
trigger can be used when 
maintenance/ground 
personnel do not fill the 
correct amount of coolant 
liquid. In this scenario, low 
coolant fluid state will be 
classified as a preflight 
hazardous state. 
Improper maintenance 
Improper preflight planning 
Improper use of procedures/directives  
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Table 383: Triggers into the Low Lubricant State  
Low Lubricant State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft was operating with low grease/lubricant level. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making These triggers can cause the 
system to enter a low 
lubricant fluid state. Note 
that a lubricating system 
failure (e.g., lubricating fluid 
leak) will trigger a system 
failure state. 
 
The improper maintenance 
trigger can be used when 
maintenance/ground 
personnel do not fill/apply 
the correct amount of 
lubricant. In this scenario, 
low lubricant fluid state will 
be classified as a preflight 
hazardous state. 
Improper maintenance 
Improper preflight planning 
Improper use of procedures/directives  
 
Table 384: Triggers into the Improper Flare State  
Improper Flare State 
Hazardous state where the pilot executed an improper flare prior to landing. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of collective In preparation for touchdown, 
pilots are instructed to flare the 
aircraft and “cushion” the 
landing. 
 
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 No/failed remedial 
action after LOC can 
be inferred if LOC was 
the preceding state. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
Improper maneuvering 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
No/failed remedial action after LOC 
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Table 385: Triggers into the Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State  
Hazardous Height-Velocity Regime State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operating in the unsafe region of the “Deadman’s curve”. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper maneuvering 
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
 
Table 386: Triggers into the On-ground Poor Weather  
On-ground Poor Weather State 
Hazardous state where the pilot failed to maintain heading/course. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper weather evaluation 
These triggers can cause the 
system to enter an on-ground 
poor weather state. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple 
states in the same accident. 
Improper use of inflight weather information 
Improper use of inflight weather advisories 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Table 387: Triggers into the Improper Vertical Takeoff State  
Improper Vertical Takeoff State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct vertical takeoff. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper maneuvering 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper Vertical Takeoff State 
Unnecessary action Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
 
Table 388: Triggers into the Improper Go-around State  
Improper Go-around State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not perform a correct go-around. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper maneuvering 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use collective and/or cyclic 
 
Table 389: Triggers into the Exceeding Design Stress Limits State  
Exceeding Design Stress Limits State 
Hazardous state where aerodynamic loads on the aircraft exceed the design stress limits. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of collective These triggers can put the 
system in a state where the 
aircraft exceeds its design stress 
limits. 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper maneuvering 
 
Table 390: Triggers into the Improper Translational Lift State  
Improper Translational Lift State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not transition correctly from hover to forward flight. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of flight controls 
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Improper Translational Lift State 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
 
Table 391: Triggers into the Improper Precautionary Landing State  
Improper Precautionary Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot did not execute a proper precautionary landing. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Improper remedial action 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
 
Table 392: Triggers into the Hazardous Powerplant Operation State  
Hazardous Powerplant Operation State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft powerplant parameters are in excess of the specified operational 
limits. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls Improper use of throttle and/or 
collective input can be inferred. 
 
Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
 
Table 393: Triggers into the Near Midair Collision State  
Near Midair Collision State 
Hazardous state where two or more aircraft almost collided with each other during flight. 
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Near Midair Collision State 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
No action after being disoriented  
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Not complying/obtaining ATC instructions 
Improper communication 
Correct traffic advisory not used/obtained 
Correct safety advisory not used/obtained 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Table 394: Triggers into the Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State  
Exceeding Helicopter Hover Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design hover performance. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Improper remedial action 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
 
Table 395: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design takeoff performance. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
These triggers can cause the 
system to enter a state where it 
is being operated beyond its 
takeoff capability.  
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
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Exceeding Aircraft Takeoff Performance State 
Improper remedial action  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred if none of the 
database triggers are 
available, and as long 
as there was no loss of 
engine power. Note 
that a loss of engine 
power can potentially 
occur after exceeding 
take off capability. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident 
 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
 
Table 396: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Landing Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Landing Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft exceeds its design landing performance. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Improper remedial action 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
Improper use collective and/or cyclic  
 
Table 397: Triggers into the Improper Lift-off State  
Improper Lift-off State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft did not lift-off correctly. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
Improper use of cyclic 
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Improper Lift-off State 
Improper use of collective  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
 
Table 398: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State  
Exceeding Aircraft Performance Limits State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of flight controls These triggers can put the 
system in state where it is 
operating beyond its 
performance limits. 
 
I do not use triggers relating to 
collective, cyclic, or throttle 
control as this state (which is 
derived from a generic NTSB) 
code, does not clearly indicate 
an aspect of performance that 
was exceeded (e.g., climb 
performance) 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Improper remedial action 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 






Table 399: Triggers into the Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State  
Improper Operation of Rotorcraft State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design performance capabilities. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of flight controls 
These triggers can put the 
system in state where it is not 
being operated properly. 
 
I do not use triggers relating to 
collective, cyclic, or throttle 
control as this state (which is 
derived from a generic NTSB) 
code, does not clearly indicate 
an aspect of rotorcraft operation 
that was not correct. 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Improper remedial action 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 







Table 400: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State  
Exceeding Aircraft Yaw Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design yaw performance capabilities. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of cyclic In order to maintain yaw 
performance, pilots need to use 
collective control or use the 
anti-torque pedals. 
 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 No action after 
disoriented state can 
be inferred if the 
preceding state was 
“disoriented/lacking 
awareness”. 
 Improper use of anti-
torque control can be 
inferred when the 
improper yaw 
performance state is 




Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use tail rotor/anti-torque control 
Improper compensation for winds 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 
Lack of action 
Forgotten/omitted action 




Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 
No action after disoriented state 
Improper use of anti-torque control 
 
Table 401: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its performance capabilities after the loss of 
engine power. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of collective These triggers can cause the 
system to move to state where it 
has exceeded its performance 
limits when one or more 
engine(s) is/are not operational. 
 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper use of rotorcraft flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Exceeding Aircraft Engine-out Capability State 
Unnecessary action Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Not possible 
Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 
 
Table 402: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Crosswind Performance State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design crosswind performance capabilities. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Not identifying crosswind component These triggers can cause the 
system to move into a state 




 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 No action after 
disoriented state can 
be inferred if the 
preceding state was 
“disoriented/lacking 
awareness”. 
 Improper use of anti-
torque control can be 
inferred if the accident 
involved improper 
heading, LTE, or 
exceeding yaw 
performance. This 
trigger can be assigned 
to multiple states. 
Improper use tail rotor/anti-torque control 
Improper compensation for winds 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 
Lack of action 
Forgotten/omitted action 




Improper use of collective and/or cyclic 
No action after disoriented state 
Improper use of anti-torque control 
 
Table 403: Triggers into the Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State  
Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft is operated beyond its design capabilities for a given configuration. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of flight controls These triggers can put the 
system in state where it is being 
operated beyond its capability 
for the given configuration 
 
I do not use triggers relating to 
collective, cyclic, use of 
landing gear, or throttle control 
as this state (which is derived 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Improper remedial action 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Exceeding Aircraft Configuration Capability State 
Incomplete action from a generic NTSB) code, 
does not clearly indicate the 




Table 404: Triggers into the Improper Power-on Landing State  
Improper Power-on Landing State 
Hazardous state where the pilot performs an improper landing with engine(s) operational. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power (power-




Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 
 
Table 405: Triggers into the Runway Undershoot State  
Runway Undershoot State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed short of the runway. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power  
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if the accident 
involved a loss of 
engine power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 




Table 406: Triggers into the Wheels-down Landing in Water State  
Wheels-down Landing in Water State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed on water with the wheels down. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
These triggers can cause the 
system to enter a wheels-down 
landing in water state. 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Table 407: Triggers into the Wheels-up Landing State  
Wheels-down Landing in Water State 
Hazardous state where the aircraft landed without extending the landing gear. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
These triggers can cause the 
system to land without 
extending landing gear. 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 





Table 408: Triggers into the On-ground Loss of Control State  
On-ground Loss of Control State 
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to maintain control of aircraft heading and attitude when on the 
ground. 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
 Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of collective 
Improper use of cyclic 
Improper use of flight controls 
Improper inflight planning/decision-making 
Improper remedial action 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 








Table 409: Triggers into the Improper Level-off State  
Improper Level-off State 
Hazardous state where the pilot fails to bring the helicopter to a level attitude (usually in preparation for 
a landing). 
Triggers into this state are Notes 
Improper use of collective  Improper use of 
throttle and/or 
collective input can be 
inferred as long as 
there was no loss of 
engine power. 
 Improper use of 
collective and/or 
cyclic can be inferred 
if there was no engine 
power. 
 
Note that some of the triggers 
(e.g., inflight 
planning/decision-making, 
delayed action) for this state 
can be applied to multiple states 
in the same accident. 
Improper use of throttle/powerplant controls 
Improper maneuvering 
Improper remedial action 
Improper use of flight controls 
Incorrect action selected 
Incorrect action performed 
Incorrect sequence of actions 
Delayed action 




Improper use of throttle and/or collective input 







APPENDIX E. DEFINITIONS OF INFORMATION CODES 
Table 410: Information about the Objects that Aircraft Collided with in Accidents 
Information about Terrain 
Information about the nature of terrain that aircraft collided with during accidents. 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
Ground 
These codes are modifiers 
associated with the subject code 
“19200: Terrain” in the pre-
2008 coding system. 
 
  The NTSB used this subject 
code (along with modifiers) to 
provide additional information 
regarding the terrain that the 















































Information about Terrain 





Not specified in NTSB manual 
Short runway/landing area 
Frozen 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
Mountainous/hilly terrain 
Accident recorded under the 
current system used codes in 
the terrain hierarchy, ranging 
from “03020000XX: Terrain-









Table 411: Information about Airport Facilities 
Information about Airport Facilities 
Information about the landing area condition at airports 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
Inadequate 
These code are modifiers 
associated with the subject 
codes ranging from “18500: 




  The NTSB used these subject 
codes (along with modifiers) to 
provide additional information 



















Short runway/landing area 
Mountainous/hilly 





Not specified in NTSB manual 





Information about Airport Facilities 
Information about the landing area condition at airports 
False/incorrect indication 
Not maintained 
Exposed runway lip/edge 
Not operating 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
Airport lighting 
For accidents recorded under 
the current system, I grouped 











Runway/landing area condition 







 Ground support/equipment 
Snow removal service/equipment 
Security 
Table 412: Information about Phase of Flight 
Information about Phase of Flight 
Information about the landing area condition at airports 
NTSB Codes (pre-2008) Notes 
Standing—engine(s) not operating 
These codes provide 
information about the different 
phases of flight in an accident. 
 
These codes remain information 
codes unless they are used in 
the rules to define a hazardous 
state.  
 
Note that in addition to the 
phase of flight code for 
“hover—out of ground effect”, I 
included the subject code 
“24808: Out of ground effect” 






Missed approach (IFR) 
Landing—aborted 
Maneuvering—aerial application 


















Information about Phase of Flight 
Information about the landing area condition at airports 
Approach—VFR pattern—downwind 
Approach—VFR pattern—turn to base 
Approach—VFR pattern—base leg/base to final 
Approach—VFR pattern—final approach 
Approach—Initial approach fix (IAF) to final approach fix 
(FAF)/outer marker (IFR) 






Emergency landing after takeoff 
Emergency descent/landing 
Maneuvering 
Maneuvering—turn to reverse direction 
Maneuvering—turn to landing area (emergency) 
Hover 
Hover—in ground effect 
Other 
Unknown 
NTSB Codes (post-2008) Notes 
Standing 
These codes provide 
information about the different 
phases of flight in an accident. 
 
These codes remain information 
codes unless they are used in 
the rules to define a hazardous 
state. 
















Enroute—Climb to cruise 
Enroute—Cruise 








Approach—IFR Initial Approach 




Information about Phase of Flight 
Information about the landing area condition at airports 
Approach—IFR Missed Approach 
Approach—VFR Pattern Crosswind 
Approach—VFR Pattern Downwind 
Approach—VFR Pattern Base 



























APPENDIX F. OCCURRENCE CHAIN DATA 
Table 413: Permissible Accident Codes (Pre-2008) 
Pre-2008 Meaning 
150 Ditching 




180 Forced landing 
190 Gear collapsed 
191 Main gear collapsed 
192 Nose gear collapsed 
193 Tail gear collapsed 
194 Complete gear collapsed 
195 Other gear collapsed 
198 Gear retraction on ground 
200 Hard landing 
220 In flight collision with object 
230 In flight collision with terrain/water 
231 Wheels down landing in water 
232 Wheels up landing 
270 Midair collision 
271 Collision between aircraft (other than midair) 
290 Nose down 
300 Nose over 
310 On ground/water collision with object 
320 On ground/water collision with terrain/water 
380 Roll over 
400 Undetermined 
 
Table 414: Permissible Accident Codes (Post-2008) 
Post-2008 Meaning 
0 Unknown or undetermined 
91 Tailstrike 
92 Hard landing 
94 Landing gear collapse 
96 Nose over/nose down 




120 Control flight into terrain/object 
160 Explosion (non-impact) 
170 Fire/smoke (post-impact) 
180 Explosion (post-impact) 
200 Ground collision 
231 Dynamic Rollover 
245 Mast bumping 
250 Midair collision 
300 Runway excursion 
441 Ditching 
470 Collision with terrain/object (non-CFIT) 
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